Josh L. Bowman v. State of Tennessee, E2016-01028-CCA-R3-PC

Background

Bowman participated in a 2009 home invasion that resulted in one victim's death; he was convicted at trial of multiple felonies and pleaded guilty post-verdict to a firearms enhancement count charging he "employed a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony" and "had a prior felony conviction."
Trial court merged certain counts; Bowman received an effective sentence of life plus 60 years. On direct appeal, one kidnapping conviction was reversed; other convictions were affirmed.
Bowman filed a post-conviction petition alleging (1) ineffective assistance for pleading guilty to the firearms enhancement because his prior aggravated robbery convictions were not qualifying "dangerous felonies" under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1324, and (2) ineffective assistance for failing to object to the racial composition of the jury venire.
The post-conviction court granted relief on the firearms count, concluding the statutory definition limited qualifying "prior convictions" to those for dangerous felonies and Bowman’s aggravated robbery convictions did not qualify; it dismissed the challenged firearms conviction. The court denied relief on the jury venire claim.
The State appealed the dismissal of the firearms conviction; Bowman appealed the denial on the jury venire issue. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the post-conviction court: it agreed the statute requires prior convictions to be for dangerous felonies and rejected Bowman’s venire claim for lack of proof of systematic exclusion or prejudice.
The court remanded to correct judgment forms to reflect the surviving merged firearms conviction and appropriate sentence adjustments for a career offender.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether prior felonies cited in § 39-17-1324(h)(2) must be "dangerous felonies" so as to qualify for the enhanced firearms penalty	Bowman: indictment alleges prior aggravated robbery convictions, which are not statutory "dangerous felonies," so counsel was ineffective in advising plea	State: statute only requires a "prior felony conviction," not necessarily a statutory "dangerous felony"	Court: "prior conviction" in the statute should be read to mean prior conviction for a dangerous felony; aggravated robbery did not qualify; counsel was deficient and prejudice shown; firearms count dismissed
Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge racial composition of the jury venire	Bowman: venire and petit jury were essentially all white; counsel should have challenged venire for failure to represent community cross-section	State: jury selection is automated from DMV/ID lists; no evidence of systematic exclusion or disparity relative to county demographics	Court: petitioner failed to prove systematic exclusion or prejudice; counsel not ineffective; post-conviction court correctly denied relief

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (U.S. 1975) (fair cross-section requirement for jury venires)
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (U.S. 1979) (three-part test for prima facie fair-cross-section claim)
State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012) (context for kidnapping jury instruction issues cited in the case)
State v. Teats, 468 S.W.3d 495 (Tenn. 2015) (supreme court clarification regarding kidnapping instruction applicability)
Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn. 2010) (standard of review for post-conviction factual findings)