*1 Janice E. Village Apartments
Record No. 970905 27, 1998 February Present: All the Justices *2 Virginia L. Central Pryor; L.M.B. Slag (Kathryn Marcellinus briefs), on Aid Legal Society, appellant brief), Marshall, (Davis Kirby, R. & on for appellee. Jr. William Court. delivered the JUSTICE KEENAN opinion us lies issue before is whether The dispositive for a district court’s denial circuit court from in an detainer proceeding. new trial unlawful Rich- in the Janice E. leased an Ragan apartment City In (Woodcroft). When from Woodcroft Village Apartments mond her sent July her rent due on failed to pay notice, rent related pay written Code § On surrender premises. within five possession charges due, amount Wood- still had not paid when July her against croft instituted an unlawful Richmond, accrued City seeking General District Court for rent, costs, fees, and of the leased *3 later, on detainer the return date the unlawful
Ten to prior $247.50, summons, the sum of the entire Ragan Woodcroft paid due the Woodcroft Ragan’s payment amount under lease. accepted reservation, seek right with in order to its to possession preserve the leased See Code 55-248.34. § on the in the appeared general
When parties summons, that had Ragan unlawful detainer Woodcroft agreed paid The court all amounts under the lease. district outstanding general leased prem- entered Woodcroft judgment awarding possession ises. did not from this Ragan judgment. a filed a motion in the requesting
Ragan asserted that the new trial on the unlawful detainer summons. She because was barred Code 55-2431 by unlawful detainer proceeding § Code return date in an action ing his attorney interest cease. reasonable attorney’s dency section A. If any party B. In cases of unlawful based in the rental . . no more than 55-243 . costs, in the provides, a default having all further cause, dwelling fees one in in relevant and right unlawful time detainer, rent, unit. pay proceedings late or claim during pay into charges detainer part: the tenant or tender to any to contracted for in the such lands seeking twelve-month all may the rent and ejectment invoke party shall, period a written rental entitled or unlawful detainer . . . before the first arrears, rights of continuous a to such residential along granted agreement, rent, with by dwell- resi- this any to had due had been she amount Woodcroft and paid previously served with unlawful detainer summons Woodcroft in twelve-month before the unlawful detainer period present instituted. The court denied the on the that Ragan was motion ground had failed to assert this at the to the hearing prior entry filed notice of circuit court from the judgment. Ragan denial of her motion new trial. requesting assumed, The circuit court it had without that deciding, jurisdic- tion hear from the court’s Ragan’s general district denial her motion a new trial. The circuit court then held requesting that district court did not abuse its discretion denying motion. to this Court the circuit court’s appealed judgment. cross-error,
In an that assignment Woodcroft the circuit argues court lacked jurisdiction to consider from the Ragan’s appeal district court’s denial of her motion trial. requesting that, asserts electing the adverse unlawful detainer had no further to be heard proceeding, circuit court. Code Woodcroft contends that neither 8.01-129 nor Code 16.1-106 from the denial permits new trial in an unlawful action.
In observes 16.1-106 response, Ragan provides, part, “any rendered a court not of record in civil case in the amount in contro- which versy She fifty dollars.” contends that general district court’s order her motion for a new trial is an “order” within the of this meaning statutory disagree We language. with Ragan. issue,
In
this
resolving
consider the
of both Code
16.1-106 in the context of the
framework
§§
statute,
We
each
process.
accord
insofar as
possible,
meaning that does not conflict
See
other statute.
First Va.
*4
308, 312,
775,
Bank v. O’Leary, 251 Va.
(1996);
467 S.E.2d
777
Marshall,
756, 761,
146,
Board
Supervisors v.
215 Va.
214 S.E.2d
(1975).
150
construction,
Under fundamental rules of
each
be
statute must
in
examined
its
rather than
entirety,
by isolating par
Co.,
469,
ticular
or
words
Buonocore v.
Tel.
254
phrases.
C&P
Va.
472-73,
439,
Bank,
312,
(1997);
441
Va.
