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House v. Estate of Edmondson
245 S.W.3d 372
Tenn.
2008
Check Treatment

*1 mаjority to determine that would allow the apply. Faced with

which standard record, majority left to

inadequate that a pronouncement

make the abstract suspicion applies standard

reasonable assigned who are to schools

those officers assigned duties “regular

on a basis” and that he or she be considered

“such as well as a law enforcement

school official necessary of the facts Deprived

officer.” issue, majority properly resolve case to the trial court

simply remands this trial the record in order for the “develop probable

court to determine whether the ap- suspicion

cause or reasonable standard truck.” I

plies to the search of R.D.S.’s a second provide

would not R.D.S. with develop an issue that he

opportunity to to raise at trial and would await

neglected properly in which the issue was case respectfully I dissent.

preserved.

J.O. HOUSE OF J.K. EDMONDSON.

ESTATE Tennessee,

Supreme Court Memphis.

Nov. 2007 Session.

Jan.

OPINION CLARK, J., A. delivered CORNELIA court, in opinion BARKER, C.J., and M. *3 WILLIAM M. HOLDER and WILLIAM C. JANICE WADE, KOCH, JR., JJ., joined. GARY R. J., dissenting. closely minority

A shareholder held corporation Tennessee filed derivative majority claiming company’s that the suit shareholder, corpo- who also served as the and chairman of its president ration’s directors, misappropriated corpo- board of minority rate funds. The shareholder also major- filed an individual claim alleging that he breached a ity shareholder agreement in which the pre-incorporation agreed to avail- majority shareholder offer and corporation to the other able stock purchasing the stock shareholders before appointed litigation himself. A committee investigate the alle- majority gations against the shаreholder charges. litigation The found merit to the corpora- recommended to the committee either settle the company tion that proceed litiga- claim or with the derivative majority if shareholder was unwill- tion the in accordance ing to resolve the lawsuit proposed by the committee. with terms litigation trial court found that committee’s recommendations findings and interests corporation’s in the best were reached, that, was once a settlement suit would be dismissed. derivative Tennessee, Edwards, Memphis, Tim summary granted trial also court Arkansas, Rubens, Memphis, Kent J. West on majority to the shareholder judgment House. appellant, for the J.O. contract claim and breach of individual Tennessee, Feibelman, Memphis, for Jef request minority shareholder’s denied Edmondson. appellee, Estate J.K. attorney’s fees. The Court of for acceptance court’s affirmed the trial II, McQuiston, Memphis, Tennes- John report and the denial litigation committee’s Ram-Tenn, see, intervenor, Inc. for the minority share- attornеy’s fees to the Stranch, III, Wall, holder, grant Michael J. trial court’s James G. reversed the but Leniski, Nashville, Tennessee, majority summary judgment P. and Joe Curiae, breach of contract The Plumbers and shareholder on the for the Amicus to determine: accepted claim. review Pension Fund. We Pipefitters Local 572 (1) in a controlled Edmondson plaintiff whether shareholder’s has been throughout corporate its existence. brought on behalf of a for- derivative suit attorney’s profit corporation recover plaintiff examined Ram- (2) fees; and whether the trial court was Tenn’s financial records and discovered adopting correct findings misusing corpo- had been Edmondson report. committee’s We hold discovered, rate funds. The that Tennessee law does not authorize an corpo- that Edmondson had used example, award of fees to a money premiums rate insurance brought shareholder’s suit owned, another business that he tuition for for-profit corporation. behalf of a alsoWe attending college, an individual and various *4 hold that the trial court did not err in personal expenses. plaintiff also dis- approving sufficiently independent, the that had Ram- covered Edmondson used thoroughly litiga- researched the report of Tenn to make to a funds contributions tion Accordingly, judg- committee. the corporation church and had used another ment of the of Appeals Court as to those ownership which he had an interest to issues is affirmed. products bill Ram-Tenn for and services at prices. inflated Background

