Junior Menteer v. United States
806 F.3d 1156
8th Cir.2015Background
- Junior Menteer filed for authorization to file a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion based on Johnson v. United States, arguing the ACCA residual clause is void for vagueness and thus his sentence (imposed relying on that clause) exceeds the statutory maximum.
- Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2), a successive motion must rely on a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court and previously unavailable.
- Eighth Circuit precedent (Woods) had granted similar authorization where the government conceded, but Woods relied on the government’s concession and provided no independent analysis.
- Other circuits (Fifth, Tenth, Eleventh) have held movants relying on Johnson failed to make a prima facie showing that § 2255(h)(2) requirements were satisfied; some circuits reached contrary views (Seventh, First).
- The court stressed that the district court must independently assess whether the statutory criteria for filing a successive § 2255 motion are met and dismiss if they are not, despite this court’s authorization.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Menteer made the prima facie showing under § 2255(h)(2) to authorize a successive motion | Johnson announced a new rule (ACCA residual clause void) retroactive to collateral review, so authorization should be granted | Government conceded in similar cases but government view is not dispositive; other circuits disagree on prima facie showing | Court granted authorization to file the successive § 2255 motion but instructed the district court to independently assess the statutory requirements and dismiss if unmet |
| Whether this court’s preliminary authorization binds the district court | Authorization is a preliminary step to allow filing in district court | District court must not defer and must evaluate the statutory prerequisites itself | District court must independently evaluate and may dismiss if movant fails to meet § 2255(h)(2) criteria |
| Whether government concessions are sufficient for prima facie showing | Concessions can support authorization (as in Woods) | Concessions are not conclusive; courts should analyze statutory criteria | Government concession is insufficient alone; district court should consider other circuits’ analyses |
| Whether circuit split requires district-level consideration | Movant cites circuit precedents granting relief | Other circuits have rejected prima facie showings; contrast requires careful review | District courts should give due consideration to divergent circuit precedent when deciding whether to permit filing |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (held ACCA residual clause is unconstitutionally vague)
- Pakala v. United States, 804 F.3d 139 (1st Cir. 2015) (concluded concession supported authorization)
- Gieswein v. United States, 802 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2015) (held movant failed to make prima facie showing under § 2255(h)(2))
- Rivero v. United States, 797 F.3d 986 (11th Cir. 2015) (similar holding rejecting prima facie showing)
- Price v. United States, 795 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015) (contrary view permitting authorization)
- Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001) (discusses time limits and standards for successive habeas filings)
- United States v. Dawn, 685 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2012) (government’s position is not conclusive in authorization decisions)
- Kamil Johnson v. United States, 720 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2013) (district court must independently dismiss if statutory requirements are not met)