Julaine K. Appling v. Scott Walker
853 N.W.2d 888
Wis.2014Background
- In 2006 Wisconsin voters ratified Article XIII, §13: "Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized... A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized."
- In 2009 the legislature enacted Wis. Stat. ch. 770, creating a same-sex domestic partnership status with eligibility requirements (same-sex partners, shared residence, age, nonconsanguinity) and a limited subset of statutory rights drawn by amending various statutes.
- Plaintiffs (sponsors/advocates of the Amendment) sued, arguing ch. 770 creates a "legal status substantially similar to marriage" and thus violates the Amendment; Intervening Defendants defended the statute.
- The circuit court and court of appeals upheld ch. 770; the Supreme Court reviewed whether plaintiffs proved unconstitutionality "beyond a reasonable doubt," applying Dairyland’s three-part test (plain meaning, ratification-time debates/practices, and early legislative action).
- The Court emphasized (1) the presumption of constitutionality, (2) the textual meaning of "legal status" as the sum of rights/duties/eligibilities, and (3) contemporaneous statements by Amendment proponents indicating the Amendment targeted "marriage by another name" (e.g., Vermont-style civil unions) but would not bar legislative grants of specific benefits to same-sex couples.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wis. Stat. ch. 770 creates a "legal status identical or substantially similar to" marriage (Art. XIII, §13) | Appling: ch. 770 is substantially similar because it recognizes intimate, exclusive same-sex relationships and shares the "constituent elements" of marriage (two persons, age, capacity, exclusivity, sex-specificity, non-consanguinity) | Intervenors/Government: ch. 770 confers a limited bundle of rights and lacks marriage's essential obligations and cross-jurisdictional recognition; it is not substantially similar | Held: ch. 770 is not unconstitutional; plaintiffs failed to prove unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt; statute survives presumption of constitutionality |
| What method governs interpretation of the Amendment | Plaintiffs: focus on alleged constituent elements of marriage, downplaying bundle-of-rights analysis | Defendants: apply Dairyland—plain meaning, ratification debates/practices, and early legislative action; consider sum of legal rights/duties and eligibility requirements | Held: Dairyland framework applies; "substantially similar" refers to the overall legal status (rights, duties, eligibilities), not merely shared relationship characteristics |
| Role of ratification-era public statements in construing the Amendment | Plaintiffs: argue proponents’ statements should be read narrowly and that voters intended to bar recognition of intimate same-sex relationships | Defendants: point to numerous proponents’ public statements saying the Amendment would not prevent legislative creation of mechanisms granting specific benefits to same-sex couples; voters understood only full marriage-equivalents ("marriage by another name") were barred | Held: contemporaneous statements by proponents support that voters approved an Amendment aimed at blocking full marriage equivalents (e.g., Vermont-style civil unions), not limited-benefit domestic partnerships |
| Weight of the legislature's enactment of ch. 770 as evidence of Amendment meaning | Plaintiffs: dispute legislature as reliable interpreter (shift in political composition) | Defendants: legislature carefully considered Amendment, sought legal opinions, and included a policy declaration that ch. 770 "is not substantially similar to that of marriage" | Held: legislative action provides limited supportive evidence but is not dispositive; combined with other factors it supports constitutionality of ch. 770 |
Key Cases Cited
- Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408 (Wis. 2006) (three-part framework for construing constitutional amendments: plain meaning, ratification debates/practices, and early legislative action)
- McConkey v. Van Hollen, 326 Wis. 2d 1, 783 N.W.2d 855 (Wis. 2010) (describing the Amendment’s ballot language and ratification)
- State v. Smith, 323 Wis. 2d 377, 780 N.W.2d 90 (Wis. 2010) (explaining the heavy burden—prove unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt—and presumption of constitutionality)
- Georgina G. v. Terry M., 184 Wis. 2d 492, 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994) (presumption of constitutionality and burden of proof in constitutional challenges)
- United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (U.S. 2013) (federal treatment distinguishing marriages from state domestic partnerships for certain federal benefits; discussed for context on cross-jurisdictional recognition)
- Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (U.S. 1888) (marriage characterized as a unique legal relation imposing enforceable mutual obligations)