578 U.S. 914
SCOTUS2016Background
- Petitioner Anne Mercy Kakarala sought Supreme Court review after the Ninth Circuit decision; the Court denied certiorari on April 4, 2016.
- The central statutory provision is 28 U.S.C. §1447(d), which states that remand orders are "not reviewable on appeal or otherwise," with limited exceptions Congress created.
- In Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, this Court interpreted §1447(d) to bar review only of remands based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, not all remand orders—a reading at odds with the statute’s plain text.
- Justice Thomas dissented from the denial of certiorari, arguing Thermtron was wrongly decided, has produced lower-court confusion, and should be overruled so courts apply §1447(d) as written.
- The dissent highlights practical problems: splits among circuits over which remands are jurisdictional, additional doctrines (e.g., Kircher) complicating reviewability, and the statutory simplicity principle endorsed in later cases like Hertz v. Friend.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Kakarala) | Defendant's Argument (Wells Fargo) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether this Court should overrule Thermtron and interpret §1447(d) according to its plain text | Thermtron should be overruled; §1447(d) plainly bars all review of remand orders except express exceptions | (Respondent implicitly relies on existing Thermtron precedent that permits some review) | Certiorari denied; Justice Thomas would grant to reconsider Thermtron |
| Whether §1447(d) should be read textually to prohibit appellate review of all remand orders | §1447(d)’s text unambiguously precludes review; Congress’s limited exceptions show intent | Precedent (Thermtron) limits §1447(d) to certain jurisdictional remands | Court did not decide on the merits; dissent urges textualist reading |
| Whether Thermtron has produced unworkable confusion in lower courts | Thermtron created circuit splits and doctrinal complexity requiring resolution | Existing precedent provides workable framework (per prior majority) | No grant to resolve; dissent emphasizes harm and calls for clarity |
| Whether administrative simplicity favors overruling Thermtron | Simplicity of categorical bar favored; complex jurisdictional tests are undesirable | Maintaining precedent preserves settled expectations | Denial of certiorari leaves Thermtron intact; dissent disagrees |
Key Cases Cited
- Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976) (interpreting §1447(d) to bar review only of certain remand orders)
- Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225 (2007) (dissent criticizing erosion of §1447(d)’s plain text)
- Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635 (2009) (addressing splits over reviewability of remands and declined to revisit Thermtron)
- Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996) (resolving whether abstention-based remands are reviewable)
- Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633 (2006) (suggesting some remand orders thought jurisdictional may be reviewable if they rest on other grounds)
- Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010) (endorsing administrative simplicity in interpreting jurisdictional statutes)