Karen Bonsack v. Michele Gregory, 0416164

Bonsack appealed a juvenile and domestic relations district court denial of her petition for visitation with Gregory’s two children and was entitled to a trial de novo in the circuit court.
After Bonsack nonsuited and refiled, Gregory obtained a district-court protective order prohibiting contact between Bonsack and the children; Bonsack appealed but then resolved that appeal by a consent decree (August 28 order) containing no-contact restrictions and the clause: “this Consent Order shall be modified by an Order of this [c]ourt upon proper motion and hearing.”
A circuit-court trial on visitation was scheduled for February 24, 2016; on February 5 Gregory moved to dismiss/for summary judgment and a hearing on that motion was set for February 19 (motions day).
Bonsack filed a motion to modify or vacate the August 28 order at the February 24 trial and included it in her objection to Gregory’s summary-judgment motion.
At the February 19 hearing the circuit court concluded it could not grant visitation because the August 28 order remained in effect and dismissed the visitation case without conducting the scheduled trial or modifying the consent order.
The Court of Appeals held the dismissal was erroneous because the circuit court had authority to modify the consent order at the upcoming trial and the premature dismissal denied Bonsack her trial de novo.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether dismissal before the scheduled trial was proper given the existing consent/no-contact order	Bonsack argued she was entitled to her trial de novo and the circuit court could modify the August 28 consent order at the scheduled trial	Gregory argued the existing consent/protective order prevented the court from awarding visitation, so dismissal was proper	Court reversed: dismissal was improper because the circuit court could modify the consent order at a proper motion and hearing and therefore should not have short-circuited the trial
Whether the circuit court may modify the consent order in the pending case	Bonsack pointed to the consent order’s explicit modification clause and her filed modification motion as permitting modification at the February 24 hearing	Gregory relied on the then-existing no-contact terms to argue no relief could be granted	Court held the consent order explicitly allowed modification by court order upon proper motion/hearing; thus the court erred by treating modification as impossible and dismissing without trial

Ragan v. Woodcroft Vill. Apartments, 255 Va. 322 (retrial de novo in circuit court)
Dodge v. Trs. Randolph-Macon Woman’s Coll., 276 Va. 1 (warning against short-circuiting litigation and denying a party its day in court)
Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson v. Lake Fairfax Seven Ltd. P’ship, 253 Va. 93 (same principle on appeal record development)
Johnston Memorial Hospital v. Bazemore, 277 Va. 308 (de novo review for questions of law)
Layman v. Layman, 62 Va. App. 134 (standard for reviewing evidence in appeals)
O’Rourke v. Vuturo, 49 Va. App. 139 (abuse of discretion standard for custody/visitation)
Whitehead v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 105 (limits on applying "right result, wrong reason" when further factual development is required)