Karen Carpenter v. State Board of Nursing
508 S.W.3d 110
Mo.2016Background
- Karen Carpenter, a registered nurse, tested positive for controlled substances; AHC found cause for discipline and the State Board of Nursing imposed a 3‑year probation with 30+ conditions.
- Carpenter petitioned for judicial review, arguing the Board’s disciplinary terms were arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and an abuse of discretion; the circuit court stayed the Board’s order pending review.
- The circuit court reversed/remanded, finding the discipline excessive and arbitrary, reduced probation to one year, and eliminated most conditions.
- Carpenter moved for attorney’s fees under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.087, claiming she was a "prevailing party" under § 536.085(3).
- The circuit court denied fees, reasoning Carpenter did not prevail on the “significant issue” of whether her license deserved discipline; on appeal the Supreme Court held Carpenter had prevailed but affirmed denial of fees because the Board’s disciplinary order was an adjudicative decision, not an agency “position.”
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Carpenter was a "prevailing party" under § 536.085(3) | Carpenter obtained a favorable judgment (reduction/elimination of discipline) and thus materially altered legal relationship — qualifies as prevailing | Board argued discipline still imposed, so Carpenter did not prevail on the central issue that license merited discipline | Court: Carpenter was a prevailing party under the statute and Supreme Court precedents (material alteration test) |
| Whether the Board’s disciplinary order qualifies as the agency’s "position" for fee-shifting under § 536.087.1 | Carpenter: board advocated discipline and therefore its decision reflects an agency position subject to fee review | Board: at the disciplinary hearing it acted as adjudicator and did not advocate for a specific sanction; the discipline was an adjudicative decision, not a litigated position | Court: Although Board acted adversarially, it never advocated a specific sanction; the imposed discipline was an adjudicative decision and not an agency “position” for § 536.087.1; fees denied |
| Whether denial of fees was reviewable on substantial‑justification grounds | Carpenter requested fees; if Board took a position, denial would require analysis of whether Board’s position was substantially justified | Board contended no position existed, so substantial‑justification inquiry is irrelevant | Court: did not reach substantial‑justification because the discipline was not a qualifying agency position under § 536.087.1 |
Key Cases Cited
- White v. Missouri Veterinary Medical Board, 906 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. App. 1995) (discusses prevailing‑party inquiry and partial success under EAJA‑style fee statutes)
- Garland v. Ruhl, 455 S.W.3d 442 (Mo. banc 2015) (distinguishes agency "position" from adjudicative "decision" for § 536.087 purposes)
- Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (U.S. 1989) (plaintiff must receive some relief on the merits to be a prevailing party)
- Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (U.S. 1992) (prevailing party requires relief that materially alters legal relationship and benefits plaintiff)
- Jean v. Commissioner, INS, 496 U.S. 154 (U.S. 1990) (EAJA favors treating the case as a whole rather than atomizing positions)
- United States v. 1,378.65 Acres of Land, 794 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1986) (EAJA principles encouraging private challenges to unreasonable government action)
- Missouri Real Estate Appraisers Comm’n v. Funk, 492 S.W.3d 586 (Mo. banc 2016) (agency’s position is assessed based on what was asserted during the agency proceeding, not during judicial review)