Justine Archer v. State of Indiana, 2017 Ind. LEXIS 658

Background

In Feb 2016 Justine Archer stole Robin Boyer’s 2003 Chevy Trailblazer; the vehicle was recovered about five hours later with fresh red spray paint on its exterior and covering the VIN.
Archer pled guilty to Level 6 felony auto theft and agreed in the plea deal to pay restitution, but the agreement left the restitution amount blank and did not specify how it would be determined.
The State and Archer could not agree on an amount; at a restitution hearing Boyer testified repair cost was $5,240.32, and Archer testified but no witness tied the spray-painting specifically to Archer.
The trial court ordered Archer to pay $5,240.32 in restitution, payable $25/month as a condition of probation; Archer appealed; the State cross-appealed arguing she waived appellate rights in the plea.
The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, finding insufficient evidence that Archer caused the spray-painting; the Supreme Court granted transfer and considered waiver, sufficiency, and ability-to-pay issues.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Archer waived appellate review of the restitution amount by pleading guilty under a plea that left restitution amount blank	State: waiver in plea of right to appeal sentence bars review of restitution	Archer: amount was not a fixed term of the agreement, so appeal waiver doesn’t apply	Waiver inapplicable because restitution amount was not a term of the plea and no mechanism for determining amount was specified; Archer may appeal
Whether evidence supports restitution for spray-paint damage	State: restitution for damage incurred as a result of the crime is supported by vehicle recovered in Archer’s control with fresh paint concealing VIN	Archer: no direct evidence she spray-painted the vehicle, so restitution lacks evidentiary support	Sufficient evidence and reasonable inferences support restitution: damage occurred while vehicle was in Archer’s custody and served the theft’s objective (appearance/VIN concealment)
Whether trial court abused discretion by ordering restitution as condition of probation given Archer’s financial situation	State: Archer agreed to restitution; modest monthly payment appropriate; court not required to further inquire because Archer gave some testimony	Archer: unemployed, no assets, indigent — court failed to ensure ability to pay per statute and precedent	No abuse: Archer provided testimony about finances; court imposed modest $25/mo obligation, acknowledged hardship, and required good-faith effort; this satisfied inquiry and discretion standards
Whether trial court needed additional inquiry into ability to pay	State: record shows Archer expected future employment and agreed to restitution; thus no further inquiry needed	Archer: more probing required to avoid imprisoning indigent probationer for nonpayment	Court: because Archer testified about finances, court satisfied statutory inquiry; Bell requires court inquiry only where neither side provides information

Key Cases Cited

Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134 (Ind. 2013) (plea agreements are binding contracts)
Griffin v. State, 756 N.E.2d 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (contract principles guide plea-agreement interpretation)
Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73 (Ind. 2008) (appeal-waiver clauses in pleas are enforceable when within plea terms)
Bell v. State, 59 N.E.3d 959 (Ind. 2016) (trial court must inquire into ability to pay when neither side supplies information; burden shifts once defendant presents evidence)
Morgan v. State, 49 N.E.3d 1091 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (restitution statute construed strictly against the State)
Little v. State, 839 N.E.2d 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (trial court abuses discretion only if no evidence or reasonable inferences support restitution decision)
Pearson v. State, 883 N.E.2d 770 (Ind. 2008) (distinguishes restitution as probation condition, which requires inquiry into ability to pay, from restitution as money judgment)