Katiuska Bravo v. Midland Credit Management, Inc
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 2145
7th Cir.2016Background
- Bravo sued Midland under the FDCPA in Jan 2014; the case settled in Mar 2014 with Midland forgiving two debts (GE/Lowe’s and Citibank/Sears).
- After settlement, Midland mailed two nearly identical letters requesting payment for those accounts to Bravo "c/o" her attorney, David J. Philipps; Philipps received and opened but did not forward them to Bravo.
- Bravo alleged violations of FDCPA § 1692c (contacting a represented consumer and continuing collection after a refusal) and § 1692e (false or misleading representations), claiming the letters demanded payment of debts resolved by settlement.
- Midland conceded it was a debt collector and that Bravo was a consumer; the district court dismissed Bravo’s complaint for failure to state a claim.
- On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo, accepting the complaint’s allegations as true but requiring plausible entitlement to relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether sending letters addressed to Bravo at her attorney’s address violated §1692c(a)(2) (communication with a represented consumer) | Bravo: Because letters were addressed to her name, sending them to counsel’s office still communicated with the consumer and violated §1692c(a)(2). | Midland: Addressing mail to a client "c/o" counsel is communication with counsel, not the consumer; §1692c allows communication with lawyers once the collector knows the consumer is represented. | Court: No violation; mail sent "c/o" counsel to attorney’s address is communication with counsel and consistent with Tinsley allowing collectors to communicate with counsel. |
| Whether requesting payment after a debt was discharged in settlement violated §1692c(c) (cease on refusal) | Bravo: Multiple prior cease demands and settlement discharge made continued collection impermissible; collector cannot demand payment after debts were resolved. | Midland: Collectors may communicate with counsel and may not be aware a debt has been resolved until contacting counsel; knowledge of dismissal or settlement cannot be imputed to collectors. | Court: No violation; whether debt was discharged is irrelevant to the collector’s ability to contact counsel, and collectors are not presumed to know file-specific resolutions. |
| Whether the letters violated §1692e as false or misleading statements by implying debts remained owed | Bravo: Letters falsely stated debts remained due and thus would mislead an attorney or consumer. | Midland: A competent attorney would recognize whether debts were settled and would not be deceived by routine collection letters addressed to counsel. | Court: No §1692e violation; standard is whether a competent attorney would be deceived, and here a competent attorney aware of settlement would not be misled. |
| Whether letters violated §1692e(5) by threatening action not legally available (e.g., reporting settled accounts) | Bravo: Statements that the accounts "may still be reported" or demands for payment were improper threats because debts were settled. | Midland: (Argument not fully developed on appeal; district‑court arguments on this point not preserved.) | Court: Arguments on §1692e(5) were waived on appeal because not raised below; appellate court did not reach merits. |
Key Cases Cited
- Tinsley v. Integrity Financial Partners, Inc., 634 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 2011) (§1692c permits debt collectors to communicate with a consumer’s attorney once representation is known)
- Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2004) (creditor knowledge of facts in its own files is not imputed to debt collectors)
- Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding, L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2007) (§1692e analysis uses an objective "competent attorney" standard when communications are directed to counsel)
- Zemmeckis v. Global Credit & Collection Corp., 679 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2012) (reiterating the applicable standards for deceptive or misleading representations under §1692e)