Karen Kenney v. Aspen Technologies, Inc.
965 F.3d 443
6th Cir.
2020

Background

  • Karen Kenney was rehired at Aspen Technologies in May 2015 as a production manager after previously working there years earlier.
  • Soon after rehiring, Aspen experienced a sharp increase in employee turnover and two formal complaints accused Kenney of mistreating hourly employees.
  • Kenney alleges she complained in mid‑May 2015 to HR manager April Jewell and to VP Keith Quinn that Aspen’s owner, Ken Beethem, preferred hiring people from neighboring (non-Detroit/Flint) counties and said he "did not like that demographic," with Jewell allegedly referring to "black people, colored people." Kenney says she reported this as discriminatory.
  • Kenney was terminated on July 31, 2015 (about 75 days after the alleged May complaint); she filed suit alleging Title VII and Michigan ELCRA retaliation.
  • The district court granted summary judgment for Aspen, finding Kenney failed to establish a prima facie retaliation case; the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding Kenney failed to show but‑for causation or pretext given intervening employee complaints and documented turnover, and applying the same analysis to the ELCRA claim.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
1) Whether Kenney engaged in protected activity under Title VII by complaining about hiring practices Kenney: she told Jewell and Quinn that Beethem’s recruiting excluded Detroit/Flint and referenced "black/colored people," and she protested that such hiring was illegal Aspen: denies Kenney made a protected discrimination complaint; says recruitment was internet‑based and not racially motivated Court: enough evidence to assume protected activity for the May complaint at prima facie stage, but other elements (causation) fail
2) Causation (whether the protected activity was the but‑for cause of termination) Kenney: temporal proximity (~75 days) and alleged increased scrutiny support causation Aspen: termination was based on high attrition, formal complaints about Kenney’s management, and legitimate business needs Held: 75 days plus the record is not ‘‘unusually suggestive’’; intervening events (employee complaints and turnover) defeat causation
3) Whether evidence of heightened scrutiny (different treatment after protected activity) supports retaliation Kenney: prior tolerated conduct vs. firing now shows increased scrutiny after complaint Aspen: intervening differences (eight‑year gap, changed circumstances, formal complaints, production demands) mean conduct not comparable Held: no heightened scrutiny shown—prior period not materially comparable and employer’s reaction reasonable given new harms
4) Applicability of Michigan ELCRA beyond Title VII analysis Kenney: state law claim independent of federal law Aspen: Michigan courts follow federal Title VII framework for ELCRA retaliation claims Held: ELCRA claim fails for same reasons as Title VII; no additional recovery

Key Cases Cited

  • McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (sets burden‑shifting framework for discrimination/retaliation cases)
  • Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard; reasonable inferences for nonmovant)
  • Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714 (6th Cir. 2014) (elements of a Title VII retaliation prima facie case)
  • Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., 682 F.3d 463 (6th Cir. 2012) (retaliation causation analysis)
  • Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2003) (explains proof of pretext after employer offers legitimate reason)
  • Vereecke v. Huron Valley Sch. Dist., 609 F.3d 392 (6th Cir. 2010) (temporal proximity alone generally insufficient to prove causation)
  • Hamilton v. Gen. Elec. Co., 556 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2009) (temporal proximity plus heightened scrutiny may support causation)
  • Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2008) (rare instance where temporal proximity supported causation when coupled with other evidence)
  • Yazdian v. ConMed Endoscopic Techs., Inc., 793 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2015) (protected activity need not be formal; must not be a vague charge)
  • Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1989) (distinguishes vague complaints from protected opposition)
  • Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714 (6th Cir. 2008) (explains when opposition amounts to protected activity)
  • Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2007) (context‑specific causation inquiry)
  • Porter v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 419 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2005) (discusses employer motive and context in causation analysis)
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