Karla Vanessa Arcia v. Florida Secretary of State
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 21685
| 11th Cir. | 2014Background
- Florida Secretary of State Kenneth Detzner conducted two programs in 2012 to identify and remove suspected non-citizens from voter rolls: an early DHSMV-based program (suspended end of April) and a later effort using DHS SAVE that he planned to run within 90 days of the general election.
- The first program produced false positives (e.g., Karla Arcia and Melande Antoine, both U.S. citizens, were flagged) and caused organizations to divert resources to help affected members vote.
- Plaintiffs (two individual naturalized citizens and three organizations) sued, alleging the programs violated the NVRA’s “90 Day Provision,” which bars completing any program that is intended to systematically remove ineligible voters within 90 days of a federal election.
- The district court ruled for Detzner; the Eleventh Circuit panel held plaintiffs had standing, the case was not moot (capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review), and that Detzner’s SAVE-based program violated the 90 Day Provision.
- The court emphasized the distinction between systematic removal programs (banned within 90 days) and individualized investigations/corrections (permitted anytime), and remanded with instructions to declare Detzner’s actions unlawful and provide appropriate relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether NVRA §1973gg-6(c)(2)(A) (the 90-Day Provision) bars a state program that systematically removes suspected non-citizens within 90 days of a federal election | Arcia: The SAVE/DHSMV matching programs are "programs ... to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters" and therefore are prohibited within 90 days | Detzner: The 90-Day Provision does not apply to removals of persons who were never eligible (non-citizens), and reading it to bar such removals frustrates state authority and raises constitutional concerns | Held: The plain meaning and statutory context show "any program ... to systematically remove" includes Detzner's programs; such systematic removals are barred within 90 days, though individualized investigations remain permitted |
| Standing of individual plaintiffs who were mistakenly flagged as non-citizens | Arcia: Direct injury from being misidentified (and imminent future injury from resumed program) confers standing | Detzner: No concrete injury; speculative future harms | Held: Individuals had concrete injury from prior misidentification and plausible likelihood of future misidentification—standing satisfied |
| Organizational standing (diversion-of-resources and associational) | Organizations: Diverted resources to assist members and have members at realistic risk of misidentification | Detzner: Insufficient concrete injury | Held: Organizations established concrete diversion injuries and associational standing because at least some members faced realistic risk |
| Mootness (whether the case was moot after the 2012 election) | Arcia: Exception applies—action was short in duration and likely to recur | Detzner: Claims moot because elections passed | Held: Exception to mootness (capable of repetition yet evading review) applies; case retains jurisdiction |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing standard for injury-in-fact)
- Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (organizational standing by diversion of resources)
- Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (associational standing principles)
- Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review doctrine in election context)
- Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340 (Eleventh Circuit: procedural election injuries can confer standing)
- Charles H. Wesley Educ. Found., Inc. v. Cox, 408 F.3d 1349 (Eleventh Circuit: voting-related procedural injuries confer standing)
- Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (statutory construction—start with ordinary meaning)
- Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (statutes may reach harms not specifically anticipated by Congress)
- Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (breadth of statutory language can be controlling)