Factual and Procedural Following discovery the of Edmondson’s appeal This arises out of a derivative funds, corporate plaintiff, misuse of the on action initiated in the Chancery Court for 12, 1999, April filed this shareholder deriv- Shelby County Ram-Tenn, on behalf of against alleging ative action Edmondson (“Ram-Tenn”), closely Inc. a held Tennes- fiduciary that he had violated his obli- House, corporation, minority see J.O. a gations complaint, to Ram-Tenn. The shareholder of Ram-Tenn. The suit was sought monetary damages as well filed against corporation’s majority the relief, injunctive claimed that Edmondson’s shareholder, Edmondson, alleging J.K. minority actions caused stockholders to misappropriated Edmondson had cor- suffer a decrease in the value of their porate personal funds his use. The investments. In addition to the derivative plaintiff sought monetary damages and in- suit, a against the filed claim junctive against relief Edmondson on be- a breaching pre-incorpo- Edmondson half of Ram-Tenn. Ram-Tenn intervened agreement ration which Edmondson in the lawsuit. agreed to offer available shares of stock to corporation and other shareholders be- Edmondson, and buying fore the stock himself. See Hall individuals, along with seven other formed Co., Tenn. Dressed Beef Ram-Tenn for the purpose building, (Tenn.1997) (holding that shareholders buying, managing hotels and restau- may bring derivative and individual claims rants. At the time Ram-Tenn was simultaneously). subsequently Ram-Tenn formed, Edmondson owned 25% of the intervened in lawsuit and a became company’s By stock. Edmondson party. majority shareholder, owning was 62% suit, cоmpany’s response plaintiffs stock. He was also the Ram- president appointed of Ram-Tenn and chairman of Tenn’s board of directors McLaren, plaintiff, Memphis lawyer, its board of directors. The Michael to minority one-person litigation shareholder of Ram-Tenn since serve as a committee inception, company’s investigate plaintiffs allegations its owned 5% of the dispute charged stock. There is no that Ram-Tenn Edmondson. The board McLaren, $552,501. who affiliation with Ram-Tenn The trial paying had no found that findings court McLaren’s any Ram-Tenn or with parties, corporation’s recommendations were in the responsibility determining how the cor- that, interests and a settlement best once poration respond should to the suit. Ram- reached, the suit would be was was specific charge Tenn’s to McLaren dismissed.3 trial court also directed “independent judgment use business any paid part funds Edmondson as whether, determine in the best interest of placed in escrow settlement be corporation, should be any appeal. Finally, trial pending continued, dismissed, settled.” granted summary judgment court conducting investigation After with Edmondson individual accounting firm, the assistance of an pre- claim that had Edmondson breached report McLaren issued an initial and then incorporation agreement. Accordingly, concluding supplemental court the trial found that Edmondson $552,501 Edmondson had misappropriated properly owned 62% of Ram-Tenn’s stock. Ram-Tenn personal from for his use. trial pending the case was While McLaren recommended to *5 court, that attor- plaintiff requested the for parties that the settle the lawsuit that him theo- ney’s fees be awarded to on the to avoid of expense amount the further ry against that the suit derivative litigation. Specifically, McLaren recom- corporation. had the Edmondson benefited that Ram-Tenn pay mended Edmondson Appeals The trial court and the of Court $552,501, would the dis- attorney’s to award fees based on declined according to to their tribute shareholders that their principle litigants the must interests, ownership any amounts that less attorney’s or an own fees absent a statute McLaren shareholders chose to waive.1 The agreement providing otherwise. parties further if the recommended courts below reasoned that the statutes settle, unwilling to Ram-Tenn were should governing for-profit corporations such the pursue derivative claim do not an award of provide Ram-Tenn for moved the Edmondson. Ram-Tenn trial attorney’s bringing fees to a shareholder See accept report. court to McLaren’s action. The Court of derivative 48-17-401(c) (2002) (a Ann. Tenn.Code prop- court further concluded that the trial “may suit or not be discontinued erly approved report. McLaren’s Howev- approval”).2 settled without the court’s er, in a divided Appeals, the of Court Following hearings in which multiple the decision, summary grant reversed the McLaren, testified, others plaintiff, plaintiffs the judgment to Edmondson ‍‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‍on court, 16, 2004, January ap- trial the claim. individual breach of contract With claim, this intermediate proved recommending rеspect McLaren’s disputed is- the case be Edmondson court found there were settled language cited statutes 1.Ninety percent payments were 2. Because the of such even- changed in effect tually waived has not from version Ram-Tenn’s shareholders. commenced, we prin- year this cite suit It should also be noted that Ram-Tenn’s asset, Nashville, the most recent edition. cipal a hotel in was sold for $3,400,000 reports before were McLaren’s is- company parties' McLaren the deriva- sued. described 3. The briefs indicate that "nonfunctioning.” company subject to the reports as has in fact settled is tive suit been pending the outcome of apparently wind-up approval the con- of the trial court and mode appeal. litigation. clusion of this Corp., fact Tobacco concerning plaintiffs sues of Williamson (Tenn.2000), public on several based knowledge acquisition of Edmondson’s First, policy litiga considerations. since additional stock for statute of limitations uncertain, party should inherently tion is purрoses. part This of the intermediate merely bringing for penalized not be court’s decision—which the case remanded defending a lawsuit. Fleischmann Distill plain- for a determination of whether Co., Brewing v. Maier 386 U.S. ing Corp. timely— tiffs breach of contract claim was 714, 718, 1404, 18 L.Ed.2d 475 87 S.Ct. has not challenged been this Court. (1967), superseded by statute on other claim individual 2, 1975, Act of Pub.L. No. grounds, Jan. against Edmondson is not before us.4 93-600, Second, poor Stat.1955. Analysis might unjustly discouraged from insti tuting rights if actions vindicate their Attorney’s I. Fees penalty losing paying included primary issue before us is Third, lawyer. opponent’s fees of their Id. whether a shareholder’s de party responsible each to be requiring brought rivative suit on behalf of a for- legal promotes their own fees settlement. profit corporation may attorney’s recover Huizar, Allstate Ins. Co. v. 52 P.3d The trial court fees. found that Tennessee (Colo.2002). Fourth, time, ex provide law does not for an of attor award pense, difficulty litigating inherent in ney’s fees to a derivative suit appropriate amount involving for-profit company. Thе Court layer to award would add another Appeals agreed, holding that the stat litigation and burden the courts and the *6 governing for-profit corporations utes do parties ancillary proceedings. with contemplate attorney’s an award of Fleischmann, 718, 87 S.Ct. 386 U.S. fees to a plaintiff. The intermediate court general principle, as a attorney’s further concluded that fees were public American rule reflects the idea not available under the common fund doc policy by litigants bearing best is served agree. trine. We legal regardless their own fees of the out come of the case. begin our analysis We of this issue Tennessee, by noting juris like most however, rules, with most there As dictions, adheres to the “American rule.” rule. exceptions are to the American One John Kohl Ewing, & Co. v. Dearborn & exceptions of these is the common fund (Tenn.1998). 528, pro doctrine. common fund doctrine American provides party rule that a in a attorney’s may vides that fees be awarded may attorney’s civil action not recover fees in litigant when the efforts of succeeds specific statutory absent a contractual or “securing, augmenting, preserving or provision providing attorney’s for fees as money in property or a fund which part prevailing party’s damages. of the in people other are entitled to share com Id. Williams, 541 mon.” Travelers Ins. Co. v. (Tenn.1976). rule, In that The American which has been de S.W.2d event, fund or by “firmly scribed this Court as estab the beneficiaries of the state,” may in to contribute to property required lished this State v. Brown & away passed 4. Edmondson December 2006 Court substituted Edmondson’s estate as in pending while Court of the case was proper party. Appeals. Upon parties, motion of the an of attor- law authorizes award attorney’s by having fees nessee litigant’s fund or assessed those fees a derivative suit ney’s fees to Eyrich, itself. Kline property corpora- brought for-profit on behalf of (Tenn.2002). Designed to S.W.3d time, clearly law At one Tennessee tion. attorney’s among fees the various spread an such award. permitted property, to the fund or beneficiaries Tennessee Code Anno- legislature enacted important purposes. doctrine serves two 48-718, provided tated section First, benefi- prevents doctrine award of both being un- legal services from ciaries 48-718(4), defendants. Under section pay them to justly requiring enriched [brought on the suit behalf “[i]f according to the bene- for those services successful, ... profit] Second, serves fit the doctrine received. [plaintiff] award the reason- the court litigation propor- spread the costs of attorneys’ and reasonable expenses able all of the beneficiaries so tionally among even further and This section went fees.” the en- does not bear that the declare a the court “shall provided tire alone. burden corpo- recovery made upon lien omitted). (citations Id. [plain- to the payment ration to secure the fund doc the common Whether attorneys of the plaintiffs] tiff] [the question is a applies given trine ease Ann. Tenn.Code amount thus awarded.”5 at 203. the cоurt to decide. Id. of law for 48-718(4). Additionally, under section standard Accordingly, appropriate 48-718(5), “that the finding if there was a novo, according no appeal is de review on reasonable brought without suit was to the trial of correctness presumption cause,” [plain- “may require the court However, “upon find Id. court’s decision. parties named party tiff] appli fund doctrine is ing that the common the reasonable or defendants as defendant cable, attorney’s fees is allowance of ‘[t]he in- attorneys, including fees expenses, trial largely ... the discretion ” of such by them the defense curred (first original) alteration court.’ Id. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d suit.” (quoting Aaron v. *7 (Tenn.1995)). a trial Consequently, Assembly updated the General upheld unless court’s award of fees will In the corporation statutes. Tennessee’s discretion, “meaning it its has abused so, Assembly the process doing General legal stan applied an incorrect it either Model Business the revised considered clearly unreasonable or reached a dard (MBCA). Kra See Corporаtion Act of 1984 injustice. in Id. at resulting an decision” Industries, Inc., 60 S.W.3d Piper del 203-04. (Tenn.2001). already- Like the Statutory Law