First
lature’s intent must determined from v. Willey, an absurd result. Abbott literal construction would yield 528, 88, 91, & (1997); Country S.E.2d 530 Barr v. Town 253 Va. 479 295, 292, 672, Inc., (1990). 240 S.E.2d 674 Va. 396 Properties, Thus, is and unambig- a statute clear language when employed uous, the are of that meaning language. courts bound by plain Bd., 252 S.E.2d County v. Sch. Va. 475 Wall Fairfax Forst, 453 276 (1996); S.E.2d 805 Carr (1995). and unambig
The of both statutes at issue clear language states, Code in relevant uous. 8.01-129 part, § “[a]n an unlawful lie from the [in the same manner and the circuit court in proceeding], under the like like taken appeals effect security then states the et Code 8.01-129 provisions seq.” § § for such an and provides any party requirements perfecting to a These are the circuit court. jury provisions inappli however, case, cable to because did present of the awarding but only the leased premises, appealed Therefore, district court’s denial of her motion for a new trial. must the broader of Code 16.1-106 to consider determine had a from the denial of whether that motion for a new trial. 16.1-106, from general which provides appeals cases, civil states in
district courts in relevant part: From rendered in a court order entered a civil in which the matter dollars ... or when the case involves of the Common- statute constitutionality validity wealth, an ordinance or bylaw corpora- or of municipal tion, conferred rights privileges or of enforcement (§Act 2.1-340 et Freedom of Information Virginia 19.2-152.10, there or of a seq.), protective ten after such if taken within shall be an of right, order or judgment, to a court of record. [2] That addition This allowing language is not at issue reflects from protective this appeal. amendment order awarded under Code which the only substantive change 19.2-152.10. is the
327 statute the a trial de novo in the circuit This gives parties See and -114.1. The of this court. two-tier purpose §§ trial is to a final the system aggrieved by judgment allow party court to have the case tried the again circuit by if the as case had been instituted there. See originally Nationwide Tuttle, 28, 32-33, 358, Mut. Ins. v. Co. 208 Va. 155 S.E.2d 361 trial, (1967). Such an is in of a effect new appeal grant which the annuls the the perfected appeal judgment as as if there had been no See completely trial. Gaskill v. previous Commonwealth, 144 (1965). 206 Va. S.E.2d 296 If the reversed, the district court is circuit judgment the court is to enter an order or judgment “as to have been made required ought given or the the from by judge of which the was taken.” appeal Code 16.1-113. definition,
This
excludes a
appeal
trial de novo
process,
aof motion for a
trial
because such a motion does not involve
an
had
adjudication
if it
been instituted in the
originally
Tuttle,
circuit court. See
The decision for denying Ragan’s motion a new trial not was a final order it did judgment because the merits of dispose the unlawful detainer final summons. A order or one judgment contemplated. of the whole of the disposes subject case and all relief gives Assocs., 1020, 1028, ns 220 Va. 265 Equitable S.E.2d Bur 579, 585, 742 (1980); Daniels v. Truck & Equip. Corp., above, (1964). 35 As stated unlawful was judgment awarding leased
Since Ragan’s motion for new trial was anot final order or judgment, Ragan’s argument would us to require allowing civil case in address Because an requirements which asserts a matter in “any under solely balance under rendered in a court not of the statute. dollars,” Code § 16.1-106 of record do in a rendered” as order entered
interpret phrase “any an interpreta- order whatsoever. Such allowing matters, interlocutory of countless tion would allow dates, continuances, orders setting including granting orders venue, orders for bills of particu- determining providing orders did documents. Manifestly, legislature lars or production *6 Therefore, that did not intend a result. we hold since such district a final order or of judgment from appeal to her circuit lacked hear jurisdiction appeal. court reasons, circuit court’s For we will reverse and vacate the these court’s order denying and reinstate the district judgment for a trial unlawful detainer proceeding. motion new Ragan’s and judgment.
Reversed CARRICO, with JUSTICE COMPTON CHIEF JUSTICE whom joins, dissenting. there is from an
I cannot with the that no agree majority an a court a for a new trial in unlaw- order of district denying 16.1-97.1, a in a case. Under district litigant ful detainer Code § has to move for a new trial. Under Code right 16.1-106, to a circuit court from there shall be an of right order rendered in a court not of entered any judgment is of value than civil case in which matter controversy greater 8.01-129, lie from the dollars. And under Code an shall fifty court in unlawful detainer to a an and like effect and like circuit court in the same manner as to the security an taken 16.1-106. Code sections Nothing any these precludes trial in an unlawful detainer an order a motion for new denying Indeed, there be an that case. Code 16.1-106 provides in a court not rendered any of is of controversy record in a civil case in which the matter certainly broad dollars. This fifty greater trial in an a motion for a new denying include order enough have no that matter finding unlawful detainer case. And I trouble when, here, dollars to a subsidized apartment matter involves for $154.00 month. renting per
doNor I have the concern expressed majority adopt matters, view would allow my countless interlocutory continuances, dates, including orders orders granting setting venue, orders and orders determining providing for bills particu- lars or production documents. Since such orders relate to mat- ters of are not of procedure, they nature of an dispositive motion for new trial denying final in sense of Hence, hand, word. would not be they On the other appealable. substance, motions new trials relate matters generally orders such motions denying attributes of final possess orders in the sense that they fully of such dispose substantive matters on the merits. I
Accordingly, would hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to Janice hear E. from the order Ragan’s appeal of the general district trial, her motion for a and I would reverse the of the trial court and remand case for further proceed- consistent ings with the views in Hubbard v. Henrico expressed Ltd. Partnership, (this decided). day