Kaiser v. CSL Plasma Inc
2:15-cv-00842
| W.D. Wash. | Mar 2, 2017Background
- Plaintiff Jasmine Kaiser (a transgender woman) sued CSL Plasma alleging discrimination: she was told she had a "lifetime" donor deferment and would be barred from donating at similar centers; claims brought under WLAD and Washington CPA.
- Case was removed to federal court, remanded for insufficient amount, then removed again; parties reported a settlement but the Court later reopened the case after Plaintiff said settlement was not perfected.
- CSL moved to enforce the asserted settlement; the Court found no enforceable settlement agreement and denied enforcement motions.
- Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment to dismiss CSL's defenses that the case was settled and CSL's affirmative defenses: failure to state a claim, preemption, and primary jurisdiction; CSL cross-moved for summary judgment on preemption and primary jurisdiction and sought dismissal of the CPA claim as exempted by federal regulation.
- The core factual dispute relevant to preemption/primary jurisdiction was whether CSL’s donor-deferral practice (categorically deferring transgender donors) was required by FDA law or guidance, or instead unlawfully discriminatory because it deferred on the basis of gender identity rather than individualized risk assessment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the parties reached an enforceable settlement | No enforceable settlement; case should be reopened | Settlement was reached and should be enforced | Court: No enforceable settlement; CSL’s settlement defense dismissed |
| Whether "failure to state a claim" is a proper affirmative defense | It is improper as an affirmative defense; should be raised by motion | (No response) | Court: Defense improper; dismissed with prejudice |
| Whether federal law or FDA regulation preempts state-law claims | WLAD/CPA do not conflict with FDA rules; WLAD requires individualized risk assessment, not categorical bans | FDA regulations/guidance make compliance with WLAD impossible and justify categorical deferrals (conflict preemption) | Court: No conflict preemption shown; preemption defense dismissed |
| Whether primary jurisdiction requires deferring adjudication to FDA | Court/jury can resolve WLAD/CPA claims; FDA lacks authority to determine state-law discrimination claims | FDA guidance on donor eligibility implicates agency expertise; primary jurisdiction should apply | Court: Primary jurisdiction not implicated; defense dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment standard)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment burden allocation)
- Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (agency regulations may preempt state law only when they have force of law; presumption against preemption in areas of state police power)
- Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (local regulations imposing donor/testing requirements not preempted when they don't frustrate federal goals)
- Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (Congressional intent is the touchstone of preemption analysis)
- Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (federal law preempts contrary state law principles)
- Rhoades v. Avon Prods., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151 (efficiency is decisive in primary jurisdiction analysis)
- Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753 (primary jurisdiction framework and limits)