A. 48-718, statute, section existing Tennessee the provided for specifically the MBCA turn to by principles, we Guided these by success attorney fees both recovery of Ten- issue before us—whether precise the attorney’s plaintiff, reasoned ap a derivative by 48-718 Although its terms section derivative necessary con for-profit corporations, it was in shareholder plied to fees were apply by Appeals to to not- encourage strued the Court of shareholders and assist suits “to well. See Hanne for-profit corporations as justified claims for the benefit pursuing ... in Inc., Cmtys., 651 S.W.2d 222 wald v. they have a valid corporations which in Fairfield Hannewald, inter (Tenn.App.1983). the interest.” Id. at 230. court, attorney’s to awarding fees in mediate ful attor- plaintiffs contemplates and defendants. See Model vision award of 7.46(1) (“On Corp. ney’s Bus. Act termination fees to a if the derivative defendant basis, proceeding may legal of the derivative the cоurt suit has no factual or but no pay entitling plaintiffs attorney’s ... the to plain provision order the fees, expenses (including tiffs reasonable coun as the former statute did. For what- fees) reason, in proceeding....”); Assembly specifi- sel incurred the ever the General 7.46(2) (“On §Act Corp. cally provision. Model Bus. ter chose not to include such a proceeding mination of Accordingly, apparent it is to us that ... may court order the legislature affirmatively considered (in any defendant’s reasonable expenses in and determined the circumstances fees) cluding defending counsel incurred in attorney’s be awarded in a proceeding....”). the General Moreover, shareholder derivative suit. Assembly, revising in corpora Tennessee’s Assembly’s not General decision statutes, tion had before it two clear meth 48-17-401(d) plaintiffs in include section plaintiffs ods allow successful to contin may interpreted not be as silence on the ability attorney’s ue to have the to receive body replaced issue. That a statute that suits; fees in shareholder derivative permitted plaintiffs successful and defen (1) legislature adopted could either have attorney’s dants to recover fees in a deriv 7.46(1) language section permitting only ative action with a statute (2) MBCA or reincorporated existing sec attorney’s successful defendants to recover tion 48-718 into the updated legislation. fees. While the dissent views this course However, silence,” “legislative Tennessee Business Cor- of action as we do poration (TBCA), Act of 1986 as adopted change not. This Court has stated that a legislature and codified at Tennes- presumption the law statute raises a see Code departure Annotated sections 48-11-101 that a from the old law was (2002 intended, Turner, to -27-103 Supp.2006), & does State v. language (Tenn.2006),

include similar merely to that found in 527 and not an omis either Tennessee Code Annotated part legisla section sion or mistake on the 48-718(4) 7.46(1) we, or section of the MBCA. ture. like the While drafters Instead, TBCA, MBCA, in enacting legisla- might permitting see merit suc repealed ture section 48-7186 its entire- cessful in a derivative action to ty fees, and chose not to include all of the recover it is not for this suggested language question found the MBCA. Court to wisdom of stat Instead, As the was utory TBCA written 1986 and as scheme. are to we con today, it reads corresponding apply there is no strue and the law written. See *8 48-718(4) 7.46(1) Resorts, provision to either or in Inc. v. Carson Creek Vacation Revenue, 1, act allowing plaintiff the a successful 2 Dept. State 865 S.W.2d of (Tenn.1993). attorney’s Instead, Therefore, leg- recover fees. the conclude that we adopted islature what is now Tennessee not controlling simply pro the statutes do 48-17-401(d), attorney’s Code Annotated section vide for an award of fees recovery attorney’s involving which limits the of in derivative actions only corporations. Although fees in derivative actions to successful the dis for-profit Thus, so, essentially urges section 48-718 was ex- sent us to do we defendants. pressly repealed judicially repealed a replaced pro- with decline to resurrect 1984, repealed by 6. section 48-718 was renumbered as were the TBCA. See Tenn.Code -721, (2002). repealed §§ 48-1-718. section Sections 48-1-701 to -721 Ann. 48-1-701 to

