989 F. Supp. 2d 216
E.D.N.Y.2013Background
- Plaintiff Mona T. Kanciper operates a 50-acre horse farm in Manorville, NY, hosting The New York Horse Rescue Corporation and employing family members on site.
- SPCA, acting through agents including Lato and Spota (Suffolk County DA), received animal welfare complaints in 2009 and 2010 against Kanciper.
- DA’s CAB initially declined to draft a search warrant; SPCA sought warrants, with Lato allegedly reactivating the case despite prior determinations of no probable cause.
- Lato drafted warrants and an affidavit for Norkelun; he allegedly misrepresented facts and status to support the warrants; SPCA executed searches in March 2010.
- Kanciper was tried in 2010 on animal cruelty and child endangerment charges; most counts were dismissed or acquitted; a single endangerment charge was later reversed and dismissed in 2012.
- In 2012-2013, Kanciper pursued state-court actions against SPCA and others, and then filed this federal action in 2013 asserting §1983 claims and state-law claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Lato’s pre-warrant investigative acts are absolutely immune | Lato acted as prosecutor; pre-warrant conduct should be shielded by immunity. | Only acts connected to judicial proceedings are absolutely immune; pre-warrant investigation is not. | Lato’s pre-warrant investigative acts are not absolutely immune. |
| Whether Lato’s warrant procurement acts are absolutely immune | Lato’s role in obtaining warrants implicates prosecutorial function and shield from liability. | Procurement of warrants, including presenting at hearings, falls within absolute immunity. | Lato’s participation in obtaining warrants is protected by absolute immunity. |
| Whether Spota is protected by absolute immunity | Spota acquiesced in or directed misconduct; should be immune only if acts are prosecutorial. | Spota’s involvement was administrative/investigative and not within prosecutorial role; no absolute immunity. | Spota cannot invoke absolute immunity. |
| Whether the plaintiffs §1983 claims against Lato and Spota survive under qualified immunity | Plaintiff alleges lack of probable cause and malice; defendants’ actions not objectively reasonable. | Arbitrary or arguable probable cause and reasonable belief could shield under qualified immunity. | Qualified immunity denied at this stage; depends on facts to be developed. |
| Whether Eleventh Amendment immunity bars official-capacity or damages claims | Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against individuals in their personal capacities; requests prospective relief against Spota in official capacity. | Official-capacity damages barred; Eleventh Amendment defense applicable. | Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar the §1983 claims here; damages against individuals in their personal capacity remain viable; prospective relief sought is allowed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (U.S. 1976) (prosecutorial absolute immunity for acts connected to judicial process)
- Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (U.S. 1993) (distinguishes prosecutorial from investigative functions for immunity)
- Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (U.S. 1997) (attesting to truth of averments not protected; distinction between role as advocate vs witness)
- Burns v. City of New York, 520 U.S. 259 (U.S. 1997) (appearance in court in support of an application for a search warrant is protected by immunity)
- Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653 (2d Cir. 1995) (immunity extends to persons acting under a prosecutor’s direction when closely tied to judicial process)
- Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1987) (police-like functions and prosecutorial participation; immunity limits)
- Colon v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 78 (N.Y. 1983) (presumption of probable cause in grand jury indictments; exceptions when indictments are dismissed for lack of evidence)
- Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 1996) (arguable probable cause standard for qualified immunity in arrest context)
- Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2007) (clarifies limits of arguable probable cause and immunity scope)
- Moye v. City of New York, 2012 WL 2569085 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (calls for early determination of immunity defenses when possible)