Josephine Smith v. City of Santa Clara
876 F.3d 987
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Police investigating a car theft and stabbing identified Justine Smith as the driver and learned she was on felony probation subject to a warrantless-search condition.
- Records from probation, DMV, and county databases listed Justine’s address at a two-unit Gale Drive duplex (940 and 942 Gale Drive).
- Officers went to 940 Gale Drive, announced a “probation search,” and Josephine Smith (mother and occupant) refused entry and demanded a warrant.
- Officers entered without a warrant, searched both units, found items linking Justine to 940 Gale Drive, but did not find Justine.
- Josephine and her minor granddaughter sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California’s Bane Act; the district court granted qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim but allowed the Bane Act claim to proceed to trial.
- At trial the jury found for defendants; on appeal Josephine argued (inter alia) that Georgia v. Randolph required a warrant because she was present and objected.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Randolph bars a warrantless probation search over a present co-occupant’s objection | Josephine: Randolph makes a present, objecting co-occupant’s refusal dispositive; officers needed a warrant | Defendants: Probation-search precedent (Griffin/Knights) uses totality-of-circumstances, not consent; Randolph (a consent rule) does not control | Held: Randolph does not automatically apply; under Knights balancing, the search was reasonable given probable cause of a violent probationer’s new offense |
| Whether jury should have been instructed that probationer’s search-condition “consent” is insufficient if co-occupant objects | Josephine: Jury should have been instructed that present objection negates any probationer-derived consent | Defendants: Probation-search rationale isn’t consent-based; instruction unnecessary | Held: District court did not err by refusing that instruction; even though the instruction used a consent framing, error (if any) was harmless because facts made search reasonable as a matter of law |
| Whether trial evidence was insufficient to show probable cause that Justine resided at the duplex | Josephine: Conflicting address records undermined probable cause | Defendants: Multiple government records listed Gale Drive, supporting probable cause | Held: Argument waived on appeal (raised first in reply); alternatively, record contained enough evidence for jury to find probable cause |
| Whether Bane Act claim required different analysis from federal Fourth Amendment | Josephine: Bane Act preserves Fourth Amendment protection for present objecting co-occupant | Defendants: Federal precedent governs; Bane Act claim treated through federal standard here | Held: Court applied federal Fourth Amendment law and assumed same result under state law; no reversible error found |
Key Cases Cited
- Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) (a present co-occupant’s refusal renders a warrantless consent-based search unreasonable)
- United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (probation-search reasonableness assessed under totality-of-the-circumstances; probation status is a salient factor)
- Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (warrantless probation searches reasonable under a special-needs justification tied to supervision interests)
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (warrantless home entries presumptively unreasonable)
- United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (consent by one with common authority can validate a warrantless search as to absent co-occupants)
- Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (probation/parole search precedent not grounded in consent rationale)
- Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2005) (probation search is unreasonable if officers lack probable cause to believe probationer resides at the searched premises)