380 rely amicus also plaintiff The and the

statute, equitable might it no matter how case, McBrayer unreported v. Dixie an McRedmond v. upon to do so. See seem 560, Co., Marianelli, 144 Mercerizing 176 Tenn. No. M2004-01496- Estate of (Tenn.1940) (Tenn.Ct. 764, (holding that COA-R3-CV, 768 S.W.2d 2805158 WL “cannot, course, guise under the 2006). courts of case, In that the trial Sept.29, App. [statutes]”). amend or alter of construction derivative action court in a shareholder’s a Ken attorney’s fees awarded B. Law Case Kentucky’s pursuant tucky company amicus curiae plaintiff and the in The issue common fund doctrine. maintain, agrees, that even and the dissent McRedmond, by parties, framed as authority statutory in the absence of “erred in its whether the trial court was fees, fees should attorney’s such award of fund Kentucky common application fund under the common be recoverable ordering Kentucky corpo in [the doctrine derivative suits doctrine because successful attorneys’ fees and ex ration] upon corporation. confer a benefit plaintiffs.” derivative Id. penses [ ] Moun v. Lookout They rely upon Grant award affirming the trial court’s at *7. (Tenn. Co., 691, tain 93 Tenn. 28 S.W. fees, that noted the Court may 1894), attorney’s that fees which held case is Ken applicable law this “[t]he plaintiff awarded to a shareholder ‍‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‍be the inter Despite Id. at *4. tucky law.” problem action. Id. at 93. Kentucky that court’s declaration mediate Grant, upon reliance plaintiff’s with however, court went governed, law however, that the case was decided before it was question to state adoption of the nearly century before the (ei common fund doctrine “whether the Act, Corporation Business Tennessee law) Kentucky under Tennessee ther type out the of cases plainly which sets facts of this case. We applies under the awarded. may be Regardless at *20. that it does.” Id. find 48-17-401(d). Ann. See Tenn.Code actually applied was of which state’s law one are not present such as the Cases McRedmond, dispositive that case is not gov in the statutes those included among To the extent present сase. corporations. erning for-profit to conflict construed McRedmond subsequent abrogated by has been Grant today, it is overruled. with our decision such, and, not as does changes the law rely and the amicus Finally, urged by compel the result where, noted, upon Hannewald and the amicus.7 rejected explicitly 48-718 was via section argues that Grant remains 7. The dissent into the legislature when not included despite repeal 48-718. Re of section ble Schantz, statutory general con rule of new “As lying Electric Co. v. Act. on Tucson Gas & struction, language (Ariz.Ct. change in the Ariz.App. 428 P.2d Jordon, departure from the old indicates that a 16 S.W.3d statute App.1967), Lavin v. Lavin, language (Tenn.2000), was intended.” the dissent asserts Therefore, intentionally removing abrogated explicitly a common law rule is 48-718, Assembly placed the General clearly section reflects unless the statute statute *9 it, with the TBCA. rule at odds the common law legislative so. As we see intent to do stated, And, law, however, previously this Court has as abrogation of the common Grant, between the com there is a conflict explicit “[w]hen intend was and reflected in statute, 1968, provisions] of law a mon and legislature. the General by ed (quoting Id. at 368 prevail.” com statute must Assembly the common law subsumed Co., Tenn. R.R. 126 Illinois Cent. Sub Graves v. 48-718. fund doctrine into section mon 148, 239, (Tenn.1912)). S.W. 242 passed in 148 TBCA was sequently, when the testified, court, January trial awarding attorney’s Appeals, Court of report recom- plaintiff approved fees to a in a shareholder deriva McLaren’s suit, attorney’s by that mending tive reasoned that the case be settled $552,501. necessary encourage “to and assist paying were Ram-Tenn Edmondson 48-17-401(c) (deriv- justified ... in pursuing shareholders Ann. See TenmCode of corporations claims for the benefit “may not be discontinued ative suits they Hanne have valid interest.” approval”). settled without the court’s wald, Hanne Citing 651 S.W.2d at 280. find- found that McLaren’s The trial court wald, plaintiff argue and amicus that cor- were ings and recommendations attorney’s disallowing plaintiffs fees to will that, interests and once poration’s best chill shareholder derivative be reached, suit sеttlement was the derivative minority prac cause shareholders lack the If the case failed to would be dismissed. corporate tical to hold fiduciaries means settle, proceed. would the derivative action They accountable for their actions. assert maintains that the trial plaintiff contingency arrangements fee would re- approving court erred in McLaren’s purpose serve no beneficial because the According plaintiff, to the McLaren port. itself, client, corporation not the would re improperly investigation limited his any proceeds litigation, ceive of the years prior activities to four Edmondson’s clients would have the financial few plaintiff filing complaint. hourly means to an fee. It seems to investigation that had the been contends us that arguments while these are not by going broadened back further McLaren given complex unreasonable nature of larger misap- sums would have discovered litigation, derivative their merits should be Edmondson. The propriated lеgislature, body addressed for that that McLaren’s should also asserts policy depart has made a choice to from be- rejected by been the trial court have providing attorney’s former law fees in cause conclusions and recommenda- involving for-profit corporations. cases inadequate an product tions were the Furthermore, that, Grant, we note like re- investigation. Resolving these issues predates adoption Hannewald context quires they be viewed Corporation Tennessee Business Act. principles. of certain well-established Thus, Hannewald is of little avail to the plaintiff. Generally, proper party “the sum, bring corporation we hold that Tennessee law a claim on behalf of a does not authorize an its acting through award itself fees to a deriva- majority shareholder’s of its directors or sharehold Fox, Fund, involving for-profit corporation. tive suit Daily Income Inc. v. ers.” statute, If application 523, 531-32, of the relevant 104 S.Ct. U.S. 48-17-401(d), (1984). However, namely produces section since L.Ed.2d 645 result,8 unfаir or unintended the answer have the courts of this state least changing lies in the statute. rights to enforce the been available their stockholders corporations Litigation Report II. Committee’s action. through what is called a derivative (8 Wilson, Tenn. Following multiple hearings See Deaderick Baxt.) (1874). McLaren, A action is a plaintiff, which the and others was due to suggested to in section 48-17-401 8. Plaintiff’s counsel has attorney's drafting." the omission of fees for "bad Court that *10 judgment own business for that the brought by one or more shareholders suit committee’s. Id. at 224. to redress an corporation on behalf of a duty to enforce a injury by, sustained case, plaintiff In the does not corporation. See Bourne v. to, owed the appoint decision to challenge Ram-Tenn’s Williams, (Tenn.Ct. S.W.2d litiga one-person McLaren to serve as a action is an App.1981). a derivative Nor does the tion committee. that the exception to the rule independence or his challenge McLaren’s bring to suit on proper party itself is the Rather, argu goоd faith.9 the its own behalf. rejecting for McLaren’s cen ments Tennessee, jurisdic like other proce McLaren acted with ter on whether tions, ap approved corporation’s has a fairness and whether his conclusions dural individual or pointment independent of an product were the and recommendations committee, group, special litigation called a inadequate investigation. merits of assessing as a mechanism for employed by procedure As to the action and for a shareholder’s derivative McLaren, argues that McLar corpora making recommendations scope of his improperly en restricted Lewis its resolution. See concerning tion records to 1994— review of Ram-Tenn’s (Tenn.Ct. 215, 222-24 Boyd, 838 S.W.2d filing of the com years prior four recognized, As our courts have App.1992). limit his plaint. deciding inquiry “provide a le litigation these committees forward, applied McLaren period expressing corpora gitimate vehicle three-year repose found at statute Id. litigation.” interest tion’s. Annotated section 48-18- Tennessee Code that a shareholder deriva 223. Given governs alleging actions tive action cannot be dismissed or settled fiduciary duty by a director or breach of approval, Tenn.Code Ann. without court corporation. That statute officer of a 48-17-401(e), deciding courts whether of limitations for adopts one-year statute accept committee’s recommen claims, provides that no “[i]n such but factors, in a number of dations consider brought any shall such action be event cluding independence, committee’s (3) years after the date on more than three faith, fairness, and the good procedural occurred, or violation which the breach of the committee’s conclusions soundness conceal Lewis, there is fraudulent except when and recommendations. defendant, part ment on critically Although at 225. courts should action shall be commenced which case the and rec findings evaluate the committee’s (1) is or year” after breach within one they determine whether ommendations to faith, have discovered. Tenn.Code should been good supported made in are were (2002). McLaren, rely §Ann. 48-18-601 investigation, and are the record of the framing ing upon in section 48-18-601 corporation’s best consistent with the a three- investigation, applied terests, scope of his they not substitute their should undisputed in this case litiga- at 224. It is evaluating independence of a committee, consider factors such with Ram-Tenn or tion courts had no affiliation McLaren committee, committee as the size of the appointed any parties when Ram-Tenn relationship corporation's members’ with the Further, undisputed that McLaren him. it is directors, qualifications and their officers attorney years, has been a licensed experience, scope the committee’s au- focusing practice in the area of commer- autonomy thority, the committee's from litigation. cial Lewis, 838 S.W.2d the officers and directors. *11 of section 48-18- the ambit squarely an addi- within repose of and added year statute Therefore, periods limitations set year any for fraudulent concealment tional (six years in sections 28-3-109 forth occurred.10 The may have (ten contract) and 28-3-110 breach of that McLaren should have maintains provided expressly “not years for eases investigation scope of his broadened conclude, for”) as apply. not we do by covering ten-year period even further did, that McLaren the Court of Code Annotated section under Tennessee scope of his limit the improperly did not (2000), provides 28-3-110 investigation. for” must be expressly provided “cases not years ten after commenced within argues also The Alternatively, the of action accrues. cause recommenda conclusions and McLaren’s that McLaren should have plaintiff argues inadequate are the of an product tions investigation of scope

