Matter of Linehan

gerousness support the in his or rebuts a new determina- commitment under condition evidence, contrary statute. In the absence of facility. treatment To allow Line- tion of the opposing properly we find the district court found han to reoffer all evidence commit- ment, including dangerousness initial sufficient evidence of both in that heard Fox, testimony hearing, estimation of Drs. Gratzer and would the state’s county’s of time and Linehan’s failure to contest the “an enormous waste resources.” changed assertion that his condition had not However, agree. because of We hearing. initial since the commitment stake, significant liberty we are interests Affirmed. judicata hesitant to confer res status on initial and believe the commitment order BLATZ, J., part took no in the must retain the discretion to district court consideration or decision of the case. consider other evidence which is new and helpful. We therefore hold that evidence JANOVICH, (concurring TOML Justice hearing properly considered at the review specially). (1) statutorily required treat limited to: II, disagreed Because I with I Linehan (2) report; changes ment evidence of in the hearing. would not have reached the review patient’s condition since the initial commit law, recognize I II that Linehan is the hearing; and such other ment evidence agree majority scope with the as to the in the discretion enhances district court’s hearing. review I Therefore concur patient its assessment of whether the con opinion. statutory tinues to meet criteria for commit subds. ment. See id. 2-3. PAGE, (concurring specially). Justice reject Accordingly, ar we Linehan’s join in special I concurrence of Justice gument improperly district Tomljanovich. limited its consideration of the evidence. First, Linehan does not assert his condi changed since initial

tion has his commit Second,

ment. because the substance of Dr. accuracy clinical

Meehl’s attack on the

predictions change on a in Line- did bear condition, previously

han’s and was consid hearing,3 during

ered the initial commitment testimony proceeding in this was his neither In re the Matter of Dennis helpful. Consequently, new nor the district Darol LINEHAN. declining court was within its discretion No. C1-95-2022. testimony. credit the of Minnesota.

Linehan’s final contention is that the county proving burden of failed to meet its Dec. highly likely that Linehan is to reoffend. He testimоny argument on Dr. Meehl’s bases inaccuracy

regarding potential of clini predictions

cians’ of future behavior. Dr. testimony of

Meehl’s evidence hearing. Be

fered the review the district court

cause we conclude Dr.

properly declined to credit Meehl’s testi

mony, reject argument we now Linehan’s evidence of dan-

that there was insufficient essentially theory guments with different assumed base rates of 3. Dr. Meehl offered same II, at 324 presented at the recidivism. See Linehan as was Dr. R. Owen Nelson although they hearing, their ar- n. 2. initial illustrated Nudell, Minneapolis,

Lisbeth J. Michael F. Cromett, Paul, Janus, St. Eric S. Minne- apolis, appellant. (Kathleen Milner,

Daniel Homstad of coun- sel, Union), Minnesota Liberties Minne- Civil apolis, for amicus curiae. Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney,

Susan Lystig, Ramsey Mark Nathan Assistant Paul, County Attorney, respondent St. Ramsey County. III, Humphrey, Attorney

Hubert H. Gen- eral, Kirwin, Attorney John L. Assistant Paul, General, respondent St. State. OPINION KEITH, Chief Justice.

Appellant Dennis Darol Linehan was civil ly Sexually Dangerous committed under the 27, July age Persons Act on 1995 at the of 54 spending after most of his life the criminal justice system for sex-related crimes. See 31, 1994, 1, August Act of ch. art. 1995 (1994 session), special Minn. Laws first part in relevant at Minn.Stat. codified 253B.02, (1994) (SDP 18b, §§ 253B.185 Act). The district court concluded application of the Act to Linehan was consti (1) tutional and found that: Linehan had engaged in a of harmful course sexual con (2) duct; Linehan suffers from an antisocial (APD); and, result, personality disorder as a (3) “highly probable” it is that Linehan will engage in harmful sexual conduct in the fu appeals ture. The court of affirmed Line- Linehan, han’s initial commitment. In re (Line (Minn.App.1996) 544 N.W.2d II). han

Linehan contends that the commitment vi- rights olates his constitutional to substantive equal protection under the Constitutions, Minnesota and United States rights against post and his ex facto laws jeopardy double under the United States (PP Act). argues that if the Linehan also Commitment See Minn.Stat. Constitution. (current (1992) constitutional, §§ then the dis- 526.09-.10 version at commitment is (1994)). clearly finding erred in that it is Minn.Stat. subd. 18a trict court However, engage in PP Act highly probable that he will harm- Linehan’s commitment was 30,1994. vacated ful sexual conduct the future and that this on June re (Minn.1994) Linehan, probability past of his is a result conduct (.Linehan I). Ramsey County dispute his APD. Linehan that he We held that does engaged prove convincing has APD or that he once in a course failed to clear and evi Rather, utterly of harmful sexual conduct. he chal- dence that Linehan was unable to predic- impulses. lenges the district court’s mеthod of control his sexual Id. The “utter specificity findings. inability” proof tion and the of the court’s element of under the PP Act was established when the statute was nar We conclude that Linehan’s initial commit- rowed State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate rights, ment did not violate his constitutional 545, 555, Ramsey County, Minn. clearly nor did the district court err in evalu- (upholding 287 N.W. the stat evidence; therefore, ating the we affirm. challenge), against, alia, vagueness ute inter 270, 277, 'd, aff I. 84 L.Ed. History Facts and Procedural August On after the reversal sexually physically and Linehan was PP discharge Act commitment and his began abused as a child and he a record of MSH, paroled Linehan was to Resi- 1956, In at sexual misconduct his teens. grounds dence 4 on the of the Stillwater 15, age pulled Linehan down the shorts of a facility. correctional Residence 4 was con- 4-year-old girl and was sent to reform halfway Linehan verted to house for be- 19, age school. In at he had inter- facility accept him. At cause no other would 13-year-old girl. In course with house, halfway Linehan was under “in- engaged peeping. Linehan Later window supervised tensive release.” Residence 4 raped year, he and a friend L.H. On (of equipped phone taps which Li- was 10, 1965, peeping, June after window Line- notified) nehan and hidden video surveil- was sexually attempting han while to killed B.I. subject to lance cameras. Linehan was also being assault her. Before arrested for B.I.’s drug testing. Linehan continued his treat- death, sex- Linehan committed two additional ment as a sex offender Residence He including rape July ual of 1965. assaults — —in began participating outpatient in the Atlantis guilty kidnapping B.I. pleaded Linehan to program completing sex offender after charges him against and the murder were Program inpatient Transitional Offender Sex dropped. He was sentenced to maximum (TSOP). group therapy Atlantis conducted years began serving and time at term of 40 4 for Linehan and oth- sessions Residence Facility in the Minnesota Correctional Still- er sex offenders. expires on Au- water. Linehan’s sentence Legislature August the Minnesota On 21,1997. gust special and amended the civil met session mini- escaped from Linehan Stillwater’s “sexually dan- commitment statute to include security facility mum on June 31, 1994, pеrsons.” August ch. gerous Act of days 12-year-old T.L. later he assaulted 1,1995 Minn. Laws at 5-9. A “sexual- art. Michigan road. in a ditch off the side of engaged in a ly dangerous person” has with intent to He was convicted of assault conduct; course of harmful sexual suffers impris- commit criminal sexual conduct sexual, personality, or other mental from a Michigan. oned in Linehan was returned result, and, dysfunction; disorder or prison years later. He remained Stillwater likely engage in and harmful sexu- serious years. of the next 12 for most Stillwater in the future. Minn.Stat. al conduct 18b(a) (1994). 7a, 253B.02, 30, 1992, § com subds. Com- December

On require Act not Security Hospital mitment under the SDP does to the Minnesota mitted (MSH) proposed patient Personality proof that the is unable Psychopathic under n impulses.

control his or her sexual Id. rate statistics and five multi-factor violence 18b(b). .2, September prediction On checklists derived from various respondent Ramsey County petitioned for studies.

Linehan’s commitment under the SDP Act. Douglas Dr. Fox also testified favor of Although commitment. he did not examine The district court denied Linehan’s motion Linehan, Dr. Fox concluded from written petition as-applied dismiss the based on records that Linehan meets the criteria for challenges, constitutional and the court of (not APD, paraphilia specified), otherwise al II, appeals later affirmed. Linehan dependence (by history), voyeurism cohol N.W.2d at 317-19. Both courts concluded (by history) according Psy to the American that APD is a mental disorder that the state Diagnostic chiatric Association’s and Statis may trigger use to civil commitment of dan- (4th tical Manual Mental Disorders ed. gerous persons; had ade- 1994) (DSM-IV). acknowledged, Dr. Fox quate applying reasons for civil commitment however, ill,” “mentally that Linehan is not sexually dangerous persons with APD but as he understood the term. Dr. Fox relied not to those without a mental disorder or primarily on DOJ base rates for rearrests dysfunction; purpose and effect and the factors in Linehan 518 N.W.2d at treatment, punishment. 614, to dangerous. conclude that Linehan is appeals correctly placed persuasion regarding burden of on the state experts disagreed Linehan’s with these equal pro- substantive due conclusions. Dr. Austin John interviewed Li- challenges. tection In re hearing nehan for the and concluded that (Minn.1994); N.W.2d Skeen APD appropriate is not an diagnosis, al- State, (Minn.1993). v. though in 1992 he had concluded otherwise. partly age Based on Linehan’s and the re- opinion, interpreted its district court “psychopathy sults of a checklist” also used require proof “high- the SDP Act to that it is by Millard, Dr. Dr. Austin concluded ly probable” proposed patient will likelihood of reoffense is low. future, sexually harm in the others even though “likely” the statute refers to future Dr. Hulsing, treating Darel psy- Linehan’s 18b(a)(3). 253B.02, harm. Minn.Stat. subd. commitment, during chiatrist PP his Act con- convincing The court relied on the clear and cluded 1992that Linehan was not commitments, evidence standard for such ill, mentally disordered, incompetent, and concerns, and the seriousness of impulse did not suffer from control disorder. proceedings. appeals The court of Hulsing diagnosed Linehan with APD in agreed interpreta- with the district court’s 1992, but at the hearing SDP commitment tion, predic- and described the standard for Hulsing testified that he had intended a II, “highly likely.” tion 544 “softer” conclusion than implied. the label N.W.2d. at 313-14. Hulsing Dr. acknowledged that APD diag- an may partly nosis thought-based rest on crite- Much of initial hearing commitment ria, empathy, such as a lack of and is not expert testimony.1 was devoted to After restricted physical to evidence of outward hearing personnel from Stillwater and three behavior. victims, county’s of Linehan’s case fo- expert cused on two witnesses. Dr. Michael Linehan also called Professor Herb Hutch- ins, critic, Millard testified that Linehan expert suffers from a DSM and to discredit (in remission), dependence alcohol impulse defining supposed DSM’s method of mental disorder, control APD. He also conclud- disorders terms of characteristics that are very likely reoffend, ed that largely Linehan is diagnostic behavioral. DSM offers (DOJ) checklists, Department based on of Justice base explain but it does not the under- significant portion hearing A January of the was also time-limited visit on 1995. There was occupied by videotape consideration of a of Line- testimony that the same behavior occurred masturbating upstairs han twice in the before, bathroom day videotape pre- but a was not physical play of Residence soon after with his served. stepdaughter. place during The conduct took pattern at 645. This must hood.” DSM-IV lying purported cause of the disorders by of at least three dysfunctions. testified indicated satisfaction Dr. Kutchins also predictions diagnostic cannot criteria.4 Id. at 649-50. of individual behavior of seven county’s diagnoses. agreed be made with the from DSM-based The district court that Linehan has APD experts and concluded accuracy Linehan then attacked the on five of the seven criteria: based county’s prediction by evidence ex- used (1) to conform to social norms of Failure Nelson, perts. psy- R. a clinical Dr. Owen behavior, by past demonstrated his lawful chologist, “clinical” testified that multi-factor conduct; course of harmful sexual predictions experi- on an examiner’s based (2) Deceitfulness, judgment generally ence accu- Linehan’s var- less shown death; testimony predictions rate than “actuarial” founded on of B.I.’s his ious versions Dr. Nelson regarding well-tailored base rate statistics. the seriousness of his attack on T.L., used a rate of to illustrate that even base 8% which conflicted with the victim’s tes- prediction dangerous- an actuarial future timony; Linehan’s statement to Dr. Mil- produce positive.”2 ness will often a “false longer lard that he no masturbated when otherwise; and Line- the evidence showed days testimony, After district prison violation of North Dakota han’s issued initial commitment order. in- by selling merchandise to other rules MSH, Linehan was or to a committed charging (“conning mates and interest oth- facility designated by treatment the Commis- 650); personal profit,” ers for Id. Services, 60-day sioner of Human for a treat- (3) Irritability aggressiveness, ex- 253B.18, §§ ment evaluation. See Minn.Stat. he pressed his attacks on women when 1. The court subds. custody, shouting was out of and in at and convincing that Li- found clear and evidence (1) irritability other toward staff at MSH and engaged nehan in a course of harmful (2) 4; conduct, Residence and manifests an Axis II diagnosis personality disorder.3 (4) of antisocial disregard Consistent reckless for the (1) (2), the court As a result of both others, safety of self or also demonstrated highly probable Li- that it is concluded past of harmful sexual con- course engage in con- nehan would harmful sexual duсt; and future. duct remorse, Lack of based on Linehan’s display regret unconvincing at the hear- DSM-IV describes the “essential feature” ing; August telephone perva- Linehan’s con- personality disorder as “a of antisocial for, of, during versation with his wife which Line- pattern disregard and violation sive got” han T.L. what rights begins others that in childhood said that “deserved she of early putting position; into adult- for in such a and adolescence and continues herself 2.Testimony regarding predictions plained predicts statistical fo- that if one from a base rate of 8%, prediction accuracy and if num- from the United States De- 75%—a cused on base rates expert attempts he ber considered mean for partment Justice. Those statistics indicated of predicting predic- at violence—then of all 79% among prisoners released in 1983 whose wrong. tions of will be future violence at the time of release was most serious offense rape rape, within 3 were rearrested for 7.7% generally 3. "Axis I" disorders include mental years their release. Bureau Justice Statis- of of disorders, illnesses and sexual while "Axis II” Justice, tics, Dep't Recidivism Prisoners U.S. of of personality personality lists Both dis- disorders. (1989) [hereinafter at 6 DOJ Released in orders and sexual disorders are subsets of "men- (table 9). Report ] Recidivism tal disorders.” DSM-IV at xxi-xxii. See if the historical evi- testified that Dr. Nelson among particular is low dence of recidivism requires 4. APD also a “conduct disorder” before rate”), (the population "base and if one assumes Otherwise, age 15. DSM-IV at 646. DSM-IV (“accuracy” predictions are accurate that not all parameters does not time set behavior 100%), the number of inaccurate than then less diagnosing used in APD. of Present exhibition conduct for those future violent predictions satisfying apparently behavior APD criteria is population necessaxy diagnosis fit the characteristics persist: who Dr. not Hulsing APD, ("false high compared positives") will be when testified that if a has ("false person's thinking personality conduct predictions of future violent and en- all condition dures, person's changes. positives”). Dr. Nelson ex- even if the behavior plus “true positives” recognize failure to that he has eluded that the statistical evidеnce was not

