Karen McNeil v. Cmty. Probation Servs., 945 F.3d 991

Giles County contracted with private companies to supervise misdemeanor probationers; violations prompted warrants from county judges.
Judges issue four types of warrants (cite, ROR, bail-set, hold); when bail is set judges determine amounts outside the probationer’s presence and only judges can change amounts.
Tennessee law directs sheriffs to keep detainees until released by law; Sheriff Helton detains probationers until they pay judge-set bail (about 130 people Jan–Aug 2018).
Plaintiffs sued Giles County, Sheriff Helton, and private probation entities claiming detention based on secured bail—set without considering ability to pay—violates the substantive due-process right against wealth-based detention; the district court granted a preliminary injunction restraining the county and sheriff from detaining persons solely on secured financial conditions absent consideration of ability to pay, necessity, and alternatives.
On appeal the county and sheriff did not contest the injunction’s constitutional basis; they argued only that the plaintiffs sued the wrong parties and that any injunction should target the judges who set bail.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding the plaintiffs may proceed against the sheriff and county at this stage; judges may be immune and Ex parte Young authorizes injunctive suits against implementing state officials.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Proper defendant for injunction	County and sheriff enforce unconstitutional bail-based detention and may be enjoined	Plaintiffs should have sued judges who set bail, not sheriff/county	Plaintiffs may sue sheriff and county; injunctive relief against them is permissible at this stage
Whether sheriff acted as State or county (arm-of-state)	N/A (plaintiffs sued enforcement actors regardless of label)	Sheriff acts as arm of the State when enforcing judge-set bail because law directs sheriffs to obey courts	Sheriff acted for the State when detaining under judge-set bail, per Tennessee law and Shorts v. Bartholomew
Applicability of Ex parte Young to sheriff	Ex parte Young permits suit against officials who administer unconstitutional policies	Allowing suit against sheriff improperly expands Ex parte Young; remedy should target judges	Ex parte Young covers the sheriff because he is actively involved in administering the alleged violation; plaintiffs may choose to sue implementers
County liability under § 1983 (Monell) at preliminary stage	County employed and oversaw sheriff who enforces bail; county is proper defendant	County may later show no county policy caused violation (Monell defense)	County is a permissible defendant now; Monell defense can be addressed on remand/through discovery

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (U.S. 1908) (authorizes injunctive suits against state officials for ongoing constitutional violations)
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (U.S. 1999) (States enjoy sovereign immunity from private suits)
Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (U.S. 1890) (sovereign immunity protects States but not counties)
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (U.S. 1978) (municipal liability requires policy or custom causing constitutional violation)
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (U.S. 1991) (judicial immunity for judicial acts)
Shorts v. Bartholomew, 278 S.W.3d 268 (Tenn. 2009) (Tennessee law on who may authorize detainee release)
Children’s Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Deters, 92 F.3d 1412 (6th Cir. 1996) (limits on breadth of Ex parte Young relief)
Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2017) (preliminary injunction factors)
Crabbs v. Scott, 786 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2015) (arm-of-state analysis for county officials)
Brotherton v. Cleveland, 173 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 1999) (when compliance with state mandates makes local officials arms of the State)