broadened are inconsistent with investigation and six-year period under Tennes- covering In consider best interests. corporation’s Annotated section 28-3-109 see Code issue, that courts take into ing this we note (2000), period applicable the limitations to determining account several factors contract breach of actions. inves adequacy litigation of a committee’s argument that McLaren plaintiff’s The length factors include the tigation. These improperly scope limited the of his investi- investigation, the commit scope and un- gation into Edmondson’s activities is the cor independent experts, tee’s use of persuasive. legislature clearly has poration’s or the defendant’s involvement provided a to period applicable limitations and investigation, adequacy and the type cases of this in section 48-18-601. to reliability supplied of the information terms, Lewis, applies its own that statute at 224. Under the committee. Moreover, “[a]ny alleging assessing to action of fidu- whether the com breach that is in the ciary duties directors or officers” of a mittee has reached decision interests, courts consid- corporation’s falls best corporation. presеnt case questioned why he 10. When at trial as to only year any by any added additional fraud- one no effort was made 6. That little or occurred, ulent have concealment that inquire even as shareholder to monitor or judgment McLaren testified that he made a Ram-Tenn, Inc. to the affairs of investiga- period call the time of the to limit years prior filing tion to four to the of the (or any plaintiff] other share- [the 10. That practical complaint because of the cost and holder) diligence, any due in the exercise of difficulty getting prior records Ram-Tenn’s and could have ascertained the nature [sic] stated, that time. As he Ram-Tenn had to misappropriations extent of Edmondson’s period prior few records for the to any time. longer have taken and been more it would language findings McLaren’s Given costly keep digging beyond years. The four requiring 48-18-601 found within section preponderate against these evidence does part on the fraudulent concealment Moreover, findings. in the commit- defendant in order to extend statute report, tee McLaren stated: beyond year, one see Tenn.Code limitations matter, great After a deal of work on 48-18-601, to ex- McLaren’s decision Ann. can be drawn: some definite conclusions scope review of his tend the prior filing many years to the as four [by made 3. That little or no effort was generous plain- appears lawsuit misappropria- to conceal the Edmondson] tions, tiff. misappropriated and the sums would reviewing apparent anyone have been books, accounts, and records.... *12 nothing the suc- tion and that was concealed from er the likelihood that will merits, financial burden on Edmondson as ceed on the the him. McLaren described case, litigating the the “open willing provide” the and whatever he permit will the Indeed, extent to which dismissal it is uncontraverted requested. benefits, improper and defendant to retain all that McLaren examined of Ram-Tenn’s continuing litigation the the will effect that could be located. records corporation’s reputаtion. the Id. have on reflects that McLaren The record also principles, of these we note that Mindful thousands deposed witnesses and reviewed the record before us establishes supplied by and of documents McLaren, liti- experienced an commercial times with others. He also met several began investigation his in December gator, useful provide individuals who could infor- in 1999 and rendered his first Octo- others, including, among the custo- mation July supplemental report ber 2000 and a in records, corporate of Ram-Tenn’s dian Thus, investigation McLaren’s Edmondson, counsel, plaintiff, spanned During nineteen months. Further, lawyers. their McLaren re- time, accounting firm to employed he an transfers, concerning viewed the law stock of at investigation assist in the at cost limitations, damages, and the statutes of $50,000 least to Ram-Tenn. The account- special litigation role of committees. The hours on the case. ing spent firm arriving in record also demonstrates that per- firm spent McLaren’s law 313 hours the case be at his recоmmendation investigation at a cost of forming the settled, account a num- McLaren took into Further, $70,000 to Ram-Tenn. McLaren relevant factors —“the likelihood of ber of in- in the hotel expert consulted with merits, extraordinary on the success dustry, along apprais- with the real estate case,11 expense going forward with the er involved in the sale of Ram-Tenn’s ho- delay wrapping up in the affairs of the only tel in Nashville. did nonfunctioning corporation, age employ experts to assist McLaren outside eighties in and in who was [Edmondson lengthy investigation, spent many he health], poor length of time involved to the case himself. hours —at least 250—on ease, try appel- and the almost certain Furthermore, we note that McLaren’s following any trial.” In the process late along reports, reports, with exhibits in ac- event Edmondson refused to settle extensive, encompassing are detailed specified terms his re- cordance with accounting firm’s pages. hundreds of that Ram- ports, McLaren recommended sixty-three pages itself is report by against him. pursue Tenn the case inquiry. areas of length and details the record before upon Based the extensive reports, along exhibits to the Numerous us, ar- unconvincing find we testimony with the of McLaren and conclusions and gument that McLaren’s him, than accountant who assisted more product of an recommendations were the efforts adequately reflect their extensive Indeed, investigation. it is dif- inadequate uncovering Edmondson’s activities. pinpoint more McLaren ficult what that none of Ram- McLaren testified in the nineteen months could have done attempted or directors Tenn’s officers investigation on be- receiving any informa- that he conducted prevent him from $250,000 attorneys’s fees alone. estimated that to continue 11. McLaren litigation "far in excess" of would cost J., WADE, dissenting. R. Moreover, no GARY we have half of Ram-Tenn. to exer- find that McLaren failed

