519 S.W.3d 572
Tenn. Ct. App.2016Background
- Mother and Father divorced; Father ordered to pay monthly child support and to satisfy an existing arrearage judgment.
- Mother filed a post-divorce petition alleging multiple counts of criminal contempt for Father’s failure to pay child support and medical expenses and also sought a judgment for arrearages and attorney’s fees under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c).
- After a hearing the trial court found Father guilty of one count of criminal contempt, entered a judgment for arrearages and medical expenses, and suspended a short jail sentence when Father paid the owed amounts.
- The trial court awarded Mother attorney’s fees both for enforcement of the child-support judgment (under § 36-5-103(c)) and for prosecution of the criminal contempt petition, reasoning the contempt action served a dual purpose (vindicating court authority and collecting support).
- Father appealed, arguing (1) § 29-9-103(b) and the statutory contempt scheme do not authorize attorney’s fees as punishment for criminal contempt, and (2) awarding fees for criminal contempt would raise constitutional issues; the State intervened.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the award of attorney’s fees tied to the criminal contempt petition, affirming fees for enforcement of the child-support judgment were proper (that portion was not challenged on appeal).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Watts) | Defendant's Argument (Watts) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c) authorizes awarding attorney’s fees incurred prosecuting a petition for criminal contempt that arises in a child-support/custody context | § 36-5-103(c) authorizes fees in proceedings involving enforcement of support and has been applied to contempt petitions arising in support/custody disputes; the contempt here had an enforcement element | Criminal contempt’s purpose is to vindicate court authority, not to enforce private rights; § 29-9-103(b) fixes permissible punishment for criminal contempt and is silent as to attorney’s fees, so fees are unauthorized absent explicit statutory/contractual provision | Reversed: § 36-5-103(c) does not authorize recovery of attorney’s fees for prosecution of criminal contempt; fees for enforcement of the support judgment remain available |
| Whether awarding attorney’s fees for prosecuting criminal contempt would violate Article VI, § 14 of the Tennessee Constitution | (alternative) award is permissible and consistent with statutory enforcement goals | Constitutional challenge raised but not necessary to decide if no statutory authority exists | Court declined to address the constitutional claim because it resolved the case on statutory grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- Ahern v. Ahern, 15 S.W.3d 73 (Tenn. 2000) (distinguishing civil and criminal contempt remedies and purposes)
- Black v. Blount, 938 S.W.2d 394 (Tenn. 1996) (discussing limits on contempt power and nature of sanctions)
- Doe v. Bd. of Prof’l Resp. of Supreme Court of Tenn., 104 S.W.3d 465 (Tenn. 2003) (criminal contempt preserves court authority; civil contempt coerces compliance)
- Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (fees awarded in custody/support litigation but fees there were tied to custody litigation, not the criminal contempt sanction itself)
- House v. Estate of Edmonson, 245 S.W.3d 372 (Tenn. 2008) (reaffirming American rule: attorney’s fees require statutory or contractual authorization)
- Reed v. Hamilton, 39 S.W.3d 115 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (attorney’s fees may be compensatory damages in civil contempt contexts)