Linehan’s misery dispositive. than 12 caused more hours of The court noted several reasons others, during believing he claimed an interview for the 7.7% rearrest rate for ra pists survey in with Dr. Millard. the DOJ was not sound base First, rapes rate Linehan’s case. commit The court did not rest its conclusion on the years ted 4 or more after release were not remaining impulsivity criteria: or failure to survey. included in the Recidivism DOJ plan, irresponsibility. and consistent (table 9). Second, at not all Report, finding very likely In that Linehan would rapes reported rapists are and not all are conduct, repeat a course of harmful sexual See, e.g., arrested. Bureau Justice Statis analysis. court used a multi-factor district tics, Justice, Dep’t Criminal Victim First, the court considered all six factors for States, 1992, at ization the United predicting dangerousness outlined Line- (table 5). Third, figure the 7.7% included (listing demograph- han 518 N.W.2d at 614 rape, rearrest for and therefore did not ics; behavior; history of violent rate base include for other crimes rearrest statistics; stress; similarity sources of included in the definition of “harmful sexual present past; and future contexts to the 7a; conduct.” Minn.Stat. therapy). record of Linehan turned 54 sex (table 9). Report, see DOJ Recidivism 15, 1995, years April on which the court old Finally, the court conceded that Linehan’s See, weighed e.g., believed in his favor. rearrested, age group likely was less to be 648; Report at DSM-IV at DOJ Recidivism emphasized likely but that rearrest was more (table 7). However, Linehan attacked T.L. longer for those with records and for those mid-thirties, Dr. while he was Fox younger age. first arrested at a See DOJ prone testified that child molesters are less (tables 11, 14, Report, Recidivism age to moderate their behavior with than are 15,16,18). history other criminals. Linehan’s of violent him, addition, weighed against weighed conduct and the court the district court oth- length discounted the of time since his last er factors it believed were sound indicators opportunity criminal act his lack of of future conduct. The court concluded that custody. upon young girls,5 reoffend while Stress re- Linehan was still attracted to potentially problematic recently displayed impulsiveness,6 lease seemed to the deceit- court, fulness, remorse, although the aggressiveness. court noted evidence of lack of ability APD, cope helpful Finally, and of a Linehan’s the court considered Linehan’s support completed structure. disorder that is characterized an endur- dependency program ing pattern Atlantis chemical of behavior. the court stated that a noncustodial but balance, record, past On Linehan’s current many opportunities environment would offer behavior, sufficiently APD outweighed young to attack Linehan also com- women. against the evidence commitment as a sexual- TSOP, pleted participate in but he does not ly dangerous person. appeals The court of Anonymous en-

Alcoholics and he refused to II, affirmed. Linehan 313-16. program ter an offender treatment at MSH February 60-day On after a treat- during PP Act commitment. Possible ment a hearing evaluation and review re- troubling future alcohol use was to the court Act, quired by the the district court a ‍​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​‍issued light pattern in of Linehan’s of alcohol-relat- final commitment order. Pursuant to that ed crimes. order, indeterminately Linehan was commit- Psychopathic

The district court rate ted to to the also considered base MSH and Person- hearing, ality statistics introduced at the but con- Treatment Center in Moose Lake. degree impulsivity 5. The that court found Linehan masturbated in "a of and lack of control in privacy physical stepdaughter play impulses.” after with his appeal connection with sexual On to during court, visits at Residence on December inaccurately asserts that January 1994 and 1995. support there was no evidence to and the district findings regarding court made no "volitional im- 6. The cited court also the masturbation incidents pairment at this time.” appeared to conclude that Linehan to suffer from Otherwise, 253B.18, 253B.185, Act operation of the SDP is §§ subds. Minn.Stat. substantially the PP Act. 1. the same as Both subd.

contain three elements. See substantive Li- Moreover, nehan at 613. II. procedures civil commitment are similar un- Sexually Dangerous The Persons Act der the the PP Act. SDP Act and The Acts, hearing procedure is the same for both Sexually Dangerous The Persons Act cre- generally procedure for and follows the com- eligible ated a of individuals new class mitting mentally dangerous. ill and See civil for treatment.7 The Act commitment 253B.185, § 1. But Minn.Stat. subd. see id. sexually dangerous defines as one (requiring county attorneys to screen and file who: sexually petitions for of dan- the commitment (1) engaged in a course of harmful has gerous persons persons psy- with a sexual or * * *; sexual conduct chopathic personality8). Grounds for com- (2) sexual, personality, or has manifested by mitment must demonstrated clear and be dysfunction; other mental disorder or convincing categories evidence for all three (3) result, engage likely to of as a acts 253B.18, patients. §§ of See id. subd. * * harmful conduct *. sexual 253B.185, patient subd. 1. If the is commit- 18b(a). 253B.02, § pursuant categories, the three Id. subd. ted to of facility the treatment must a treat- submit departure The Act is from the report days ment within 60 of the commit- Personality upheld Act Psychopathic Blod- ment, committing and the court must then First, gett, 510 N.W.2d at 918. commitment 253B.18, §§ hearing. id. hold review See require proof under the SDP does 2, 253B.185, Finally, 1. subd. subd. same inability proposed patient has to procedures discharge and full conditional impulses. control his or her sexual Minn. patients. apply categories to all three 18b(b). 253B.02, Second, § Stat. subd. 7,15, 253B.185, 253B.18, §§ id. subds. subd. conduct SDP Act describes the which patient engaged have before the com- must

mitment, patient likely and in which the

engage III. in the future. “Harmful sexual con- a sub- duct” is sexual conduct “creates Harmful Sexual Conduct Likelihood of physical emo- stantial likelihood of serious or finding 253B.02, requires a § Id. The SDP Act tional harm to another.” 7a(a). “likely” proposed patient engage rebuttably pre- subd. harm is Such the future. harmful sexual Id. certain crim- conduct sumed for conduct described 18b(a)(3). 7a(b) 253B.02, 253B.02, § The evidence (ap- § subd. inal Id. subd. offenses. convincing. Id. must clear plying presumption to criminal sexual 1; 253B.18, 1, 253B.185, §§ subd. through subd. see degrees, fourth conduct the first Texas, murder, Addington v. 425- manslaughter, crimes such as 1804, 1809-13, L.Ed.2d if crimes kidnapping, such were motivat- requires part (holding were that due impulses or ed for civil com convincing clear and evidence pattern included criminal of behavior dangerous). ill and mitment goal). as a sexual conduct 144.12, §§ health threat to others. Minn.Stat. statute also allows com- 7. The civil commitment 144.4172, 144.4171, 1(7), and care subd. 8 the treatment subd. mitment for subd. dangerous chemically dependent (1994 whо Supp.1995). & others, Minn.Stat. themselves 2; mentally retarded and equiva- psychopathic personality” is 8. "Sexual 14; others, 253B.02, § id. subd. themselves mentally personality” under "psychopathic the lent to dangerous mentally ill and to the ill or Commitment Act. to the Civil 1994 amendments 13, 17; 253B.02, § public, subds. and sexual id. 253B.02, 18a; Act of § subd. Au- See Minn.Stat. 253B.02, § personalities, id. subd. psychopathic 1, 5(a), gust sec. 1995 Minn. ch. art. addition, the Commissioner of Health is 18a. In at 8. Laws persons who confine constitute authorized to demonstrated) ordinary that convincing The state believes the mean- be and a clear and “likely” likely ing (say, degree is more than not. Even of evidence standard a 75% of cer- satisfy petitioner if the clear tainty), must process then the demand of due standard, convincing con- evidence state equally the citizen not share the risk of error n underlying fact to deter- tends that Addington holding would be undermined. (a probability) necessarily mined is not relat- partly motivated substantive concerns (the proof degree the burden of of liberty. ed to preservation about the of individual 99,S.Ct. certainty). Addington, See at U.S. Hence, the error that due agree with the conclu- We lower courts’ process prediction seeks to avoid is a false First, sions for two reasons. the best read- conduct, only pre- future harmful not ing of the statute and its concern for accu- diction that is less accurate than the statuto- findings precludes rate factual the state’s ry prescribed by legislature. standard construction. The SDP Act’s demand for process The due clauses of both the federal “likely” implies committing harm courts require and state constitutions that future cannot combine a factual element re- highly likely harmful sexual conduct must be quires only probability 50.1% with an eviden- proposed patient order to commit a under tiary less-than-certainty. standard of Act. SDP 18b(a)(3). § Minn.Stat. We do not believe that the intended to IV. iveaken the standard likelihood the SDP relatively high Act combination with a Due Substantive Process persuasion burden of clear and convinc- —the that, argues applied as to ing evidence standard. The district case, civil commitment under the SDP Act applied heightened persuasion burden of process rights violates substantive due aris proof necessary to each element of under the ing from thе Minnesota and United States Act, by demanding highly likely but future primary Constitutions. Linehan’s contention harm, degree the lower courts established his SDP Act commitment is not nar certainty of overall consistent with stat- rowly drawn to serve the state’s interests ute. criminal because sanctions are available Second, alternative, process and in the and, necessary, punish deter him from if concerns under the state and federal consti- any him for future harmful sexual conduct. legislative tutions constrain discretion to set presently competent He asserts that he is liberty standards of likelihood when trial, impul stand able to control his sexual Const, XIV; stake. amend. Minn. ses, ill, and that he has not been Const, I, § art. 7. “The individual should not acquitted insanity. of a crime on the basis of equally society be asked share Linehan further contends that an antisocial possible injury risk of error when the to the personality disorder is' an insufficient basis significantly greater individual is than for the commitment of persons, possible Addington, to the state.” harm inability and that an utter to control sexual U.S. at 1810. No less is impulses required satisfy order to required by guarantee process in of due tailoring scrutiny. narrow demand of strict Const, our state constitution. See Minn. art. 7; Skeen, 313; 505 N.W.2d at Despite arguments, State v. these Linehan’s Fuller, (Minn.1985). 726-27 commitment under the SDP Act is constitu Unlimited, Transportation applied Linehan, Schulte v. tional. As Cf. Inc., (Minn.1984) narrowly departure is a tailored from the PP (applying Act, notice standards policy under the due which itself is a limited but valid process highly clauses the Minnesota and United of confinement and treatment for dan procedural gerous predators. States Constitutions acknowledge safe- We guard unemployment compensation recip- the constraint of substantive due ients). action, require only legislative If the state were to this area of but we con (the probability dangerousness 10% principled fact to clude that there nois and constitu-