basis to the trial majority that I with the agree judgment business determin- cise sound special by approving not err court did of Ram-Tenn— ing that the best interests For a vari- report. committee’s nonfunctioning, closely company— held reasons, however, respectful- I must ety of *13 settled, served if the case were would be that a holding to the ly regard with dissent company’s pri- especially given suing on behalf of minority shareholder sold, litigation mary asset had been recover can never for-profit corporation nearly years, nine and spanned has fund doc- attorney fees under the common wind-up pending mode company is First, that failure I do not believe trine. short, this suit.12 In conclusion of Assembly include the of the General demonstrates adequately record more than Tennessee doctrine in the common fund conclusions and recom- that McLaren’s (“TBCA”) abro- Act Corporation Business much product mendations were Lookout holding in gates our Grant effort, time, light of these expense. Co., 93 Tenn. 28 S.W. Mountain not, circumstances, have we will as we (Tenn.1894). common fund Secondly, the said, judgment our substitute business to Tennessee analogous is not doctrine duly appointed independent 48-17-401(d), of the Annotated section Code litigation committee.13 attorney an award of which authorizes Finally, from party.

against opposing application of the policy standpoint, Conclusion de- doctrine to shareholder common fund reasons, foregoing For the we hold that promote cor- suits is ‍‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‍desirable rivative Tennessee law does not authorize an accountability. porate fees to a in a award brought on shareholder’s derivative suit I. fur- for-profit corporation.

