Juan M. Garrett v. State of Indiana
2013 Ind. LEXIS 634
| Ind. | 2013Background
- Victim A.W. was sexually assaulted in one evening; testimony described two separate rapes (Rape A then Rape B) by an older man and two younger men.
- Garrett was charged with two identically worded rape counts (Count I and Count II) arising from the same night.
- First trial: jury acquitted on Count I, deadlocked on Count II; retrial was scheduled solely on Count II and Garrett waived a jury, so retrial was a bench trial.
- Retrial (bench): prosecution presented largely the same evidence; judge convicted Garrett of rape (treated as Class B), and acquitted on confinement.
- Garrett pursued direct appeal (unsuccessful), then filed post-conviction relief arguing state double jeopardy violation under the Richardson "actual evidence" test and ineffective assistance for failing to raise/press that claim.
- Post-conviction court denied relief; Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, held Richardson's actual-evidence test applies post-acquittal/hung-jury retrial, found a state double jeopardy violation on facts here, but affirmed denial of ineffective-assistance claims as counsel’s failure to raise the issue was not prejudicial given then-existing authority.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Garrett) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of Richardson actual-evidence test to retrial after acquittal on one count and hung jury on another | Richardson test should apply to determine whether retrial violates state double jeopardy | Buggs and collateral estoppel doctrine make Richardson unnecessary/ inapplicable to acquittal+retrial context | Richardson actual-evidence test does apply to cases with an acquittal on one charge and retrial on another (Court adopts modified application) |
| Whether retrial and conviction violated Indiana double jeopardy under the actual-evidence test | Retrial presented essentially the same evidentiary facts the jury could have relied on for acquittal, so there is a reasonable possibility the same facts established both offenses | State argued counts and evidence were understood chronologically (Count I = Rape A; Count II = Rape B) and retrial properly focused on Rape B | Court held double jeopardy violation: reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts supporting the acquittal were used to convict at retrial; conviction vacated on state double jeopardy grounds |
| Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object/dismiss on double jeopardy grounds before retrial | Counsel should have objected or moved to dismiss and prevented the unlawful retrial/conviction | Retrial was procedurally permissible; double jeopardy problem arose from evidence presented at retrial, so an objection/motion would not have succeeded | Claim denied: Garrett could not show a reasonable probability that an objection or dismissal motion would have prevailed |
| Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the double jeopardy claim on direct appeal | Appellate counsel unreasonably waived a strong double jeopardy issue | Appellate counsel raised other arguably stronger issues; prevailing authority at the time made the double jeopardy claim weak | Claim denied: issue was not "clearly stronger" than those raised; counsel not ineffective given existing case law (e.g., Buggs) |
Key Cases Cited
- Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999) (announcing the "actual evidence" test for Indiana double jeopardy analysis)
- Lee v. State, 892 N.E.2d 1231 (Ind. 2008) (explaining the "reasonable possibility" standard and evaluating the jury's perspective)
- Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831 (Ind. 2002) (clarifying that actual-evidence test applies to all elements of offenses)
- Buggs v. State, 844 N.E.2d 195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (refusing to extend Richardson to acquittal+retrial context; relied on below)
- Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1978) (prohibiting retrial after a reversal for insufficient evidence; principle against multiple attempts to convict)
- Coleman v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1160 (Ind. 2011) (discussing collateral estoppel as part of double jeopardy protections)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)