181 liberty deprivation tionally significant distinction between Line- and of the state’s inter- guide determining commitment under the SDP Act and ests as a the extent of han’s predators guarantee. Blodgett, the commitments of other sexual the constitutional 914, Blodgett, (upholding at PP upheld under the PP Act. See 510 510 N.W.2d 918 important against N.W.2d at 914-16. Linehan raises federal and state constitutional challenges); Guminga, at issues and valid concerns a difficult field of 395 N.W.2d 348-49 interests, public liberty process (balancing law. due constitutional Substantive alternatives, policy preventive light the substitution of de- under the state forecloses constitution). justice sys- tention schemes for the criminal tem, judiciary has a constitutional police powers, Under its the state duty to intervene before civil commitment compelling protecting has a interest prosecution

becomes the norm and criminal public Blodgett, from sexual assault. 510 Louisiana, exception. See Foucha v. 504 compel at There N.W.2d is also 71, 82-83, 1780, 1786-87, 112 U.S. S.Ct. ling interest the care and treatment of the (1992). But that is not ease. L.Ed.2d 437 mentally Addington, 441 disordered. Cf. (noting at at U.S. 99 S.Ct. such A. justify an interest as sufficient to civil com

Both the Minnesota and United mitment). Clearly, these two interests are from protect States Constitutions individuals Treating predators intertwined. liberty process deprivations of without due explain dangerous disorders their Const, V, XIV; Minn. law. U.S. amends. ness serves and falls within the state’s inter Const, I, § guarantees art. 7. Both include protecting public est from sexual as components prohibiting substantive “certain sault. 510 N.W.2d at 916 Cf. actions, arbitrary, wrongful government ‘re (“[E]ven problematic, when treatment is procedures gardless of the fairness of the is, safety it often the state’s in the interest ” implement used to them.’ Zinermon v. legitimate compelling. is no less others Burch, 113, 125, 975, 983, U.S. long programmed as civil commitment is So (1990)(citation omitted); 108 L.Ed.2d 100 see review, provide periodic treatment and 344, 346-47, Guminga, State v. 395 N.W.2d process provided.”). due (Minn.1986). physical Freedom from re liberty right is at the core of the straint B. process. protected 504 U.S. We therefore consider whether the SDP 1785-86; Youngberg at 112 S.Ct. at v. narrow, sufficiently applied to a Act is Romeo, 307, 316, S.Ct. APD, person suffering satisfy strict 2458, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 scrutiny. leading United States Su subject right preme case on the of civil Because the fundamental to lib stake, subject dangerous persons is Fou erty is at the SDP Act is commitment for Louisiana, 71, 112 scrutiny persuasion cha v. S.Ct. strict burden (1992), in government. Blodgett, 510 118 L.Ed.2d 437 which the Court rests with the 914; (Wahl, J., process to invalidate id. at 922 dissent invoked substantive due insanity presently sane ing). scrutiny, challenged legis strict the commitment of Under narrowly acquittee suffered from APD. The Lou lation must be tailored to serve who Weston, required mandatory compelling Young interest. v. isiana statute at issue state (W.D.Wash.1995)(inval insanity commitment for ac- F.Supp. and indefinite quittees, and allowed release if the ac- idating a civil commitment statute for antiso Post, quittee prove that he or she was no dangerous persons); cial and State v. could sanity current of the longer dangerous; 197 Wis.2d 73, 112 acquittee was irrelevant. Id. at S.Ct. (upholding a civil commitment statute dangerous per Foucha’s continued commitment disordered and 1781-82. sons). circumstances, solely inability on his to demon In certain we have was based danger posed that he no to himself or recognized that substantive due strate 1787; 83, 112 id. at comparison magnitude of the to others. Id. at allows a 182 J.,

86-87, (O’Connor, 112 at 1788-89 S.Ct. medical rationale for commitment and the concurring). diagnosed patient’s liberty, Foucha was continued loss of but not of- APD, fering but the state conceded that he was no limits to the medical basis for commit- ment). longer “mentally ill” and did not contradict the assertion that APD could not be treated. Other decisions make clear that civil com 75, 80, 82, 1782, 1785-86, Id. at 112 S.Ct. at predators mitment for sexual if is allowed insanity that 1786-87. The Court held ac- necessary treatment the mental abate quittees may only long be committed so as persons danger disorders that make such so mentally patient danger ill and is both Gomez, ous to others. See Call v. 535 1784; 112 ous. Id. at S.Ct. at see also (Minn.1995) (holding N.W.2d that States, 354, 370, 103 v.

Jones United patients may long PP Act be confined so as 3043, 3052-53, (1983); 77 L.Ed.2d 694 S.Ct. treatment, they dangerous and need de Donaldson, v. 574- O’Connor spite longer meeting inability-to-con no 2486, 2493-94, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 commitment); requirement trol for initial Randall, 800, 806-07, State v. 192 Wis.2d (1995) (holding dangerous upheld After the PP insanity acquittees may but sane be confined Act of a commitment convicted sex offender facility long in a mental health so as there is diagnosed Blodgett, with APD In re so). justification doing medical Blod (Minn.1994). Blodgett interpret- N.W.2d 910 gett reality was concerned with the of an permit categories ed Foucha to three least identifiable mental disorder that caused a pursuant police of confinement ato state’s person sexually dangerous. to be See Blod- (1) powers: may convicted criminals be im- gett, 510 N.W.2d at 914-15. The SDP Act’s prisoned purposes of deterrence and ret- application dangerous person suffering to a (2) ribution; mentally ill dangerous and an personality from antisocial disorder does committed; may civilly be and process analy not alter the substantive due pose danger may subject who to others sis. confinement in certain limited narrow cir- cumstances, pretrial such as detention of that, We conclude under the SDP dangerous up- The PP Act criminals. was sufficiently satisfy Act is narrow to strict held either as a ill subset of scrutiny applied as to Linehan. The SDP statutes, dangerous commitment or as an Act purposes serves the same state and in- category additional not mentioned in Foucha. fact, terests as the PP Act. In Act SDP See id. at 914. attempt protect an public by treat- ing predators dangerous sexual even more Although departure Act is a SDP than PP those reached Act—the men- Act, Blodgett the PP distinguishable. is not tally enough disordered who retain control to Linehan, Blodgett Like wait, “plan, delay indulgence of their APD; suffered from the court concluded that presented higher proba- maladies until with a there was a valid mental health basis for II, bility of success.” Linehan Blodgett commitment. The court did note appeals recog- 318. And as the court of psychopathic personality severe nized, requirement the mental disorder dys- form of APD that involves a “volitional Act public serves the state’s interest in grossly impairs judgment function which safety by aiding prediction dangerous- respect behavior with to the sex drive.” Id. ness. Id. Both the PP SDP Act and the However, at 915. the court did assert apply only already engaged if a has inability that an utter to control sexual im- conduct, harmful prob- course of sexual will pulses was the constitutional basis for ably again, do so and suffers from a mental committing Blodgett predators; did explains helps predict disorder process not indicate that substantive due person’s dangerousness. precluded APD milder forms of as the men- attempts distinguish tal health basis for civil commitment. Blodgett See id. Linehan (emphasizing by posing underlying theory that substantive due of substan- process requires applied between the tive due to civil connection commit- Rather, the defendant requires under Minnesota law. argues that Foucha ment. that, act,-he prove at the time of the why is insuf- must explain criminal law the state to Charge, understand the nature of the dangerousness. she could not to address ficient conviction, wrong. that the act was See Minn. heightened penalties for re- act or and 611.026; Jolley, dealing § State v. 508 N.W.2d means of Stat. are “the normal cidivists Rawland, (Minn.1993); 772 State v. 294 persistent criminal conduct.” From Minn. 199 N.W.2d at 1786-87. proposed hermetic seal be- the Nor is Linehan’s proposition, Linehan asserts jus- and criminal satisfy narrow-tailoring ele- tween the civil commitment cannot state proposed systems tice mandated state or federal scrutiny unless the ment of strict protections. our process the criminal law. due Under ease patient is “unreachable” law, person utterly unable to a who is control argu- force to Linehan’s There is some not, impulses sexually others does assault Foucha n application of strict scruti- ment. fact, by that have a defense to criminal of a sane ny to the continued commitment yet person may charges, and still be sound reasons insanity acquittee did demand subject under the PP to civil commitment justice sys- departing from the criminal for 253B.02, 18a(b); § subd. Act. See Minn.Stat. protection. More- public in the name of tem Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914-16. over, process theo- Linehan’s substantive due accept theory cannot Linehan’s without ry might constitutional issues. We avoid difficult Blodgett disrupting Blodgett. the result in every implied a If basis for civil commitment dangerous per- every upheld the commitment of a charges, and if to criminal defense from APD and who lacked precluded civil commit- son who suffered criminal conviction control, serving pris- ment, inquire but who was judiciary might not have to volitional disorder, dys- time, at the of his commitment. on sentence particular mental whether 914-16; function, Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at see acceptable under sub- or illness is Gardebring, F.2d Bailey v. process; the division be- stantive due (8th Cir.1991) (upholding commitment dual systems would be relevant. the two tween confinement), prison The relevant fea- health legislature could create mental commitment, distinguishing Linehan’s case from Blod- ture but then a defense basis for disorders, Likewise, gett’s nature of their mental is the charges would follow. criminal by the criminal charges not that one was “reachable” to criminal health defense mental And, as we the other was not. law and imply a valid basis for commitment. would below, of Linehan’s APD evidence discuss Nevertheless, overlap we believe that some constitutional- dangerousness supplied a justified to ade- systems between two ly for civil commitment. adequate basis public protec- quately serve the interests true, philosophical may It a certain its mer- treatment.9 And whatever tion and blameworthy sense, Blodgett was less its, by our theory is foreclosed Linehan’s Minn, Pearson, Blodgett could not than Linehan because case law. See Blodgett impulses. And control his sexual (stating that an uncontrollable at 303 N.W. by impending may less deterred if the have been a defense to a crime impulse is not Blodgett, Line- But like quali- criminal sanctions. the nature and was aware of defendant mentally han, incompetent nor act, mental was neither a committable ty and that ill, im- Blodgett’s inability to control his necessarily create an excuse malady does not liability. conduct). criminal inability pulses was not a defense to The utter for criminal to the civil commit- The 1994 amendments impulses is one’s mental or sexual control conclusion. Minn. reaffirm this not, se, punishment ment statute to criminal per a defense dangerous persons retarded and preserve would We doubt that the others). theory process A themselves or if forced to bases for commitment the current See, seems un- such civil commitments that threatens parallel criminal defenses. create new and 253B.02, Blodgett, at 914 n. 6 (allowing sound. See § subd. 2 e.g., Minn.Stat. (interpreting a limited fashion to avoid chemically dependent Foucha in commitment for others); accepted bases for civil threats to id. unintended or to themselves commitment). 253B.02, (allowing § subd. 14 commitment (declaring patients that sat- confined as mental Stat. absent some justification so; doing medical psycho- such of the definition of sexual isfaction necessary case the connection between the pathic personality sexually dangerous per- defense). purposes nature and of confinement would be a criminal son does not constitute absent.”). malаdjustments Mere social today, Blodgett reaffirm and therefore We might satisfy state or federal due process theory Linehan’s substantive due concerns, see 510 N.W.2d at unpersuasive. certainly provisions other constitutional government’s ability civilly limit the com- C. See, e.g., mit those whom it fears. U.S. is, se, per Linehan also contends that APD Const, I, (guaranteeing amends. XIV free- an invalid basis for commitment because the speech, religion, equal protection dom of and diagnosis is little more than a definition of laws); 2, 3, §§ of the art. Minn.Const. 16 recognize criminal behavior. We that there (same).10 are constitutional limits to state-created defi- However, substantive due allows nitions of mental in illness the civil commit- legislature flexibility some to define the implied ment context. The grounds medical for civil commitment. See such limits Foucha. Foucha, 1785-86; 504 U.S. at 112 at S.Ct. [T]he State asserts because Foucha 87-89, (O’Connor, id. at 112 at S.Ct. 1789-90 a once committed criminal act and now J., concurring) (discussing importance personality has antisocial that some- vitality judicial of deference state conduct, aggressive times leads to a disor- Jones, legislatures); 463 at 364 n. U.S. der for which there is no effective treat- 103 at (assuring S.Ct. 3050 n. 3053 ment, may indefinitely. he be held This judicial legislatures designing- deference to permit rationale would the State to hold defenses, insanity legislation an area of indefinitely any insanity acquittee other “fraught with medical and scientific uncer- mentally ill who could be shown to (citation omitted)). Addington, tainties” Cf. personality may have a disorder that lead (noting U.S. 99 S.Ct. at 1812 to criminal conduct. The same would importance places diversity federalism on criminal, true of convicted even procedure the substance and of civil commit- though completed prison he has term. laws). Thus, ment we are hesitant to re- only step away It would also be a legislative judgment strain of medi- areas substituting dangerous- confinements for uncertainty. cal We are bound to enforce which, present system ness for our with requirements process, give of due but we only exceptions narrow and aside from regard identifying permissible confinements for mental ill- medically disorders, recognized mental such ness, incarcerates those who are APD, explain person’s dangerous- beyond proved reasonable doubt to have appropriate ness and that are bases for civil a criminal violated law. commitment and treatment. See Minn.Stat. 82-83, § S.Ct. at 1787 (requiring proper care added); (emphasis treatment, see also id. at adapted best to eliminate the (O’Connor, J., care); concurring) need for continued confinement and (“I Call, acquittees think it clear that (rejecting could not be 535 N.W.2d at 319-20 a dou- opinions idiosyncratic process requires compo- Other indicate that or due nent”); ‍​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​‍a “mental condition Hendricks, constitutionally "unusual” behavior is not suffi- In re Care & Treatment 246, 277, 279-81, restricting liberty. Addington, cient basis for Kan. 912 P.2d MS- at'426-27, 433, (1996) (Larson, L, dissenting) (arguing 99 S.Ct. at for the statute, (emphasizing constitutionality stating risks of confinement of Kansas's but "isolated purposes, instances of unusual conduct. Loss of that "for constitutional ¡8 ‘mental illness’ * * * liberty showing iegai calls for that the individual determination to be made with something suffers from more than is reference serious to some standard that establishes that behavior.”); by idiosyncratic demonstrated see suffers a condition that is an ailment Post, mind, 'idiosyncratic also 197 Wis.2d at 541 N.W.2d at 122 rather than mere be- (upholding predator range general- within a Wisconsin’s sexual commit- havior’ of conduct that is statute, acknowledging ly acceptable.”). ment but that substantive

