Joyce Barlow v. Colgate Palmolive Company
772 F.3d 1001
| 4th Cir. | 2014Background
- Two Maryland asbestos suits (Barlow and Mosko) named numerous defendants including in-state parties; Colgate removed to federal court alleging fraudulent joinder of in-state defendants.
- Plaintiffs’ counsel told federal courts there was at least a “possibility” of claims against in-state defendants; district courts remanded both cases to state court based on those representations.
- After remand, plaintiffs’ counsel told the state court the cases involved Cashmere Bouquet exposure only, contradicting earlier federal-court statements.
- Colgate moved in federal court for Rule 11 sanctions and for vacatur of the remand orders under Rule 60(b)(3), alleging the remands were procured by misrepresentations.
- The district court concluded § 1447(d) deprived it of jurisdiction to vacate the remand orders and declined other sanctions; Colgate appealed and the en banc Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a district court retains jurisdiction after remand to impose Rule 11 sanctions | Plaintiffs: prior federal statements were legal argument, not factual misrepresentations subject to Rule 11 | Colgate: counsel knowingly misrepresented facts to procure remand; district court can sanction post-remand | Court: district courts have jurisdiction to consider and impose Rule 11 sanctions after remand; remand for merits consideration |
| Whether § 1447(d) bars vacatur of a remand order via Rule 60(b)(3) for fraud/misrepresentation | Plaintiffs: vacatur is impermissible review of remand and § 1447(d) forbids review | Colgate: Rule 60(b)(3) targets procurement of the order (fraud) and does not amount to impermissible review | Court: § 1447(d) bars review but does not bar vacatur under Rule 60(b)(3) when relief attacks the manner (fraud) by which the remand was obtained; remand for Rule 60(b)(3) merits determination |
| Scope of § 1447(d)’s prohibition on post-remand relief | Plaintiffs: remand decisions are final and largely unreviewable, including collateral challenges | Colgate: exceptions allow collateral, non-merits relief (e.g., vacatur for fraud) | Court: distinguishes reconsideration (proscribed) from collateral vacatur for fraud; § 1447(d) does not categorically bar such collateral relief |
| Standard/applicability of Rule 60(b)(3) after remand | Plaintiffs: Rule 60(b)(3) typically addresses prejudice in merits proceedings, not jurisdictional forum disputes | Colgate: misconduct that prevented fair assertion of right to federal forum satisfies Rule 60(b)(3) elements | Court: Rule 60(b)(3) can apply where misconduct prevented a party from fully and fairly presenting its claim to a federal forum; district court should decide merits on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990) (federal courts may impose Rule 11 sanctions after dismissal because sanctions are collateral to merits)
- Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131 (1992) (a finding of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction does not automatically erase prior proceedings; Rule 11 sanctions remain available)
- Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224 (2007) (interpretation of § 1447(d)’s bar on review of remand orders)
- In re Lowe, 102 F.3d 731 (4th Cir. 1996) (§ 1447(d) bars reconsideration of remand orders)
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (distinguishing Rule 60(b)(3) motions that attack procedural integrity from attacks on merits)
- Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 1999) (vacatur of remand order for procured-by-fraud grounds does not necessarily constitute prohibited review)