Karvo Cos., Inc. v. Dept. of Transp.
2019 Ohio 4556
Ohio Ct. App.2019Background
- Karvo Companies, Inc., a Summit County paving contractor, held an ODOT certificate of qualification permitting bids on ODOT contracts.
- On Sept. 22, 2017 ODOT notified Karvo that its certificate was revoked and a debarment was proposed; a hearing followed.
- On Feb. 5, 2018 the ODOT Director overruled Karvo’s objections, ordered a six-month, nine-day revocation and a debarment (applied retroactively).
- Karvo filed administrative appeals in both Summit and Franklin Counties; ODOT moved to dismiss the Summit appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
- The Summit County Common Pleas Court denied ODOT’s motion, reviewed the Director’s order on the merits, and reversed and remanded; ODOT appealed the jurisdiction ruling to the Ninth District.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Karvo) | Defendant's Argument (ODOT) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ODOT’s certificate of qualification is a "license" under R.C. 119.01(B) | The certificate is a license because it is a certificate that confers the right to bid on ODOT work and permits conduct that otherwise would be prohibited | Not a license: it does not confer the right to do construction generally; contractors can work on non-ODOT projects without it; no criminal penalty for bidding without it | Certificate of qualification is a "license" within R.C. 119.01(B) |
| Whether revocation and debarment constitute a licensing adjudication subject to R.C. 119.12(A)(1) (home-county rule) | Revocation and debarment are tied together in statutes/rules and are part of ODOT’s licensing function; appeal proper in licensee’s home-county court | Debarment merely bars future ODOT contracts and is separate from license revocation; thus not a licensing adjudication | Revocation and debarment are part of a single licensing adjudication; appeals lie in the common pleas court of the licensee’s residence/place of business (Summit) |
| Whether ODOT’s asserted R.C. 119.09 procedural defects rendered the Director’s order nonfinal and deprived the Summit court of jurisdiction; and whether ODOT preserved that argument | Order was not strictly R.C. 119.09-compliant so appeal period/venue rules were not triggered; noncompliance defeats jurisdiction and is non-waivable | Any R.C. 119.09 defect challenges the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction and was not raised below, so it is forfeited (not subject-matter) | The court held procedural noncompliance does not strip subject-matter jurisdiction; ODOT failed to raise the R.C. 119.09 objection in the trial court and thus forfeited the argument on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Bloomfield v. State, 86 Ohio St. 253 (1912) (license defined as permission to do what otherwise would be disallowed)
- Home S. & L. Assn. v. Boesch, 41 Ohio St.2d 115 (1975) (Ohio Supreme Court definition of "license" as permission to do an act otherwise illegal)
- State v. Hipp, 38 Ohio St. 199 (definitional authority for "license")
- Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81 (2004) (distinguishing subject-matter jurisdiction from jurisdiction over a particular case)
- Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75 (2014) (definition of subject-matter jurisdiction)
- Hughes v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 114 Ohio St.3d 47 (2007) (R.C. 119.09 strict-compliance rule starts appeal period but does not itself render an order nonfinal for subject-matter jurisdiction purposes)
- Groveport Madison Loc. Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 137 Ohio St.3d 266 (2013) (source on scope of common pleas court review of administrative actions)
- Asphalt Specialist, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 53 Ohio App.3d 45 (10th Dist. 1988) (treating ODOT certificate of qualification as within ODOT’s licensing authority)
- Abt v. Ohio Expositions Comm., 110 Ohio App.3d 696 (10th Dist. 1996) (common pleas jurisdiction to review administrative proceedings)