951 F.3d 805
6th Cir.2020Background
- Tchankpa worked for Ascena as a database manager and suffered a disabling left-shoulder injury diagnosed by multiple providers; he sought treatment over several years.
- He requested to work from home three days per week as an accommodation; his supervisor permitted flexible hours and time off for treatment but repeatedly asked for medical documentation linking the restriction to job performance.
- Ascena obtained a medical report (Oct. 2013) indicating Tchankpa could work eight hours a day with intermittent breaks and a 10-pound lifting limit; the report did not state a need to work from home.
- Ascena denied the three-day remote-work request; after tense exchanges and being told he could quit, Tchankpa resigned and then sued under the ADA (failure to accommodate, constructive discharge, and state tort claims).
- The district court granted summary judgment for Ascena on the ADA claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims; the Sixth Circuit AFFIRMED.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure to accommodate | Tchankpa requested working from home 3 days/week to avoid aggravating his injured shoulder. | Ascena needed medical documentation tying the work-from-home request to job limitations; employer permissibly denied the request without such proof and offered alternatives (flexible hours, leave). | Affirmed — plaintiff failed to show the requested accommodation was reasonable/necessary and failed to provide adequate medical support; he resigned before completing the interactive process. |
| Constructive discharge (intent requirement) | Tchankpa contends Ascena’s conduct made working conditions intolerable and invokes Green to eliminate subjective intent requirement. | Ascena says plaintiff invited the district court’s use of the subjective-intent framework and, in any event, conditions were not objectively intolerable or linked to disability. | Affirmed — plaintiff invited the error below; even setting Green aside, conditions were not objectively intolerable and plaintiff failed to show discrimination-linked intolerability; court declines to resolve Green’s full effect. |
| Other ADA theories (retaliation, unlawful medical inquiry, hostile work environment, disparate treatment) | Plaintiff asserts various additional ADA claims on appeal. | Ascena and the court note these theories were not pleaded with necessary factual allegations in the amended complaint. | Affirmed — these claims were not properly pleaded and cannot be raised for the first time on summary judgment or appeal. |
| Standard of review / evidentiary test | Tchankpa argues the district court used McDonnell Douglas (indirect evidence) erroneously. | Ascena and the district court applied the direct-evidence accommodation framework (Kleiber). | Affirmed — district court used the direct evidence test; no reversible error in denial of Rule 59(e). |
Key Cases Cited
- Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2007) (direct-evidence framework for failure-to-accommodate claims)
- Brumley v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 909 F.3d 834 (6th Cir. 2018) (failure-to-accommodate claims involve direct evidence)
- Kennedy v. Superior Printing Co., 215 F.3d 650 (6th Cir. 2000) (employer may request medical documentation and employee must cooperate)
- Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201 F.3d 718 (6th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff bears burden to propose a reasonable accommodation)
- Nance v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 527 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2008) (accommodation must be necessary in light of physical limitations)
- E.E.O.C. v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2015) (on-site attendance is presumptively an essential job function)
- Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099 (6th Cir. 2008) (constructive discharge requires objectively intolerable conditions and employer intent)
- Green v. Brennan, 136 S. Ct. 1769 (2016) (Supreme Court language on constructive discharge and the role of employer intent)
- Jakubowski v. Christ Hosp., Inc., 627 F.3d 195 (6th Cir. 2010) (reasonable accommodation must address obstacle preventing job performance)