behalf of We Indeed, “Ameri- Tennessee follows the ther hold that the trial court did not err rule,” whereby in a civil action parties can com- approving any attorney fees absent pay for their own Accordingly, judgment mittee. contrary. common agreement Court of is affirmed. The costs doctrine, however, well-recog- is a fund plaintiff, this Court are taxed to the J.O. rule. to the American See exception nized House, surety, and his for which execution Gemert, 444 U.S. Boeing Co. v. Van may necessary. issue if (1980) (ap- L.Ed.2d 676 100 S.Ct. fund to a class

plying the common doctrine action). WADE, J., to shareholder deriva- dissenting. applied R. As GARY interests, interesting plausible to us that this note that McLaren it seems 12. It is judgment possibility in- approach by suggests made a call at the outset of his McLaren vestigation that because Ram-Tenn’s records findings may actually gen- that McLaren’s fashion,” kept “sophisticated were corporation. in favor of the erous supported expenditures that could not be would be held with documentation arguments makes additional placed repayment Edmondson and "in the authority scope concerning the of McLaren’s words, any lack of infor- column.” In other proposed by which settlement and the method charged against automatically mation was paid by Edmondson. We proceeds were to be plaintiff’s Contrary to the ar- Edmondson. argu- that these alternative have concluded gument McLaren’s conclusions and rec- have no merit. ments were not in Ram-Tenn’s best ommendations suits, provides tive the doctrine that a serfs that this common law rulе was re- minority pealed by separate ways: who initiates a meri- statute in two shareholder (1) through torious suit recover reasonable fees the codification and subse- (the from the common fund settlement or quent repeal of Tennessee Code Annotated verdict) (2) paid by 48-718; the shareholders as com- adoption section pensation expended for the efforts for the Annotated Tennessee Code section 48-17- Grant, 401(d). benefit of all shareholders alike. agree. I cannot fair, compensation at 90. This 28 S.W. A. 48-718 Section

considering that the benefit would not shareholders, have accrued to the other Assembly adopted the General small, large but the efforts that allowed in deriva- statute *14 it, shareholder. As Grant minority put attorney by fees tive actions recover [rightfully] “the restored to the property placing upon recovery a “lien made by minority in motion corporation, was set corporation.” legislation This was Id. at 91. The common stockholders.” Grant. holding our in comparable with a partiсularly fund doctrine is suited for 48-718(4). TBCA, §Ann. The Tenn.Code mi- shareholder derivative action because a 1986, in did not include which was enacted nority suing is not on his own shareholder subject. that provision addresses the behalf, corporate but on the behalf of the presents question the classic of This entity, unlikely which is to file suit codification of a common law doc- whether leadership partici- its own unless forced to trine, by subsequent repeal of the followed through a action. pate derivative statute, abrogates the common implicitly majority, I do not believe indicated, law. Unlike the previously As has Court always By codifying this is the case. recognized the common fund doctrine as 1968, in common fund doctrine General applied attorney fees shareholder Assembly enacted a statute that both af- for-profit derivative suits on behalf of Grant, concurrently with the corporation. (holding operated 28 S.W. at 93 firmed and Through adoption that an “owner of stock common law.1 TBCA, Assembly repealed for himself and all other share- the Gеneral who sues not, view, my successfully, wrong done to that codification. It did holders for a law.2 As American to be re-im- overrule the common corporation, is entitled (Second) out, Jurisprudence points stat- necessary expenses, actual and bursed his fees, repeal the common corpo- utes are not deemed to including attorneys out of the fund.”). However, legislative by implication unless the majority rate as- law KeyCite 2. It notable that neither Westlaw’s 1. The Arizona Court of has held that is categor- Shepard’s right feature nor Lexis’s feature codification of a common law creates a statutory right right as overruled at the time of this in addition to the a com- izes Grant Application tools to holding of both research mon law. that a shareholder case. "yellow” catego- inspect in the right to Grant reveals that it is maintained a common law website, wrote, records, yel- According corporate ry. "[A] to Westlaw’s ”[S]ince the court flag case or administrative legislature clearly low warns that the has not manifested its treatment, negative but has repeal nor decision has some intent to the common law rule http:// specifically statutory remedy reversed or overruled.” See declared the not been exclusive, “yellow” web2.westlaw.com/keycite/default. A law a shareholder’s common meaning. While right inspection, independent- in Lexis has a similar which exists label statute, persua- controlling authority, abrogated....” it is ly not Tucson this is not 511, Elec., Schantz, rely considering many lawyers Ariz.App. that 5 sive Gas & Co. (1967). conducting their research. these tools while 428 P.2d 690 387 Jordon, Lavin v. manifested. 15A clearly do so is intent to added) (citations (1995). (Tenn.2000) (emphasis § Law Am.Jur.2d Common omitted).3 not meet that test. further observed legislation does This This Court it only when prevailed the statute affirmative in a statute is not Silence common law. Id. with the conflicted legislature did Simply because the law. not statutory remedy does provide not ruling in by our confirmed principle common law. application of the preclude majority’s support not Lavin does recog- Suрreme Court The United States courts Tennessee holding. Since awarding attor- principle nized this when fund the common recognized have action ney to a a derivative fees applies to shareholder doctrine 14(a) brought under section of the Securi- Grant, at 93. While 28 S.W. suits. v. Elec. Exchange Act. Mills ties and recognized was fund doctrine common Co., 375, 389, 90 S.Ct. Auto-Lite 396 U.S. legis corporate of our 1968 section 48-718 (1970). case, In that L.Ed.2d TBCA, lation, in the absent its exclusion absence highest “[t]he our court ruled contrary, “leaves the express intent to the statutory authorization for an express enactment.” La law it was before its attorneys’ in a suit under award of vin, way only S.W.3d 14(a) such an award preclude does *15 our rule in has been conclude that Grant Likewise, type.” Id. the fail- cases of this the more recent act would by overruled ure to include the common fund doctrine majority, I “by implication.” Unlike is insufficient for this Court TBCA with implication to draw that unwilling am cir- fairly legislative “purpose infer a legisla from the manifest directive out a power grant ap- cumsсribe the courts’ ture. propriate remedies.” Id. at 90 S.Ct. legis- trump 616. The common law should 48-17-401(d) B. Section