1«5 jeopardy challenge Again, to the PP Act because well as a ble mental disorder. purposes requirements).

of its treatment explain reasoning does not how his can be applied disturbing without the result Blod- Young Linehan relies on v. Weston for Second, gett. circularity argu- even if the constitutionally proposition that APD is a diagnosis ment is valid after deficient basis for his commitment. personality applied antisocial disorder to Li- Young, a federal district court held that the solely nehan the district court was not Washington’s definitions of mental State unconstitutionally based on his criminal behavior. The “abnormalities” were cir- Washington cular. allowed civil commitment on relied evidence of Linehan’s mental charged APD, convicted of or with a processes finding has em- he violence, from a crime of sexual who suffer phasizing empathy Linehan’s lack of re- abnormality personality mеntal disorder morse. persons likely to commit makes such Moreover, the SDP Act was written offenses. Wash.Rev.Code

violent psychiatrists psychologists the advice of (4) (West 71.09.020(1), Supp.1997). Ann. helpful who believe that DSM-IV offers thought statutory The court bases categorization mental disorders—“clinical- essentially civil commitment were de- ly significant psychological syn- behavioral or behavior, dangerous scriptions of and not * * * * * * pattern[s] currently drome[s] medically recognizable mental See illnesses. behavioral, considered a manifestation of a Young, F.Supp. at 749-50 & nn. 2-3. psychological, biological dysfunction or in the targeted personality The statute “antisocial Granted, individual.” DSM-IV at xxi-xxii. a existing are unamenable to features which diagnosis part of APD is based in on evi- mental treatment illness modalities.” Wash. However, § (providing legisla- purpose Ann. 71.09.010 dence of Rev.Code behavior. findings). tive diagnostic and effect of the criteria in DSM- identify underlying to IV is mental disor- reasoning Young cannot to The be used that der accounts for the behavior. Linehan First, invalidate Linehan’s commitment. adopting Young n belief that substantive due challenge does not now the district court’s conclusion that he has such a disorder. process precludes “circular” definitions of contrary, the absence of evidence to the we mental illness seems inconsistent with this legislature’s accept the and the American opinion Blodgett. ina- court’s The “utter Psychiatric Association’s determination that bility psychopathic per- to control” test for APD is an identifiable mental disorder that might “circular” in the sonalities also be dangerous helps explain that it describes behavior as behavior.11 sense diag- 11. The district court did not conclude that Line- convicted of violent-sexual offenses and er "dysfunction” nosed with APD under DSM-IV criteria. The han has a under SDP Act. offense, required a a language Wisconsin statute violent That is not at issue here. probability and a mental disorder substantial support We draw for our conclusion from oth- that the will commit future acts of sexu- offender upheld er courts that have commitments of dan- al violence because of the disorder. Wis. Stat. gerous persons medically recog- who suffer (West Supp.1995); §§ Ann. 980.01-.02 see also Weston, Young nized mental disorders. Before v. 980.01(2)' (defining § "a id. mental disorder as Washington Supreme upheld Court its sexual congenital acquired affecting the condition against predator pro- statute a substantive due capacity predisposes emotional or volitional challenge. cess In re Personal Restraint of violence”). person engage a to in acts of sexual 59-60, Young, 122 Wash.2d 857 P.2d acknowledged The court that substantive due majority conceded that Fou- The process requires compo- a "mental condition on the basis antiso- cha bars civil commitment applied nent” in civil commitment statutes However, Washington statute behavior. offenders, cial dangerous require- but held that this applied predators to violent sexual with antiso- by a ment was satisfied definition of mental disorder, "recognized personality a mental cial targeted predisposed disorder that those to com- Id., Post, under DSM-III-R. 122 Wash.2d disorder” sexually violent acts. 197 Wis.2d at mit 12; n. at 37 n. 857 P.2d at 1006-07 see 541 N.W.2d at 123-24. id., 122 Wash.2d at 857 P.2d at 1020-21 Minnesota Civil Liberties Union Amicus curiae J., (Johnson, dissenting). (MCLU) Supreme points the Kansas out upheld application recently of that The Wisconsin a simi- Court held applied prison- predator a with a predator statute to lar sexual statute as state's 525-26). reasons, Blodgett we conclude that concluded For these Pearson, Act, Linehan, Act, interpreted that the PP as applied to satisfies the SDP permissibly genuine drew and substantial process. demands of substantive

distinctions that define class of disordered who victim- V. particular PP ize others manner. The Equal Protection predators Act addressed the threat of sexual argu Linehan’s second constitutional Therefore, pose unique danger. Id. who right ment is that the Act violates his SDP heightened scrutiny, scrutiny, not strict is Const, equal protection of the laws. U.S. applicable “genuine to the Act. The SDP Const, XIV; § 2. Ami- amend. Minn. art. Blodgett and substantial” standard used cus curiae MCLU contends that the SDP Act scrutiny a form of intermediate under the impermissibly distinguishes between two Minnesota Constitution. See State v. Rus- (1) sexually dangerous persons: classes sell, (Minn.1991), cited sexual, personality, from a those who suffer 510 N.W.2d at 917. Deference dysfunction, or other mental disorder or due, legislature to the and the statute’s 18b(a)(2), Minn.Stat. genuine and substantial distinctions be must Only not. the first those who do class reasonably achieving connected to the state’s subject civil commitment under the Russell, legitimate purposes. argues Act. the Act fails to MCLU 888-89.13 satisfy scrutiny strict because classifica had sufficient basis to con- may tions are underinclusive: public protection clude that interests many likely are as sex offenders who reasonably treatment would be served reoffend as Linehan do not suffer from men sexually dangerous per- distinction between tal, sexual, personality disorders.12 sons with and without mental disorders. First, analysis. Again, Blodgett legislature ap- controls our has concluded that There, recognized plying that civil commitment civil commitment to we those with mental liberty, helps sexually predators for sexual threatens disorders isolate satisfy height likely therefore such schemes must most to harm others in the scrutiny equal Although already and federal future. ened under state the SDP re- protection principles. Blodgett, quires that harmful See 510 future sexual conduct (departing highly likely, N.W.2d at 917 from the rational must be the existence of a Pearson, basis in 309 U.S. at 274- mental disorder such as APD identifies a standard abnormality” personality dangerous. "mental violated substantive due disorders are not This process. interpreted argument unconvincing Foucha to re- is The court because SDP Act quire application highly "mental illness” before confines some form of com- its to those who are dangerousness permissible. likely sexually mitment dricks, Hen- harm others. Minn.Stat. for 255, 260-61, 18a(a)(3). § 259 Kan. at 912 P.2d at 137-38. Hendricks was ill Because not definition, legislature's under the own the court 13. The United States Court has not scrutiny held that Hendricks’s confinement violated sub- established a level under the federal id., Foucha, process. stantive due See 259 Kan. at constitution in this context. See (plurality P.2d 138. U.S. opinion) (demanding 112 S.Ct. at 1788-89 persuasive light “particularly convincing Hendricics is not our Hendricics, precedent. Blodgett imposing proof Like noted that reason” for a burden of on sane dangerousness insanity acquittees seeking mental illness combined with release that is not merely dangerous); an alternative basis for civil commitment under demanded of the id. at Still, (O’Connor, J., Blodgett, concurring) state law. N.W.2d at 914. 112 S.Ct. at 1789-90 Blodgett (conсluding equal protection analysis upheld Id. at the PP Act commitment. Jones, legislative unnecessary); 914-16. A definition of mental illness 463 U.S. 365 n. part Blodgett in one does S.Ct. at 3050 n. 13. held that the stan- civil commitment statute preclude scrutiny other mental health bases for com- dard of under the state constitution is at reasoning unavailing searching as under the mitment. The MCLU’s least standard Blodgett. Blodgett, after federal N.W.2d at constitution. See Therefore, Blodgett apply we follow heightened scrutiny might 12. MCLU also asserts that the Act be ov- under both the state and many federal constitutions. erinclusive because sex offenders enduring proposed harmful reasonable cause of behavior. connection between a legislature’s judgment regarding patient’s the rela- mental disorder and the state’s in- tionship between mental disorders and dan- public protection terests and treatment. gerousness heightened is sufficient under Therefore, the Act does not violate Linehan’s 917; scrutiny. See 510 N.W.2d at rights equal protection. 87, 112 see also 504 U.S. at S.Ct. at (O’Connor, J., concurring). VI. Second, the state’s interest treat Jeopardy Ex Post Facto and Double ing predators by confining sexual is served MCLU also asserts that the Act and scope of the SDP Act to those with application its to Linehan constitutes en- appears mental disorders. The state to as punishment hanced or additional criminal un- by emphasizing sert this interest the sub Jeopardy der the Ex Post Facto and Double legislature stantial commitment the has made Clauses the United States Constitution. creating adequate facilities and treatment Const, I, 10; V, art. id. amends. XIV. programs for those committed under the PP apply only pre- Both clauses to criminal and and SDP Acts. The state has an obvious dominantly punitive civil laws. Because the treating predators interest for their SDP Act was an to a civil amendment statute they mental harm disorders before others 253B) civil, (chapter facially and thus Line- again. Addington, 441 U.S. at proof’ han must offer the “clearest (discussing parens patriae at 1809-10 sufficiently punitive purpose Act is or ef- powers); Young, In re 122 Wash.2d at negate fect to its civil label. United States v. (“[I]t 857 P.2d at 1000 is irrefutable that the Ward, 242, 248-51, compelling State has interest both treat (1980)(citation 2641-43, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 omit- ing predators prоtecting society sex ted). actions.”). rely exclusively their Rather than enhancing on sentences sex-related ' crimes, opted pro has also A. comprehensive

vide care and treatment Article Section 10 of the feder committed sex offenders at MSH and at laws, prohibits post al constitution ex facto new treatment center in Moose Lake. See punish which include laws that increase the Call, 5; 535 N.W.2d at 318-19 & n. Minneso ment for crimes committed before enact Security Hospital, ta Sex Treat Offender 37, Youngblood, ment. Collins v. 497 U.S. Plan, Program: Sequence ment and Content 2715, 42, 2719, S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 30 1-2, 6. (1990). protection warning The fair ensures sanctions, of criminal and restrains “arbi pro-

