June Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 544 F. App'x 696

Plaintiff June Johnson bought a $77 car battery at Wal‑Mart’s Ridgecrest, CA store on August 3, 2010 and was charged a $9 "recycling fee" listed on her receipt and indicated by a store sign noting some states require a fee.
Johnson alleged Wal‑Mart implied the fee was required by California law when in fact California does not require such a fee.
She filed a putative class action asserting economic injury and fraud-based claims; the district court dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and Rule 9(b) with prejudice.
On appeal Johnson argued she was injured because she paid $9 more than she would have if correctly informed and that Wal‑Mart’s statements were false and misleading.
The Ninth Circuit reviewed whether (1) Johnson alleged a sufficient economic injury‑in‑fact under California law and (2) her fraud allegations met Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirements.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded, concluding Johnson adequately pleaded economic injury and pleaded fraud with sufficient particularity.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether plaintiff alleged economic injury under California law	Johnson paid $9 she would not have paid if told the fee was not legally required	Wal‑Mart argued no cognizable injury; district court found insufficient injury	Reversed: payment of $9 plausibly shows economic injury (surrendered more than she otherwise would have)
Whether Rule 9(b) pleading standards were met for fraud	Johnson pleaded who/what/when/where/how: sign, receipt, date, store, concealment, falsity	Wal‑Mart argued complaint lacked required particularity	Reversed: complaint met Rule 9(b); allegations give Wal‑Mart clear notice of conduct to defend
Whether statements were nonactionable statements of law	Johnson contended the sign/receipt implied a factual assertion that CA required the fee	Wal‑Mart urged misrepresentation of law is not actionable	Court declined to decide on that ground and noted misstatements of law that imply facts can be actionable
Whether cases like Bower or Peterson defeat standing/pleading	Wal‑Mart relied on those cases to argue lack of injury or inadequate pleading	Johnson distinguished them: here she alleged actual overpayment tied to defendant’s conduct	Court held those cases inapposite given Johnson’s allegation she paid more because of the fee

Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.4th 310 (Cal. 2011) (economic injury under California law when plaintiff surrendered more in a transaction)
Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting inducement to spend more constitutes economic injury)
Alvarez v. Chevron Corp., 656 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 2011) (on accepting factual allegations as true on motion to dismiss)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
Bower v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 196 Cal. App.4th 1545 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (distinguishable; addressed opportunity to shop, not actual overpayment)
Peterson v. Cellco P’ship, 164 Cal. App.4th 1583 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (distinguishable; plaintiffs did not allege they paid more due to defendant’s conduct)
Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2003) (Rule 9(b) requires who, what, when, where, how)
In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994) (pleading must explain why statements were false or misleading)
Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2001) (fraud pleading must give defendant clear notice of allegations)
Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616 (9th Cir. 2004) (discusses when misrepresentations of law may be nonactionable)