Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139

Background

Plaintiffs are a certified class of ~714 individuals civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) under Minn. Stat. § 253D; they challenged the statute and MSOP practices under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
MSOP operates secure facilities in Moose Lake and St. Peter and a small Community Preparation Services (CPS) unit; since 1994 no resident has been fully discharged and releases are extremely rare.
The MSOP program is a three‑phase, indeterminate treatment model with slow progression, inconsistent scoring (Goal Matrix), staffing shortages, and virtually no linkage between treatment phase completion and discharge.
The statutory and administrative process for reduction in custody is centralized (SRB → SCAP), slow, and practically requires MSOP support; MSOP rarely petitions on behalf of residents and provides limited discharge planning.
MSOP/State do not perform regular, periodic, independent risk assessments for committed persons absent petitions; risk tools used (Static‑99R, Stable‑2007) have limits and assessors lacked consistent legal training.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Facial constitutionality of § 253D under substantive due process	§ 253D is not narrowly tailored: no periodic risk reviews, no bypass, discharge harder than commitment, burden shifts to detainee, no available less‑restrictive placements, and no state duty to petition.	§ 253D is civil and remedial; existing processes (statutory SRB/SCAP and habeas) are adequate; program not punitive.	§ 253D is facially unconstitutional; fails strict scrutiny for multiple independent reasons.
As‑applied constitutionality of § 253D and MSOP practices	MSOP applies § 253D in punitive fashion: no periodic risk assessments, misapplied legal standards, confinement past treatment benefit, dysfunctional discharge process, and lack of less‑restrictive options.	Defendants point to some reforms and discretionary practices (rolling assessments) and claim safety/administrative constraints.	§ 253D is unconstitutional as applied; MSOP practices cause indefinite, punitive confinement beyond constitutional limits.
Standard of review (due process)	Fundamental liberty interest in freedom from physical restraint requires strict scrutiny.	Defendants argued alternate standards (e.g., shocks‑the‑conscience) might apply.	Strict scrutiny applies to substantive due process claim.
Burden of proof for continued confinement	State must bear burden to justify continued confinement; statutory scheme impermissibly shifts burden to detainee to show eligibility for less‑restrictive placement or release.	State relies on statutory allocation and procedural safeguards.	Court holds burden must remain with state; statute impermissibly shifts burden.
Adequacy of petitioning/judicial bypass	Statutory SRB/SCAP process and habeas are inadequate and too slow; no effective bypass to timely challenge continued commitment.	State argues existing remedies and processes suffice and habeas available.	Court finds lack of judicial bypass renders statute not narrowly tailored.
Relationship of treatment to discharge	Treatment phases and scoring do not provide a viable path to discharge; program changes, regressions, and no end point produce de facto life confinement.	State asserts treatment exists and is aimed at reintegration.	Court finds treatment bears no meaningful relation to timely discharge; contributes to punitive effect.

Key Cases Cited

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (civil commitment statute invalid if punitive in purpose or effect)
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (commitment cannot continue once basis for confinement no longer exists)
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (due process required for civil commitment; significant liberty deprivation)
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (civil confinement is a massive curtailment of liberty)
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (substantive due process standards; substantive component bars arbitrary government action)
Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1995) (continued confinement constitutional only while need for inpatient treatment and danger to public persist)
In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171 (Minn. 1996) (program duration representations relevant to remedial vs punitive characterization)
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996) (heightened protection where fundamental liberty interests implicated)
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (commitment constitutes significant deprivation requiring due process)
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (strict scrutiny where law infringes fundamental liberty)
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (substantive due process bars certain arbitrary government actions)