The state adds that substantive due trary potentially legislation.” vindictive requires challenged cess the classifications Graham, 24, 29, 101 Weaver v. 450 U.S. by Linehan: civil commitment is not avail- (1981) 964, (explaining 67 L.Ed.2d protecting public a able as tool for unless criminal, post that ex facto laws must be proposed patient is both conduct, disadvantage apply past to suffering from a mental disorder. offender). question whether The initial is 77-78, 112 In 504 U.S. at S.Ct. at 1784. sufficiently punitive pur Act the SDP essence, the state contends that Linehan’s pose or effect. process rights preclude substantive due equal protection analysis. difficulty haveWe MCLU does not address accepting this conclusion. It is far from emphasized which that treat- constitutionally imposed clear that a limita- Call, required, or ment after commitment is legislative a tion on classifications creates 319-20, upheld which a PP 535 N.W.2d compelling justify to those clas- state interest against jeopardy a Act commitment double rights sifications. Constitutional and state challenge. purpose Call concluded concepts. are distinct

interests treatment, preventive PP Act is not

Nevertheless, (assuming argu- id. the SDP Act’s classification detention. See raised). justified by also sufficiently Blodgett and the ment could be Call described

18§ 2(b). 253B.185, § substantial efforts to treat and tion. See Minn.Stat. subd. state’s However, not, by sex offenders. Id. at 318-19 & n. rehabilitate the SDP Act does its statute, terms, require any outstanding 5. the civil commitment all Under criminal patients right “proper have the to receive facility. sentence be served at a correctional treatment, adapted, acсording Moreover, best care and the lower courts in this case did standards, professional contemporary provision not invoke the cited MCLU. rendering custody, further institutionaliza- ultimately Linehan ‍​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​‍was committed to the tion, unnecessary.” or other services Minn. and to the institutions MSH MPPTC. Both 253B.08, 7. Patients are Stat. subd. managed by of Human the Commissioner program plan entitled to written articulat- Services, provide and both must care and duration, ing goals, treatment and measures 246B.02-.04, 253.20-202; §§ treatment. Id. employed, quarterly progress to be Call, 5; Blodgett, 535 N.W.2d at & n. The Act ensures treat- review. Id. SDP (holding that due extent the PP Act. ment to the same system “pro- is satisfied commitment 253B.185, §§ 1. id. grammed provide periodic treatment and review”); Program, Sex Treatment work, Moreover, years Offender after the staff supra, at 8. Security Hospital developed of the Minnesota program four-phase treatment for sex of- MSH, fenders committed and a similar B. program being developed at the Minnesota protection against jeop The double Personality Psychopathic Treatment Center ardy in the Fifth Amendment to federal (MPPTC) in Moose Lake. Sex Offender applies through constitution to the states Program, supra, at 29. Ac- Treatment Fourteenth Amendment. Ma See Benton v. cording to evidence introduced at Linehan’s 784, 794-96, ryland, 395 U.S. 89 S.Ct. hearing, each' initial commitment of the four (1969). 2062-64, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 MCLU as phases approximately will last 8'months for serts that Linehan’s commitment constitutes patients complete pro- who model —those punishment past a second convictions. gram’s therapy requirements, and education prevail, To Linehan must show that the civil satisfy program’s goals, and behave con- (1) (2) “penalty” punishment, imposed was program sistent with Id. at standards. separate proceeding, based on the fact, treatment and rehabilitation are es- proposed patient same offense for which the (“Resi- sential to mission. Id. at MSH’s already placed jeopardy. United treatment.”). right pur- dents have a 435, 438, 440-41, Halper, States v. 490 U.S.

pose and effect of is therefore 1901-03, 1892, 1896, 1897-98, 109 S.Ct. remedial, predominantly punitive. L.Ed.2d 487 This conclusion is in accord with Allen v. above, As Linehan fails to demonstrate Illinois, 92 that his commitment under the SDP Act is (1986). Allen, L.Ed.2d 296 In the held “punishment.” See id. at sexually that confinement and treatment of (explaining at 1901-02 that a civil sanction dangerous persons under the Illinois sexual jeopardy only “may violates double if it not predator statute was civil in nature. Id. at remedial, fairly only be characterized as but 369-75, 106 at 2992-95. The Illinois S.Ct. retribution”). as a deterrent or Call conclud- provided mandatory statute for treatment at ed that the PP Act did not violate double psychiatric facility full care and for dis- jeopardy the because commitment was for charge patient when the that demonstrated purpose the of treatment. Our decision was longer dangerous. he or she was no id. See not affected Call’s incarceration at the 369-70,106 at at 2992-93. Call, of time commitment. See 535 N.W.2d above, requires proce- MCLU notes'that the Act As SDP at 319-20. we noted the prison that a completed sentence be at a dures and treatment after commitment under facility designated by Act the Commissioner of the SDP are identical to those of the PP (us- patient Young, F.Supp. Corrections if the to Act. was committed analysis the peti- ing punitiveness commissioner before the the same for SDP post pur- According facto jeopardy testimony both ex and double eific facts. at the hearing, poses). prediction some research on violence combining indicates that actuarial methods that Linehan has not offered evidence the experience knowledge with the clinician’s and regime treatment or MPPTC is a MSH peculiar of the given circumstances of a case sham, even that such is ineffec- or treatment may accuracy. Moreover, contrary enhance light tive. the record before us in On claim, county’s the experts Linehan’s did Call, in that our conclusion we conclude rely “exclusively not prediction.” on clinical facially punitive is SDP Act civil and is not so Dr. Dr. Millard and Fox both considered purpose trigger in or effect federal base rate statistics. prohibitions against post ex constitutional statutory precedential Linehan no offers jeopardy. facto and double laws support argument for the that actuarial permissi- methods or rates are the base sole VII. fact, prediction. ble In basis for Linehan’s Sufficiency of the Evidence argument contrary to the multi-factor anal- ysis dangerousness prediction for outlined argues Linehan certain that I Linehan 614. Linehan findings clearly of fact were erroneous. On potential inquiries offered six to aid courts appeal, weigh will not we the evidence. We predicting likely harm whether future was if will determine the evidence a whole under the PP Act. Id. These be factors must presents support substantial for the district presented considered such evidence when Noot, court’s conclusions. Johnson v. they at a hearing, particularly impor- (Minn.1982). tant when the last instance of harmful sexual petition conduct time from is remote A. for Id. commitment. Statistical evidence First, Linehan asserts only recidivism is one of the six factors. likely county prove highly failed to future case, properly court this the district followed harm “state of art” or the evidence pertaining Linehan I evaluated evidence knowledge scientific “best available prediction. to each six for It factors methodology.” argues Linehan that “actuar specif- not consider error to evidence not prediction ial” methods of on base founded else, ically I. nothing listed in Linehan If rate recidivism statistics are accurate more hearing case demonstrated that predictions, than “clinical” and therefore prediction dangerousness methodology is dangerousness predictions rely on must complex I and contested. Linehan did base rate noted former.14 statistic good attempts by foreclose faith the courts opinion court 7.7% 3- the district was the important predict- isolate the factors in most year rapist rearrest rate. The dis ing harmful sexual conduct. We conclude weight sever counted that statistic for guidelines dangerousness predic- reasons, convincing already al which we have apply Act, I to the tion Linehan Nevertheless, argues detailed. accept therefore cannot at- we Linehan’s required dangerousness a base rate tempt inquiry. to confine district court’s county the bur prediction, and that the had facts, unpersuaded we are On these if establishing another it be den of statistic Linehan I should modified. lieved 7.7% was too low. B. first thаt the district court’s dan- We note “clinical” gerousness finding purely is not a claims that the district Linehan First, specificity. Line- prediction. opinion findings The district court’s ana- lack case-spe- that lyzed emphasizes base rate han the district court did not both statistics and hearing, According testimony predictions to clinical Actuarial are based on statistics that 14. mathematically age (e.g., predictions are based on the clinician's observa- can be determined offenses), tions, experience, knowledge previous the sub- the number of and on a for- about evaluating partic- significance ject predictions vari- or about individuals mula for such classes, rapists such as or child molesters. ables. ular pattern enduring that APD and the listed in Minn.Stat. conclude identify the crimes high- 253B.02, likely Linehan that Linehan is it can cause makes § subd. 7a behavior sexually in the fu- argue ly likely -that the harm others Linehan seems to commit. “low-level, acts should non-violent” ture. risk of light supposed

not be included only the Act to commit purpose of the SDP C. predators. But what- dangerous sexual most findings challenges factual Linehan also six Act, scope of the purposes of the ever the that underlying conclusion the district court’s sexually Nonviolent but statute is clear. likely sexually harm others if highly he is reach. are included its See harmful acts for treatment. Review- he is not committed general determination Act calls for a id. The error, evi- ing we find sufficient for clear high- seriously conduct is harmful sexual uphold in the record to the court’s dence Therefore, the district ly likely to occur. findings. highly that Linehan was court’s conclusion conduct was ade- likely engage such First, court inferred the district quate. masturbating videotape from the of Linehan play stepdaughter vigorous after with his Second, that the “time hori- Linehan notes young girls. that he was still attracted to in- prediction court’s for the district zon” if Line- permissible inference was even This However, Act does not limit the definite. not group therapist at Residence 4 had han’s addition, period. prediction time attraction on other occasions. noted such specifici- incorporate the factual Act does not opinion Linehan’s The court based its on ty of men- requirements for the commitment departure upstairs to the bathroom sudden retarded, ill, chemically de- tally Second, during visit. there a time-limited 253B.09, subd. pendent persons. id. See adequate that Linehan lacks evidence findings specific and identifica- (requiring tes truthfulness in sexual matters. Linehan that formed the patient’s tion of the conduct tified that he masturbated Residence order). basis for commitment Millard, probably he told Dr. “You won’t but Third, the district Linehan asserts Third, it, I don’t.” as Linehan believe but sufficiently specific make find- court failed to concedes, in the record there was evidence link between the ings regarding the causal past lack remorse for his that he continues to sexually harmful conduct and his likelihood of course of harmful sexual conduct. The court personality disorder. past conduct or his testimony recently said heard that Linehan However, in Linehan I and oth- the factors got,” and that that T.L. “deserved what she appro- court are balanced the district ers accept Linehan still does not has he dangerousness priate under predicting misery caused more than hours of Their consideration satisfies the SDP Act. Fourth, weight the court others. whatever nothing have demanded the statute. We placed irritability and verbal on Linehan’s commitments, and, as noted more in PP Act confinement, aggressiveness during the rec requirements above, specificity the factual supports the conclusion that such inci ord findings were not for other civil commitment Fifth, court used Line- dents occurred. adopted Act. id. in the SDP against age han’s as a factor commitment. 253B.18, 253B.09, §§ subd. subd. Linehan that the evidence deserves believes weight, more but that determination was past sexual that his also asserts largely for the district court and its assess shame, by anger and violence was caused testimony. expert ment of Minn.R.Civ.P. However, anger finding APD. 52.01; Mining Oliver Iron Co. v. Commis prior harm- played a in Linehan’s shame role Taxation, 6, 23-24, 247 Minn. sioner of ful conduct is not inconsistent 107, 118 APD will result finding that Linehan’s Sixth, there was sufficient evidence These two harmful sexual conduct. future presently mutually to conclude that Linehan is not motivating are not exclusive. factors Anony- willing participate Alcoholics evidence to The district court had sufficient It mous. seems thаt the district imply court’s as- relevant not facts does that the clear sertion that Linehan believes he has “licked” and convincing evidence standard was not problem his alcohol phrase properly was based on the applied. Contrary . to Linehan’s as- county Nevertheless, attorney. sertions, of a dangerousness prediction under the transcript of Linehan’s examination with Dr. simply SDP Act is not a matter for statisti- Millard indicates that Linehan believes he cians. See Linehan 518 N.W.2d at 614. can urge control his to drink without external support, although he claimed that if he VIII. thinking drinking” “started about he would Linehan’s commitment under the SDP Act “go back to AA get before let it [he] out of does not rights violate his to substantive due Furthermore, hand.” psychological a 1993 equal protection or of the laws. The

