Katrina Webster v. Carlos Del Toro, 49 F.4th 562

Background

Katrina Webster, a Navy secretary, filed a 2017 EEO charge accusing contractor Richard Garland of creating a hostile work environment and initially alleging her supervisor Captain Patrick Croley permitted the harassment.
During the Navy investigation Webster gave a sworn statement naming Garland and disavowing that Croley had permitted the harassment; she speculated Croley might have discussed her prior EEO activity but did not press a claim about disclosure.
The Navy issued a final decision finding Webster failed to prove harassment; the EEOC agreed as to harassment but identified—without Webster having charged it—a separate retaliation-by-disclosure claim (Croley allegedly told Deputy Tarik Yameen of Webster’s prior EEO activity), and remanded for further agency action.
The EEOC’s order also contained a standard “right to file a civil action” statement; Webster, proceeding pro se, sued in district court asserting multiple claims including the retaliation-by-disclosure claim.
The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim; on appeal the only remaining issue was whether Webster could litigate the retaliation-by-disclosure claim without having presented it to the Navy first.
The D.C. Circuit affirmed dismissal on the alternative ground that Webster failed to exhaust the retaliation-by-disclosure claim administratively and modified dismissal to be without prejudice to administrative pursuit.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Webster could pursue a retaliation-by-disclosure claim in court after receiving the EEOC decision or waiting 180 days even though she did not charge that claim with the agency	Receiving a final EEOC decision (or waiting 180 days) satisfied exhaustion and she may sue regardless of whether the specific claim was charged	Section 717(c) requires an initial charge with the employing agency and exhaustion is claim-specific; one exhausted claim doesn't permit litigating an uncharged different claim	Held: No. Exhaustion is claim-by-claim; receiving EEOC action or waiting 180 days for one claim doesn't exhaust a different, uncharged claim
Whether facts uncovered during the Navy’s investigation (e.g., Yameen’s testimony) put the Navy on notice and thus exhausted an uncharged retaliation claim	Investigation revealed Croley disclosed Webster’s EEO history, so the agency had notice and the exhaustion purpose was satisfied	A charge must describe the action(s) forming the basis of the complaint; attachments/clarifications to a charge count, but an investigation cannot convert uncharged claims into exhausted claims	Held: No. Investigation revelations do not substitute for a properly filed charge unless the claim is "like or reasonably related" (not alleged here)
Whether the Navy waived the exhaustion defense by seeking summary affirmance on other grounds	Amicus argued the Navy waived exhaustion by not raising it in its summary-affirmance motion	Navy preserved exhaustion by raising it in district court and in its merits brief on appeal	Held: No waiver; exhaustion defense was preserved and is properly considered

Key Cases Cited

Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820 (1976) (agencies have primary responsibility for resolving federal employment discrimination claims)
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) (discrete discriminatory or retaliatory acts are separate "unlawful employment practices")
Loe v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (filing an initial charge with the employing agency is a prerequisite to court action under § 2000e-16)
Kizas v. Webster, 707 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (an agency complaint is the sine qua non of a federal Title VII civil action by a federal employee)
Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (doctrine allowing claims "like or reasonably related to" charged claims to proceed)
Crawford v. Duke, 867 F.3d 103 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (applying claim-by-claim exhaustion analysis to multiple discrete acts)
Payne v. Salazar, 619 F.3d 56 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (refusing to treat temporally distinct retaliatory acts as exhausted when not charged)