961 F.3d 800
5th Cir.2020Background
- Plaintiffs (Thomas et al.) brought a Section 2 Voting Rights Act challenge to Mississippi’s state legislative apportionment; the suit proceeded in district court and produced a judgment before appeal.
- Mississippi argued that 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) requires a three-judge district court for statutory-only challenges to state legislative apportionment (i.e., Section 2 claims); plaintiffs and some prior courts treated § 2284(a) as limited to constitutional challenges.
- The 2019 general election occurred while the appeal was pending; the State acknowledged the challenged district lines would no longer be used or serve as a baseline for future elections.
- The en banc Fifth Circuit unanimously concluded the case became moot, vacated the district court judgment under Munsingwear, dismissed the appeal, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
- The court issued multiple concurrences: Judge Costa (joined by several judges) argued § 2284(a) covers only constitutional challenges; Judge Willett (joined by others) argued § 2284(a) requires three judges for all challenges to state apportionment (statutory and constitutional); Judge Oldham explained vacatur’s effect on attorney-fee claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness / jurisdiction | Case remains justiciable despite election; relief still meaningful | Election mooted the dispute because lines won’t be used; no live controversy | Appeal is moot; judgment vacated and case remanded to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (Munsingwear) |
| Whether § 2284(a) requires a three-judge court for statutory-only challenges to state legislative apportionment | §2284(a) does not trigger three-judge panels for pure statutory (Section 2) claims — single judge can hear them | The statute’s phrasing (the repeated "the apportionment") prevents carryover of "constitutionality of," so three-judge courts are required for all state-apportionment challenges | Not decided as a binding circuit holding because case was mooted; concurring opinions split: Costa (text/history/canons) says §2284(a) limited to constitutional claims; Willett says §2284(a) requires three judges for challenges to state apportionment (including statutory) |
| Proper textual reading of § 2284(a) (does "constitutionality of" modify both clauses?) | The modifier carries over; ordinary meaning and statutory history limit three-judge courts to constitutional claims | The determiner and syntactic canons (series-qualifier with determiner exception, surplusage) support treating the second clause separately | Court did not reach a precedential majority on merits; concurrences present the two competing textual readings as above |
| Effect of Munsingwear vacatur on fee claims | Plaintiffs contended they would seek prevailing-party fees | Vacatur eliminates the district-court judgment and thus plaintiffs did not "prevail"; no enforceable judgment remains | Vacatur moots any prevailing-party fee claim; plaintiffs are not prevailing parties post-vacatur (per Oldham concurrence) |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36 (1950) (vacatur of lower-court judgment when case becomes moot on appeal)
- Gonzalez v. Automatic Emp. Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90 (1974) (discussing three-judge courts and rationale for limiting single-judge power in sensitive cases)
- Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941) (origins and purpose of three-judge panels to ensure deliberation in important cases)
- Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (strict-construction canon applied to three-judge-court statutes; federalism concerns justify three-judge panels)
- Page v. Bartels, 248 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2001) (analyzing whether §2284(a) treats statutory and constitutional apportionment challenges differently)
- Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779 (2020) (substantive canons like lenity apply only after traditional canons leave ambiguity)
- Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74 (2007) (a plaintiff does not qualify as a prevailing party if the initial victory is undone and no enforceable judgment remains)
- Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) (defining when a plaintiff is a prevailing party for fee purposes)
- Harris v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301 (2016) (referring to §2284(a) in discussing three-judge courts for constitutional apportionment challenges)
- Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (context for congressional and state reapportionment litigation and constitutional significance)