review indicated that longer par- Linehan no Act has not been shown punitive to be so ticipated in Anonymous Alcoholics because post constitutes an ex facto law or violates he does not believe that alcoholism is a dis- prohibition against jeopardy. double Fi- ease. He also said that he relied on self nally, the district clearly court did not err prevent control to returning himself from findings its of fact. alcohol. Affirmed. Finally, Linehan asserts that the ev- identiary standard used the district court BLATZ, J., part took no in the would allow civilly almost criminal to be consideration or decision of the case. disagree. committed. A thorough We re PAGE, JJ., view of the record strength demonstrates the TOMLJANOVICH county’s dissent. case for Linehan’s commit long history ment. Linehan ahas of harmful TOMLJANOVICH, (dissenting). Justice conduct, opportunity and the The case before us illustrates better than public him to harm the years the last 30 judicial most that power is often diffi- escaped was he when mini Stillwater’s * * * cult in its exercise. The fact hard security mum facility. days, Within he that sometimes we must make decisions we committed another sexual assault. Li- Since do not they like. We make them because custody, nehan was returned to he has dis right, right in the sense that the law played persuasive signs less overt but of his Constitution, them, and the as we see com- dangerousness. years, In the last 2 Linehan pel the result. expressed his absence of empa remorse and thy. rеcently displayed Johnson, 397, 420, Linehan 421, 109 a con Texas v. 491 U.S. tinuing young girls; 2533, 2548, attraction to the district 105 L.Ed.2d 342 2-day J., court identified three (Kennedy, concurring). instances over a period masturbating of Linehan within min By affirming the trial court’s civil commit vigorous play utes of stepdaughter. with his ment of Dennis Darol Linehan under the Furthermore, engage Linehan’s failure to (“SDP Sexually Dangerous Person’s Act opportunities treatment and lack of truthful Act”), today this court chooses to make the ness about sexual matters are additional evi easy right, decision. Not because it is dence that his commitment for treatment compelled by because it is the constitutions proper. Minnesota, of either the United States but Dangerousness prediction under the SDP because it is convenient. The United States Act is a difficult task has its affirmation of Pearson case, delegated to district duty “pro courts. asserted that it was this court’s days appellant every district court had to evaluate 20 tect right constitutional he testimony during possesses.” Linehan’s initial commit- State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate hearing. ment The evidence Ramsey County, was voluminous Court complex, against (1940), aff'g but the record 84 L.Ed. 744 (Minn.1939). civilly was sufficient to commit him. Minn. 287 N.W. 297 Likewise, balancing district court’s during careful of all the the state admitted oral ar belief, the medical authorities shared at bar that “it is gument in the case others, that crimes are committed safeguards sex provide courts” to function of the well as a weakness of the will as improper use of civil com because of against the state’s v. ex rel. Pearson constitutionally invalid form of of the intellect.” State as a mitment Ramsey County, 205 Minn. today Yet this court Probate Court preventive detention.1 297, (1939), aff;d, 309 duty uphold appellant’s 287 N.W. its not shirks L.Ed. 744 process as mandated 60 S.Ct. right due U.S. to substantive Court, effectively allowed the state to provide a The statute fails to by the have a civilly persons those found to constitutionally necessary upon check commit the statute liberty. “psychopathic personality,” which appellant’s state’s restriction worse, majority reaches this con defined as: Even entirely upon In re by relying almost clusion any person of such con- existence [T]he (Minn.1994), cert. Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d impul- instability, or of emotionаl ditions — —, denied, behavior, customary or lack of siveness of (1994), eight a case decided L.Ed.2d 86 good judgment, or failure to standards of Act, and passage of the SDP acts, months before consequences of his appreciate the this court found that conditions, six months before as to a combination of such upheld not fit within the statute appellant did person irresponsible for his render such Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609 Blodgett. In re respect to sexual matters and conduct with 1994) denied, (Minn.1994), reh’g (Aug. persons. thereby dangerous to other I). (Linehan upon is the basis And what Act, Psychopathic Personality 1939 Minn. majority reaches this conclusion? which the (codified Laws, Minn. as amended at ch. 369 Dennis Darol Linehan and It is the fear of (1992)). Upon a consti- 526.09-526.10 Stat. might upon do his release. he what vagueness, challenge tutional for imperfectly “was stated that statute reaching issue of the constitutional Before drawn,” “psycho- and therefore redefined process, which itself inval- substantive personality” including only those pathic as Act to the application of SDP idates the persons who: clarify that this important to appellant, it is Psycho- regarding the prior decisions court’s by a habitual course of misconduct sexu- (“PP Personality pathic matters, Commitment lack al have evidenced utter Act”) mandate, majority as the would impulses do power to control their sexual believe, .today’s holding regarding who, result, likely have us to attack or as anything, loss, If this court’s hold- Act. injury, pain inflict or other otherwise Blodgett require us to ings in Pearson and objects on the of their uncontrolled evil Act is unconstitutional conclude that the SDP and uncontrollable desire. appellant. applied to the Minn, Pearson, 287 N.W. at 302 added).2 time, courts (emphasis Since

I. Precedent power to have considered the “utter lack of impulses” to be a neces- control their sexual It in 1939 when all started sary under the recognizing a “need criterion for civil commitment passed PP Act after Pearson, E.g., PP Act. legislation with sex offenders and to deal great the harm become so During argument, Anderson stated: 'At what level does oral Justice 1. commit that it's constitutional to have a civil gu Soviet Union * all with the We’re familiar * * * By * n like this?’ its nature ment statute say peo lag Germany. Let’s and Nazi going require the court to that standard is conduct, dysfunctional ple had antisocial decisions sometimes. make some difficult particular society, wanted to and the state away put them indeterminate confinement. * ** permissible 2. limitation on the reach As further safeguards here that What are the statute, ”[i]t this court said would not be happening prevent in our would that from apply provisions of the statute reasonable to society a statute such as this? under guilty every person of sexual misconduct nor attorney general response, John assistant having strong propensi- even to Kirwin said: Minn, Pearson, You, 287 N.W. at ties.” your I think it is the function honor. 's * s Asking, the courts to draw those lines. 193 (“[W]e constitutionally at 525 must take the statute as the PP Act was S.Ct. consistent “[wjhatever precisely though highest read as the court with expla- Foucha because the I, it.”); label, interpreted ‘psychopathic has the personality’ of the Linehan nation or State (stating “testimony at 613 that is an identifiable documentable violent * * * support finding sexually fails to the trial condition court’s deviant or disorder.” Id. words, appellant that exhibits an of con- at In utter lack 915. other this court held that impulses”); required by trol over his sexual see also the criteria prove Pearson to (in- “psychopathic sufficiently personality” Minn.Stat. subd. 18a were corporating power required the “utter lack of to con- similar criteria to those under Fou- (“The impulses” language prove trol the PP into cha to mental illness. Id. Act). problem what is not medical label fits best criteria, statutory the but whether these cri- significant in The next case which this may, constitutionally, teria warrant civil com- constitutionality the court considered mitment.”) was essential What to this time, Blodgett, only PP In re Act was the this Blodgett, court’s in holding and what the question was whether the as inter- statute majority fails to today recognize, is that the preted light in Pearson of remained valid in prove appellant criteria that the used to Supreme holding the Court’s in Foucha v. Blodgett fit the within restraints of Foucha Louisiana, 504 U.S. S.Ct. necessarily finding the Blodgett included that (1992). Blodgett, at L.Ed.2d an impulse danger- had uncontrollable sexual Foucha, 914. In held (in words, ous to other a psychopathic others that Louisiana could not to hold a continue (“[Ojur personality). at 915 Id. presently insanity acquittee sane without vio- provided has ‘psycho- for commitment of the lating right liberty. his fundamental to Fou- who, pathic personality’ because of an uncon- cha, S.Ct. at 1784^87. impulse, dangerous trollable sexual to particularly, More that a Court ruled public.”). Although majority today would constitutionally an deprive state could indi- Blodgett that have us believe stood for the right his or her vidual of fundamental proposition appellant’s diagnoses of (a) liberty only under three circumstances: enough satisfy APD would be the mental- imprisonment of convicted for the criminals requirement of of illness the words (b) retribution; purpose of deterrence and Blodgett negate this conclusion: persons mentally confinement shown person psychopathic per- A committed as a dangerous by convincing clear sonality may petition the Commissioner (c) evidence; and detention of who Human Services time for a transfer pose danger community, others or to the hospital provisional open to an for a extremely circum- and then limited community discharge or other to a residen- pretrial stances such detention. Id. facility, temporary tial or for a treatment appellant at 1785-86. The Blod- pass. security hospi- relaxations of These gett argued that his uncon- commitment was provide opportunity tal an confinement under Foucha did not stitutional because it incentive) (and per- for the committed the second cir- fit within of Foucha’s three son to that he demonstrate has mastered Although it cumstances.3 was conceded impulses ready his sexual and is to take psy- the statute’s he fit within definition place society. personality,4 appellant argued chopathic added). words, In Blodgett, (emphasis ill.5 510 Id. at 916 other he was agree, psychopathic per- 914. as a N.W.2d at This court did not committed Blodgett’s sonality under who to control his sexual and held commitment learns argued appellant impulse nor the state that he had "an uncontrollable sexual 3. Neither under the PP Act would have fit a commitment to others." 510 N.W.2d at categories. of Foucha 's other two under either appellant found met the 4. The trial court Linehan, Blоdgett 5. Like suffered from an antiso psychopathic personality under criteria personality cial disorder. imposed by appeal to this standard Pearson. On court, finding appellant challenge did not vagueness against an attack for PP Act longer requires civil commit- impulses no Pearson; court relied requirement fact, very this was the situation ment. against PP an attack upon uphold Linehan this court held that when equal protection, process, the statute’s definition for substantive did not fit within jeopardy violations precisely post because facto and double “psychopathic personality” ex requirement to this court prove Blodgett; to he was unable and a the state failed I. impulses. Linehan in Linehan his sexual to release the committee control cited (“Because “utterly that the today says we hold the unable N.W.2d at Yet this court county prove the utter lack of con- principled did not is of “no to control” element of the Pearson be- constitutionally significant element distinction trOl/uncontrollable test, unnecessary whether it to address under the SDP Linehan’s commitment tween that convincing evidence clear and of other sexual there is Act and the commitments Ante, in future dan- likely engage to PP appellant predators upheld was under the Act.” behavior.”). Linehan, Although Furthermore, like majority that gerous the states 180. APD, court diagnosed proposition with this that APD Blodgett was for the stands prove failed to he was that the state mental health basis for found alone is “a valid his desires. utterly pro- to control sexual unable and that substantive due commitment” held that Line- APD Consequently preclude this court “milder forms of Id. cess does not Blodgett could han was different for civil commit- as the mental health basis personal- Ante, psychopathic majority a not be committed as the ment.” 182. Of course ity.6 Blodgett a recognize Id. that involved fails to personality not re- psychopathic and does end of In re that was not the Of course a quire to hold that APD alone is this court subsequently Linehan. mental-health basis commit- sufficient provided civil com- passed Act and the SDP ment. sexually dan- to be mitment for those found (“SDP”). Sexually Dan- gerous why disingenuous, perhaps That is it is ch. August gerous Pеrsons Act of convenient, assert, the ma- a little too to as Spec. § Minn. Laws 1st art. does, jority Blodgett “that under the SDP (1994), at Minn.Stat. Sess. 5-7 codified satisfy sufficiently to strict Act is narrow (1994). 253B.02, the new §§ Under 253B.185 Ante, scrutiny applied to Linehan.” law, person to show that the the state needed Blodgett upheld com- This court in the 182. harmful sexual engaged in a course of has only appellant mitment of the because he had conduct, person manifested has words, psychopathic personality, other “sexual, mental disor- personality, or other power lack to because he had an utter result, likely dysfunction, and as a der or impulses. Despite the ma- control his sexual harmful sexual conduct.” engage in acts of Blodgett jority’s holding that stands for 18b(a) (1994). 253B.02, § subd. Minn.Stat. APD alone fits within the proposition that additionally provides that for The law Foucha, requirement of mental-illness SDP, the state need purposes proving a Blodgett that if stood for such fact remains inability person has not show that contrary to proposition, it would have been impulse's. Minn. control his or her sexual Supreme rulings by the Court. 18b(b) Stat. (stat- 82-83, 112 at 1786-87 504 U.S. at process does not ing that substantive due legislature in essence did was What civilly a state to commit a power to control allow out the “utter lack of throw may lead to personality “a disorder requirement: re- impulses” their sexual added)).7 (emphasis This uphold criminal conduct” created to quirement this court propo by stating it clear that Foucha stood for the majority point If was 6. The concedes was a suffi sition that a mental disorder alone cient mental-illness true, may philosophical in a certain ”[i]t justification for civil commit sense, blameworthy Blodgett than less ment, why the U.S. then there is no reason Blodgett his could not control is Linehan because granted certiorari in Court would have impulses.” sexual Hendricks, 259 Matter Care and Treatment of (1996) (striking down 912 P.2d 129 Kan. 2) merely Blodgett police powers asserted assaults under the argu- provide would not embroil itself a semantic care and treatment of the labels, upon ment based and that it would majority disordered. What the fails to rec- analyze appellant against however, ognize, the criteria validity is that the identify used to a mental vary illness Fоucha. depending upon state’s action will which But using now this court is the label compelling “antiso- trying interest the state is personality cial disorder” to conclude that serve. Linehan fits within Foucha’s definition of If the state attempting to serve

