32 F.4th 1218
9th Cir.2022Background
- Shields underwent an April 2018 bone biopsy (three-day hospitalization; a 10‑cm skin incision and a window into the bone) and suffered postsurgical injuries to her right shoulder, arm, and hand.
- Her injuries allegedly prevented fundamental functions (lifting, typing, handwriting, tying shoes, grooming, pushing/pulling) and affected core job tasks listed in her HR Generalist job description.
- Her surgeon completed Credit One’s ADA medical certification form, listed major life activities affected (sleeping, lifting, writing, pushing, pulling, manual tasks), and an eight‑week unpaid medical leave was granted as an ADA accommodation.
- On June 18, 2018 the surgeon certified she remained unable to work pending a July 10 appointment; shortly thereafter Credit One eliminated her position and terminated her; health coverage ended soon after.
- District court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), holding Shields failed to plead a “disability” because she had not alleged permanent or long‑term effects; the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding the district court applied the wrong legal standard and Shields adequately pleaded a disability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an impairment must be permanent/long‑term to be "substantially limiting" under the ADA | ADAAA and post‑ADAAA EEOC regulations allow severe temporary impairments to be disabilities; no categorical long‑term requirement | Pre‑ADAAA EEOC guidance and Curley require consideration of duration and effectively exclude short/transitory impairments | Temporary impairments can qualify; the district court erred in imposing a categorical permanent/long‑term requirement (post‑ADAAA EEOC regs control) |
| Whether Shields adequately pleaded an "impairment" | Complaint details invasive surgery, substantial injury, and surgeon’s certification that she could not work | Defendant argued allegations were limited to short/post‑surgical effects and lacked required specificity for the extension period | Allegations (surgery detail, functional limitations, surgeon note) sufficiently plead an impairment at pleading stage |
| Whether Shields pleaded a "substantial limitation" of a major life activity | Alleged inability to lift, perform manual tasks, self‑care, and core job functions for several months | Defendant argued limitations were not sufficiently severe or long to be substantial | Allegations plausibly show substantial limitation (duration + severity); EEOC guidance supports that several‑month severe restrictions can qualify |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard requires plausible factual allegations, not detailed facts)
- Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (prior narrow interpretation of "substantially limits" that ADAAA rejected)
- Summers v. Altarum Inst., Corp., 740 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2014) (upheld EEOC regulation treating severe temporary impairments as disabilities)
- Weaving v. City of Hillsboro, 763 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2014) (post‑ADAAA standards for "substantial limitation" in the context of work)
- Nunies v. HIE Holdings, Inc., 908 F.3d 428 (9th Cir. 2018) (post‑ADAAA case recognizing lifting/work limitations can be substantial)
- Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2014) (procedural reference for accepting factual allegations on a motion to dismiss)
- Hawkins v. Kroger Co., 906 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2018) (procedural guidance on treating allegations as true on Rule 12(b)(6))
- Curley v. City of North Las Vegas, 772 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2014) (district court had relied on this pre‑ADAAA approach; Ninth Circuit clarified it was inapposite)