161 A.3d 154
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.2016Background
- Plaintiffs are the adoptive parents of Z.A.; Z.A.’s father of record is J.P. Plaintiffs allege defendant is a stranger who contacted their family via social media.
- Defendant used Facebook and Instagram to contact Z.A., told Z.A. he was his biological father, disclosed adoption and birth-family information, and posted a composite image including Z.A. publicly on Facebook.
- Plaintiffs attempted mailed cease-and-desist notices to two Pennsylvania addresses; certified mail was returned; regular mail was not returned but personal service failed.
- Plaintiffs moved for substituted service of the summons and complaint via Facebook because the account was the only reliable means of contacting the defendant.
- The court found the social-media accounts were the means by which the alleged harm was caused and that defendant had actively used the Facebook account to contact plaintiffs’ son.
- The court granted substituted service by Facebook, concluded it had specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant based on intentional online targeting of New Jersey residents, and entered the requested injunction restraining contact.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendant | Defendant’s targeted social-media contacts with NJ residents make the state the focal point of the harm, so jurisdiction exists | (Implicit) Defendant is out-of-state; no continuous systematic contacts to support general jurisdiction | Specific jurisdiction exists: defendant’s intentional online targeting supports jurisdiction for claims arising from those contacts |
| Availability of conventional service | Plaintiffs tried personal service and mailed notices to known addresses but could not effectuate service | Defendant had addresses in Pennsylvania; conventional methods available in theory | Conventional personal service unsuccessful; mail returned or undeliverable, so substituted methods appropriate |
| Substituted service via Facebook — due process | Serving via defendant’s active Facebook account is reasonably calculated to notify him and affords opportunity to defend | (Implicit) Social-media service may be unreliable or insufficient in some cases | Service by Facebook permitted here: account active, communications were the conduit of harm, and service was reasonably calculated to notify defendant |
| Appropriateness of injunctive relief | Immediate, irreparable harm to child; no adequate legal remedy; equities favor plaintiffs | Defendant claims he is the child’s father (but can pursue paternity via appropriate proceedings) | Preliminary injunction granted; defendant restrained from contacting plaintiffs/family pending proper legal action for paternity |
Key Cases Cited
- Waste Management v. Admiral Insurance Co., 138 N.J. 106 (discusses general vs. specific jurisdiction)
- World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (effects test for jurisdiction)
- Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (forum as focal point of harm from intentional acts)
- Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446 (internet contacts can support jurisdiction)
- O'Connor v. Altus, 67 N.J. 106 (constitutional due-process standard for notice)
- Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (notice reasonably calculated under all circumstances)
- Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490 (factors for permitting substituted or published service)
- Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126 (standards for granting injunction)