mental illness. interest, compelling first in other words it is In the absence of contrary, evidence to the trying only protect public from future accept legislature’s we and the Ameri- assaults, deprive person it cannot Psychiatric can Association’s determination liberty obtaining without first a criminal APD that is an mental disor- identifiable Foucha, past conviction for acts. 504 at U.S. helps explain der that behavior. 77-78,112 (holding danger- S.Ct. at 1784 that Ante, added). (emphasis at 185 Although the civilly ousness alone is not to sufficient com- much, majority Indiana, wont person); to admit as such a mit a v. Jackson 406 U.S. holding necessarily negates 715, 1845, (1972) Pearson and 92 S.Ct. 32 L.Ed.2d 435 grossly expands Blodgett. (holding Even more im- that a state could not continue to portantly, protections it erodes person incompetent trial); of sub- a hold to stand process Herald, 107, stantive due as established Fou- v. Baxstrom 383 U.S. 86 S.Ct. 760, (1966) cha. (holding 15 L.Ed.2d 620 that a deprive state cannot continue to a convicted II. Substantive due nearing penal criminal the end of his term of proposition Foucha stands for the that a liberty committing him without first civil- deprive person state cannot a of his or her ). If, however, ly attempting the state is liberty simply person danger- because that is. serve both the compelling first and second way, ous. Put another the Due Process interests, words, in other attempting it is prohibits Clause of the Constitution us as a provide mentally care and treatment for a ill society locking up persons simply from be- person poses who a threat to himself and cause we fear them. It matters not if our others, deprive person liberty it can a of his upon fear is based a rational assessment of it convincing once demonstrates clear and person’s likelihood to commit future bad person that mentally evidence is both ill acts, Supreme the fact remains that Foucha, dangerous. 504 U.S. at person Court has said we cannot remove a 1784; States, 112 at S.Ct. Jones v. United society prevent- from purpose the sole 354, 3043, 369, 3052, 103 S.Ct. 77 acts, ing the future bad if even the future bad (1983); Texas, Addington L.Ed.2d 694 v. 441 acts are almost certain to occur. That is the 418, 1804, U.S. 99 S.Ct. 60 L.Ed.2d 323 required baseline from which this court is (1979); Weston, Young see also v. begin analysis its of the SDP Act. (W.D.Wash.1995) F.Supp. (listing 748-49 Supreme circumstances in which Court end, majority correctly To that admits nonpunitive has allowed incarceration for deprives that the SDP Act an individual of Randall, reasons); State v. 192 Wis.2d right liberty the fundamental and there- (stating 100-01 that subject scrutiny. majori- to strict The fore can Court has held that states treat ty correctly adopts the form of strict differently). ‍​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​‍civil and criminal committees scrutiny that asks nar- whether the action is majority put way: it Foucha this rowly compelling tailored to serve a state State, majority recognizes pursuant police power, interest. The then A to its compelling may imprison the state has two interests in of course convicted criminals 1) safety public purposes case: to ensure from sexual deterrence and retribu Act), nearly Kansas statute identical cert. L.Ed.2d 1047 - -, granted, U.S. “[cjivil commit- But there constitutional limita admit that under such a test

tion. may certainly a on the conduct that State ment as we know almost be tions' would unconstitutional; only criminalize. Here the State has no such in the rarest of cir- punitive As Foucha was not a to show interests. cumstances will be able State ** n convicted, may punished. interest,’ he not be can ‘compelling and one that be involuntarily way, in no other insti- served may mentally also confine a ill The State tutionalizing person.” Id. at S.Ct. ‘by convincing if it shows clear J., (Thomás, dissenting). at In sum- mentally individual is ill evidence mary, the court concluded that civil commit- Here, dangerous.’ the state has non-mentally ill ment of but indeed, burden; the state carried does person would be: not claim that Foucha is now ill. Foucha, only step away substituting confine- (citations omitted) added). (emphasis Al- dangerousness present ments for for our Supreme' though the was divided in which, exceptions system only narrow concluding it was unanimous permissible and aside from confinements scrutiny requires action to strict a state’s illness, for mental incarcerates those narrowly compel- particular tailored to the proved beyond who are reasonable doubt ling interest stake. Justice O’Connor in to have violated criminal law. acquittees “that her concurrence stated could added). (emphasis Id. at S.Ct. at 1786 patients not be confined as mental absent so; justification doing Likewise, medical for in some upon compel- this court relied necessary the between such case connection encompassed in ling Blodgett interest that puvposes the natv/re and protection. than mere more of confinement absent.” 112 S.Ct. at would be Id. compelling government Here the interest J., (O’Connor, concurring) (emphasis protection public the is the of members of added). fact, Kennedy, in Justice based his persons who have an uncontrollable validity on that the entire dissent the fact of impulse sexually to assault. upon depending actions a state’s will differ (emphasis add- 510 N.W.2d at 914 acting it is in a criminal or civil whether ed). say This court to that “[s]o went on context. long programmed as civil to commitment is The criminal law defines discrete cate- review, provide periodic treatment and gory society conduct has for which re- provided,” (emphasis is Id. greatest opprobrium served its added). Blodgett The state in asserted its sanctions; past or future dan- strictest compelling protection interest of soci- to be predicted gerousness, as ascertained ety from those control tmable to proceedings, civil is different kind. * * * impulses precisely their the Su- because context, In the the State acts civil preme Court Foucha made clear that a large part parens of its on the basis narrowly civil tai- commitment would not be power provide patriae protect and for compelling government the lored to interest individual, an ill in the while criminal society protecting alone. context, the State acts to ensure the safety. public Texas, Addington v. S.Ct. [99 95-96, J., (1979), (Kennedy, L.Ed.2d that to Id. at at 1794 held 323] S.Ct. dissenting). finally, a mental institu- And Justice Thomas commit individual to legitimate proceeding, that “there tion in a civil the State is stated is a real and insanity acquittees required by the distinction between Due Process Clause the justifies procedural prove convincing committees clear and evidence civil that dis- statutory preconditions commit- parities.” Id. at at 1800 twо (Thomas, J., person Although sought to be com- dissenting). Justice ment: mentally requires from bodi- mitted is ill and that he Thomas maintained that “freedom ly hospitalization for his own restraint” did not constitute fundamental welfare scrutiny, protection he interest that did others. merited strict

1Q7 acts, past 504 U.S. at 112 S.Ct. at 1783 ished Linehan for his criminal how- added). (emphasis ever, rely Foucha will upon not allow to public safety alone to him incarcerate The bottom line that a is state cannot Instead, predicted future acts. the state person simply incarcerate a because it fears must that show his civil commitment is nec- person’s can, however, the future acts. It essary to the additional compelling govern- civilly fears, long commit a whom it so providing ment interest of care and treat- narrowly as the commitment is tailored to mentally ment of the ill.9 compelling the state’s additional interest treating mentally people. Addington, ill further, going any Before revealing it is (stating U.S. at 99 S.Ct. at 1811 that note that the state did not even bother to key question in civil commitment argue compelling government that its inter- ill “[w]hether individual passing est in provide the SDP Act was to dangerous to either himself or others and is treatment for Dennis Linehan or other ” therapy (emphasis in need add- of confined subsequent that, committee. And for ed)). difference, subtle, though is essen- honesty. state deserves credit for its Al- disposition tial to the of this case. Foucha though provides the statute a treatment involuntarily deprive allows a state to a dan- mechanism, it given following is clear gerous person liberty only of his or her when regarding passage circumstances the bill’s purpose treating it does so government the actual interest was to person. why majority And misses up sexually dangerous persons gener- lock holding the mark in the SDP Act is particular. al and Linehan in Dennis narrowly only compelling gov- tailored to the ernment interest asserted the state in this Less than one week after this court ruled protecting public from sexual as- case— that Linehan could not be committed under majority sault. As the stated: Act, PP speaker of the house called attempt protect Act is an [T]he SDP meeting quoted saying, for a and was public by treating predators sexual even prospect predators being “The of these re- dangerous by more than those reached the frightening, especially leased is for the wom- mentally PP Act—the disordered who re- Halvorsen, en of Minnesota.” Donna Sex wait, enough ‘plan, tain control to and de- Sparks Insecurity; Predators’ Status Com- lay indulgence the of their maladies until Trib., Appears Frayed, mitment Law Star presented probability higher with a of suc- 1994, July Approximately at IB. five appeals recog- cess.’ And as the court of later, attorney general proposed weeks the nized, requirement the mental disorder legislation keep that he said would Act SDP serves the state’s interest in Whereatt, predators up.” “locked Robert public safety by aiding prediction Proposed Keep Laws to Sex Predators off dangerousness. Streets, Trib., 12,1994, Aug. at 1A. The Star Governor, Ante, who at the same news conference majority’s at 182. We concede that the public safety special legisla- he call for a reliance on alone would be suffi- announced would session, said, accounts, “By past cient to incarcerate Linehan for criminal tive all these two already pun- danger public.” acts.8 Because the state has men10 remain a to the Id. can, crime, compelling government pulse 8. Such a interest to commit in the mind of one who is depending acquittee, insanity act, on a state’s definition of an quality conscious of the nature and guilty person a reach found to be not person not relieve a liabili- allowed to of criminal Randall, insanity. reason of See State v. Minn, Pearson, ty.” 287 N.W. at (1995) (hold- Wis.2d ing acquittee doubt,” 106-07 However, 303. this does not mean that the tests insanity an because Wisconsin considers validity for a commitment’s under substantive "guilty beyond to be a reasonable fact, they very are the same. In are presently insanity can confine sane different. alone). acquittee dangerousness on correctly argu- majority rejected Linehan’s The Linehan, 10.In addition to we concluded that the ment that criminal conviction and civil commit- Rickmyer state could not commit Peter under the mutually ment are exclusive. As this court stated PP Act. Pearson, "an uncontrollable and insane im- sufficiently petition the SDP Act is not narrow to After this court denied state’s rehearing governor government’s even the additional com- 'for serve pelling providing would move Line- care and treat- announced that state interest just mentally han an staff outside the again, old residence ment of the ill. Once prison keep him under constant surveil- for this is Foucha. foundation conclusion Whereatt, lance. Paul Gustafson & Robert asserts that because Foucha [T]he State Tight Rapist/Murderer Release —and Wins a criminal act and now has once committed Surveillance, Trib., 16, 1994, Aug. at 1A. Star personality that sometimes an antisocial attorney Linehan’s said the treatment When conduct, aggressive leads a disorder for “appalling,” governor responded by was treatment, which there is no effective he saying, “I’d much rather make a mistake on may indefinitely. be held This rationale public safety than the side of be overwhelm- indefinitely permit would the State to hold ingly attorney’s percep- concerned some insanity mentally any acquittee other rights the civil of Mr. tion of Linehan.” Id. personali- ill who could be shown to have a meanwhile, Ramsey County prosecutor, The ty may lead to criminal con- disorder quoted by Today saying, USA as “These duct. The same would be true of dangerous people got pro- and we’ve criminal, though he has convicted even tect the women and children our communi- completed prison term. Hall, A ties.” Mimi Furor Breivs over Re- Foucha, 82-83, 112 504 U.S. at S.Ct. at 1787 Offenders, Today, Aug. lease Sex USA added). Although (emphasis Justice O’Con- 1994,at 3A. something nor’s concurrence intimates that eight days primary Just before statewide less than a bona' fide mental illness would elections, governor officially called for a suffice, plurality in Foucha could not be one-day, special legislative one-bill session. civilly A more clear: state cannot commit a Whereatt, Legislators, Agree Robert Carlson person dangerous “person- who is and has a Session; Ground Rules Set Goal With ality disorder.” 504 U.S. at Trib., Avoiding Partisanship, Aug. Star (explaining state at IB. The convened one civilly person cannot commit a who is dan- hour, just week later and in 37 minutes gerous personal- and has either “antisocial passed margin disorder”). a 65-0 in the ity” personality person or “a margin senate and the house. be both ill. It must Whereatt, Donna & Robert Halvorsen Sexu- Blodgett’s holding is debatable whether OK’d, Trib., Signed, al Predator Bill Star psychopathic personality who has Sept. Immediately prior 1A. fits within the definition of mental illness session, Foucha,12 the the bill’s drafters had told their in asserted but it could not be colleagues speaking to avoid about Linehan only that an more clear a who has because, specifically say “Whatever we on “personality disorder” not fit antisocial does * * * against the will be used us. It’s floor within the definition of mental illness as as- going challenge to be used to the bill.” Id. in Foucha. serted themselves,

By these circumstances are This limitation is essential. Not because enough transparent “personality rather with to render this ef- disorders” recog preventive fort at detention unconstitution- less than those who have illnesses,13 very in al.11 But we assert the alternative that nized mental but because the holding Supreme grant Supreme did 11.The Kansas Court in a simi- 12. The Court not certiorari. (Minn.1994), lar noted that: statute unconstitutional In re 510 N.W.2d 910 cert. denied, - U.S. -, 146, overriding 115 S.Ct. 130 L.Ed.2d the It is clear that the concern of (1994). segregation legislature 86 is to continue the of sexually public. violent offenders from the fact, appeals "[pier- the court of noted that goal reintegrating Treatment with the of them incidental, whose mental afflictions leave them with a society sons at best. into Hendricks, especially present in measure of self-control Matter Care and Treatment 259 of of cert, risk, 129, 246, (1996), ability plan, they grant- for retain the sidious wait, Kan. 912 P.2d - ed, -, delay indulgence the their maladies of U.S. 116 S.Ct. 135 L.Ed.2d (1996). higher probability presented a of suc until constitutionally (striking essence of the state’s re 912 P.2d 129 down a civil civilly nearly quired compelling interest commit commitment statute identical to the — Act), —, ting person granted, ill. is treatment of the SDP cert.

