K. v. NORTH ALLEGHENY SCHOOL DISTRICT
2:14-cv-00218
W.D. Pa.Jun 27, 2017Background
- K.K., mother of S.K. (severely disabled: blind, deaf, medically fragile), requested the North Allegheny School District (the District) transport S.K. between his specialized day care (Child’s Way, outside district boundaries) and the Western Pennsylvania School for the Blind (WPSB).
- Child’s Way provided one-to-one nursing care; K.K. presented a physician’s letter and evidence that day care centers inside the District could not accommodate S.K.
- The District provided similar daycare-to-school transportation only for daycares located inside its boundaries and declined K.K.’s request, citing boundary policy, ride-time impact on other medically fragile students, precedent/cost concerns, and the option of contracting with neighboring Shaler School District (quoted cost ~$70–72/day).
- Because transportation was unavailable and K.K. could not arrange private transport, S.K. did not attend school for the 2012–2013 and 2013–2014 school years.
- K.K. sued under Section 504, Chapter 15 (Pa. Code), and Title II of the ADA, asserting associational discrimination and failure to provide a reasonable modification; both parties moved for summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether K.K. stated an associational discrimination claim under ADA/RA/Chapter 15 | District refused a reasonable modification (transport to daycare outside district) needed to permit K.K. equal access to the nonacademic transportation benefit | District applied neutral boundary policy equally to all parents; denial was based on daycare location, ride-time/cost, and precedent, not on association with disabled child | Court denied summary judgment for both sides; evidence created genuine disputes whether refusal was discriminatory and whether individualized inquiry/reasonable accommodation analysis was adequate |
| Whether the requested accommodation was medically necessary / reasonable | K.K. adduces physician letter and evidence that in-district daycares could not serve S.K., so out-of-district daycare was medically necessary | District stresses alternative options (home nursing), lack of formal applications to in-district centers, and that Child’s Way attendance was driven by parent convenience/work schedule | Court held fact question resolved in favor of K.K. for summary judgment purposes: sufficient evidence that out-of-district daycare was medically necessary |
| Whether the District conducted a meaningful individualized inquiry | K.K. says District focused on cost/precedent and failed to engage in an interactive/individualized dialogue about accommodations | District points to emails, internal deliberations, and Ms. Maximo’s declaration showing consideration of ride-time, medical needs of other students, and cost options (Shaler) | Court found genuine factual dispute: reasonable jury could find the inquiry inadequate; also could find it adequate — summary judgment inappropriate |
| Whether the accommodation would be an undue burden or fundamental alteration (liability and damages) | K.K. argues additional ~25 minutes or paying Shaler would not be undue or fundamental and that District failed to prove undue burden | District contends increased ride-time, risks to other medically fragile students, and extra cost would be undue/fundamental alteration | Court concluded disputed factual issues exist about burdens; denied summary judgment on liability and on compensatory damages (also denied K.K.’s motion for damages/equitable relief) |
Key Cases Cited
- Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (reasonable modifications required to provide meaningful access under Rehabilitation Act)
- PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (necessity of individualized inquiry for accommodations)
- Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247 (Rehabilitation Act and ADA standards applied similarly)
- Strathie v. Department of Transportation, 716 F.2d 227 (failure to accommodate may require modification only if not fundamental alteration or undue burden)
- S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248 (intentional discrimination/deliberate indifference standard for damages under ADA/RA)