lative silence. approach pre- This is consistent with our conclusion is majority states its The subject. up- on the vious decisions While relevant stat- merely “application recovery statutory cap holding 48-17-401(d)....” ute, namely section against damage for intentional parents However, anything to find I am unable children, made by caused them this Court barring plaintiff a explicitly that section following observation: attorney fees recovering reasonable from Assembly plenary has While the General Furthermore, I fund. from the common limits to power within constitutional comparison be- any helpful find do not statute, by ... change the common law and this the common fund doctrine tween ‘rules of the common law are not the TBCA. provision of by implication, and if a statute repealed 48-17-401(d) directs case, Section include and cover such does not if attorney fees the defendant’s pay as it was its it leaves the law before “reasоnable not commenced with suit was enactment.’ Turner, (emphasis Id. that it was deliberate.” majority 193 assume 3. The cites to State (Tenn.2006), proposi- added). change involve a 527 for This case does not S.W.3d change in the law statute tion that "a language a statute. Because in the departure from presumption that a raises a addressed in the doctrine is not common fund What Turner ac- was intended.” the old law TBCA, language different of two there is no legislature tually "When the makes said was compare case. in this of a statute to versions statute, language we must change of a policy cause.” The property behind section 48-17- the fund or as fair itself 401(d) discourage is to frivolous derivative compensation “securing, augmenting, compensate suits and defendants that are preserving property or a money fund of harmed the costs incurred in the de- people in which other are entitled to share fense of litigation. policy baseless The in common.” Travelers Ins. Co. v. goals of the common fund doctrine are Williams, (Tenn. completely different: 1976)). First, prevents the doctrine the benefi- short, these are two different con- legal being ciaries of services from un- view, cepts. my nothing in section 48- justly by requiring pay enriched them to 17-401(d) supports abrogation according for those services to the bene- common fund doctrine. this Court’s While Second, fit received. the doctrine serves apply role is to the law as written to spread litigation propor- the costs of second-guess legisla- the wisdom of the tionally among all of the beneficiaries so ture, I find no simply statutory clear di- that the does not bear the en- rective that mandates abrogation tire burden alone. common law.4 (Tenn

Kline v. Eyrich, 69 S.W.3d 2002). objective of the common fund II. “impose doctrine is to fees on the class majority opinion its conclu- bases that would have had to the fees if it solely grounds statutory sion on the brought had the suit its benefit.” considerations, policy construction. Public (1995). Corporations Am.Jur.Zd view, my support a different result. legislation discourages Just as the 1986 suit, encouragеs frivolous our common law The common fund doctrine enables *16 a meritorious one. justified “pursu[e] shareholders ‍‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‍to claims corporations for the benefit

Section 48-17-401 and the common they have a valid interest.” Hannewald v. fund doctrine aspects differ other be Inc., 222, Cmtys., 230 policy sides In goals. section 48-17- Fairfield Here, (Tenn.App.1983). minority 401(d), attorney the defendant’s fees would only shareholder owned 5% of the shares. paid by opposing party. Under the A verdict or settlement in a derivative doctrine, minority shareholder’s attor $200,000 action would have to be or above ney from a paid fees would be common minority recoup for a shareholder to a fee being fund before distributed to share $10,000 compensation words, for a obligation holders. other “the —minimal litigation of that cost of suit matter. The plaintiffs in a reimburse successful de be so as to could burdensome deter other- corporation, rivative action falls on the misappropria- wise valid claims unless the losing party, such as the di not on the tion is substantial. suits сharged mismanagement.” rectors with Derivative are (em Corporations risky prove § 19 2487 and difficult to even when Am.Jur.2d added). fi- phasis corporate The fees are assessed there is clear misconduct Ass’n., holding many Cooperative Light 4. Our in Grant concurs with er & Power 257 See, e.g., 362, 423, (Minn.1960); our sister Decatur Mineral & states. Minn. N.W.2d 425 101 Palm, 531, 315, 140, 54, Land Co. v. 113 Ala. 21 So. Bass, Fitzgerald v. 122 Okla. 252 P. (Ala.1896); Frushour, 316 Knutsen v. 92 Ida stated, (Okla.1927). the common fund 55 As 521, 37, (Idaho 1968); ho 436 P.2d 525 State recognized by doctrine is also the federal Bechtel, ex rel. Weede v. 244 Iowa Mills, 392, 90 S.Ct. 616. courts. 396 U.S. at 1952); (Iowa N.W.2d v. Meek Bosch A is less inclined to duciaries. shareholder doing relief so

seek deserved when would loss.5

result net excep-

The common fund doctrine —the

tion to the American rule —arose

equitable doctrine. 20 Am.Jur.2d Costs (1995). former Justice Har- allowing

lan wrote to re- expenses conveying

coup signif- when

icant to the benefit other shareholders is Mills, equitable.

simply fair and 396 U.S. believed that a S.Ct. He ruling “To

contrary unjust: would be allow obtain others to full benefit from the efforts contributing without

equally expenses would be plain- others unjustly enrich the at the expense.”

tifPs Id. That assessment sense. perfect

makes reasons,

For these I must dissent. I

would not overrule and would Grant hold

that a action for-profit

behalf of can re- attorney

cover reasonable fees under the

common fund doctrine.

France Isabelle Ter WINE Weele

Jeffrey Michael WINE. Tennessee,

Court of Section,

Middle at Nashville.

February 2007 Session.

May 18, 2007.

Permission to Denied Appeal 22, 2007.

Supreme Court Oct. attorney, requires, that it this is pro is a investment of work An alternative bono ‍‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‍but complex the amicus curiae states: "Given neither realistic.” fair nor and the nature of massive

Case Details

Case Name: House v. Estate of Edmondson
Court Name: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date Published: Jan 25, 2008
Citation: 245 S.W.3d 372
Docket Number: W2005-00092-SC-R11-CV
Court Abbreviation: Tenn.
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