When, fact, only the state’s articulated S.Ct. 135 L.Ed.2d 1047 majority passing protection distinguishes interest a law is of in the case bar society, apparent by stating it becomes that the real it upon Hendricks was based Kan law, purpose despite platitudes statutory its to sas’ own definition of mental ill treatment, Ante, preventive Although detention. We do ness. at 185 n. 11. the Supreme that Kansas not maintain the SDP violates sub Court did look at its mental during process only with illness statutes its substantive due stantive due because those process analysis, actually holding- currently APD cannot be treated. We main based its reading on a strict of Foucha’s mental-illness legislature’s tain reason for requirement: Act, passing properly exposed once Therefore, Hendricks, spotlight scrutiny, applied of not

under the strict as treatment, purpose constitutionality depends upon of but for of the Act stated showing dangerousness purpose detaining person the actual who of without a find- ing Clearly, of mental illness. the due frightens us. Church Lukumi Babalu Cf. Hialeah, Addington standard of Aye, City Fou- Inc. v. 508 U.S. (1993) (hold applied met the Act cha 124 L.Ed.2d 472 Hendricks. facially ing that neutral statute violated free part city

exercise clause because of coun Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 138. motivation); discriminatory Arlington cil’s Likewise, a federal district court in a ha- Heights Metropolitan Corp., v. Hous. Dev. corpus proceeding Washing- beas found 252, 266-68, 555, 563-65, Statute, Sexually ton’s Violent Predator (1977) (concluding L.Ed.2d 450 that the cir upheld Washington which had been surrounding passage en cumstances Court,14 Supreme scrutiny. failed strict legislation actment of can be used to deter rejected “Like the scheme purposeful if mine the statute is device permits Statute here indefinite incarceration treatment). discriminatory majority, Yet the showing po- on more than a based little * * * presents noting after that Foucha “constitu dangerousness. tential future Pre- tional limits to state-created definitions of dangerousness dictions of alone are an in- mental illness in the civil commitment con indefinitely sufficient basis to continue text,” manages spotlight somehow dim complet- of offenders who have incarceration “give[s] due re instead Weston, prison Young v. ed their terms.” identifying medically recognized gard (W.D.Wash.1995). F.Supp. disorders, APD, explain mental such as case, majority in Unlike the these appro person’s dangerousness and that are duties, courts fulfilled their constitutional priate for civil commitment and treatment.” decisions, and followed Fou- made difficult Ante, Never before has strict scruti at 187. namely involuntary cha’s civ- mandate — ny been so lenient. narrowly il commitment is tailored to the recently government’s compelling in treat- Kansas interest As the demonstrated, scrutiny only legislaturе’s when the actual rea- actual strict neces ment passing give the statute is to a men- sarily opposite to the result. Matter son leads Hendricks, tally help ill the he or she needs.15 259 Kan. Care and Treatment of 308, Post, 279, Linehan, 318 Foucha. State v. 197 Wis.2d 541 cess.” Matter 544 N.W.2d (1995). (Linehan II). (Minn.App.1996) Unlike the Foucha plurality, required which a state to find a com- dangerous, Young, ill and Justice 122 Wash.2d 857 P.2d 989 mittee both 14. In re (1993). only required medi- O’Connor that there be some justification cal for commitment. (O'Connor, J., Supreme S.Ct. at 1789-90 true that the Wisconsin U.S. 15. While it is Consequently, concurring). the Su- recently upheld a statute Wisconsin civil commitment Act, Court, preme majority by relying much like in the case it did so similar to our SDP bar, that APD is a sufficient medical basis entirely upon O’Connor’s concurrence in found Justice 200. analysis. post Equal protection, uphold and the act under due ex facto

III. jeopardy Likewise, justification for the dis double the second (treatment), surplusage while mere tinction disagree Technically speaking, we do not requirements, equal protection under is majority’s equal protection analysis. with the necessity court’s conclusion that the for this process, which neces- Unlike substantive due post ex facto or Act does not violate SDP sarily per- effect on a examines the statute’s jeopardy. double Unlike substantive pro- right liberty, equal son’s fundamental government’s process, which focuses on the the distinction between tection focuses on interests, jeopardy post ex facto and double fit within the statute’s reach and those who it purpose and whether not. such a distinction focus on the statute’s those who do Unless * * * classification, suspect purposes this court not for involves a is “for treatment any only if there is rational basis for preventive will ask v. purposes of detention.” Call Pearson, (Minn.1995) a selection. Gomez, such a statute 60 S.Ct. at 525-26. When such added). Although apparent (emphasis is interest, however, liberty this threatens passing legislature’s motivation apply heightened scrutiny and ask court will up dangerous per Act was to lock SDP genuine delineates whether statute Linehan, majority noted sons such as distinctions. substantial purpose of the Act “[t]he SDP effect * n * distinguishes Act N.W.2d at 917. The SDP remedial, puni predominantly is sexually dаngerous persons between those added). Ante, (emphasis tive.” at 188 a mental disorder and those who who have earlier, 18b(a) quibble As stated we elect not to not. do Minn.Stat. (1994). holding majority legisla- with this at this time. But see The holds that the Weston, Young F.Supp. civilly commit the first v. ture’s decision to (W.D.Wash.1995) (holding Washington’s is valid group but not the second because help sexually mental disorders to “isolate predator violent statute violates ex sexually likely dangerous persons most to harm oth- post jeopardy). Despite facto and double future,” “the state’s motivation, ers because in- legislature’s the statute does treating predators interest enough provisions clude treatment to con- confining scope served purpose remedial. clude that its stated Ante, at to those with mental disorders.” But note that Court has we short, upholding this court is only upheld as remedial those civil commit- sexually legislature’s determination that dan- provide ment statutes that for both mandato- a mental gerous disorder ry psychiatric facility treatment at a care more and more amenable to both discharge patient full once the demonstrates treatment than are those without a mental longer that he or she no need of treat- disorder. Illinois, Allen v. ment. See 2988, 2992-95, 92 L.Ed.2d Although disagree we do not with this majority correctly conclusion, justifi states point we out that the first that “Linehan has not offered evidence that (dangerousness), for the distinction cation regime uphold the treatment at MSH or MPPTC is sufficient to the act under the while sham, clause, protection or even that such treatment is inef- equal is not sufficient to defense, Post, asserting insanity finding for commitment. 541 N.W.2d at 127-28. federal ordinary Such a conclusion is not valid under apart sets them criminal conduct jurisprudence however. Not constitutional (O'Connor, J., concurring). citizens.” Id. han, Line- O’Connor’s concurrence lack the does Justice Post, escape like the committee in did not law, guidance given weight of it lacks real punishment prior criminal for his bad acts. He II. The com- the facts in both Post and Linehan and served his sentence. Accord- was convicted guilty by mittee had been found not in Foucha ingly, he is now outside the realm of the criminal it, put insanity. reason of As Justice O'Connоr words, justice system. To use Justice O'Connor’s "escape[d] punishment" by pleading Foucha had citizen," "ordinary now an Dennis Linehan is (O’Connor, insanity. Id. at 112 S.Ct. only upon civilly whom the state can commit one J., concurring). Consequently, Justice O'Connor dangerousness finding mental ill- of both ”[a]lthough insanity acquittees may noted that penalized for ness. not be incarcerated as criminals or Ante, Blodgett “inability given legis- ing of to con fective.” But the 189. Act, impulses sig behind the SDP trol” sexual has constitutional lature’s real motivation represents evidence will a substantive due we are concerned that such nificance and readily preventive in the near future. become available detention. threshold occurs, joined When that we will not hesitate to find I That is the basis on which the Act, violating Indeed, the in addition to requirement opinion. court’s process, post ex substantive due also violates previously Psychopathic the Personali saved jeopardy. facto and double ty vagueness Act from a chal Commitment lenge Ramsey in v. Probate Pearson Court of PAGE, (dissenting). Justice (1939), County, Minn. 287 N.W. join Tomljanovich. I aff'd, the dissent of Justice 84 L.Ed. 744 Pearson, I separately write to note that there is no In this court stated: question that Dennis Linehan is extreme- Applying principles these to the case be- ly dangerous person. ques- There is no also us, reasonably can fore it be said the tried, convicted, tion that he has been language [Psychopathic of 1 of the Section punished under our criminal law. Some Personality Commitment is intended Act] included, might argue, myself that the sen- who, by a to include those habitual enough tence he not severe received was matters, course of misconduct sexual longer. and that it have been should Cer- power have evidenced an utter lack of tainly if constitutional limitations did not ex- who, impulses control their sexual as a ist, qualms I about Linehan would have' no result, likely to attack or otherwise remaining preventive detention for the loss, injury, pain inflict or other on the evil However, limi- rest of his life. constitutional objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrol- exist, respect we must those tations do lable desire. It would not be reasonable to if it limitations even means the Dennis apply provisions every the statute to of the world be set free after Linehans of must person guilty sexual misconduct nor Thus, completing their criminal sentence. I persons having strong pro- even respectfully because I believe that dissent pensities. only a definition Such would Sexually Dangerous goes Persons impracticable make the act of enforcement beyond imposed by our well the limits consti- and, appli- perhaps, unconstitutional its permits preventive unrestrained tution and cation, would also be an unwarranted but solely ‍​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​‍on an individual’s dan- detention based departure accepted meaning from the gerousness. the words defined. separately to comment on the I also write (emphasis Id. at 287 N.W. Blodgett. Blodgett court’s treatment of added). joined. I of this court which a 4-3 decision (Minn.1994). The court now holds that the instant case In re indistinguishable Blodgett despite I joined I that decision because believed “inability holding require- fit within constitutional limita fact that to control” court’s then, Blodgett I did believe and still ment articulated is not contained tions. While now, Sexually Blodgett Dangerous fit in the Act. that our decision Persons believe limits, upholding psychopathic personality I believe that constitutional stat- within ute, Blodgett reached the extreme court made clear that there that decision we constitutionally permitted pre are constitutional limitations to the state’s outer limits However, preventive The court now holds that use detention. no ventive detention. Sexually if Blodgett have to be overturned we such limitations are found would Sexually Dangerous Dangerous Persons Persons Act. The real crite- were to find My disagree. Sexually I read ria for commitment under the Dan- Act unconstitutional. prison possibil- certainly without the would have met constitutional A of life in muster. sentence may appropriate reason, ity well have been Unfortunately, of release for whatever at the time for which Linehan on the criminal conduct committed, based Linehan’s crime was Indeed, may have been better convicted. was than he provide did not see fit to for such a sentence. event, such a sentence deserved. In Thus, dangerousness. gerous Act is Persons today goes beyond well

the court’s decision has, essence, conclud-

Blodgett The no limitations

ed that there are constitutional preventive use of detention.

on the state’s people who are

Today target sexual- people,

ly dangerous. class of who Which like, who we do not

are different from us and tomorrow?

will be wrote in

As Simonett Justice safety public on “the of the

issue is and, other, liberty on the

the one hand * * *. In the final interests of the individual credibility

analysis, it moral is the justice system that

criminal stake.” By the court’s decision to-

N.W.2d at 918. credibility jeopardy.

day, placed LE, Respondent,

Thanh

v. and Safeco

KURT MANUFACTURING Relators, Company,

Insurance intervenor, Respondent.

D.C.A., Inc.,

No. C5-96-1675. of Minnesota.

Dec. Tuft, Arthur, Chapman, L. Ket-

Christine Pikala, P.A., Minneapolis, tering, Smetak & Employer/Insurer.

Case Details

Case Name: Matter of Linehan

Court Name: Supreme Court of Minnesota

Date Published: Dec 12, 1996

Citation: 557 N.W.2d 171

Docket Number: C1-95-2022

Court Abbreviation: Minn.