708 F. App'x 221
6th Cir.2017Background
- Terre, a 71‑year‑old long‑time teacher certified in economics, took approved FMLA leave beginning October 25, 2013, with extensions certified by his provider; he was cleared to return in October 2014.
- In April 2014 Wooddale principal Michael Kyle informed Terre his full‑time economics position would be excessed due to budget cuts; economics duties were redistributed among other teachers including younger teacher Ryan Quinn.
- Terre received a non‑renewal notice in June 2014 but after complaints was told his contract would not be terminated and he remained an active employee on leave while Human Resources assisted placement.
- Terre filed an EEOC charge (age and disability) in August 2014, obtained a right‑to‑sue, and sued SCS and the superintendent; the district court granted summary judgment for defendants.
- On appeal the Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Terre’s ADEA claim but reversed and remanded Terre’s ADA failure‑to‑accommodate and ADA disparate‑treatment claims for further factfinding.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| ADEA — prima facie/reduction‑in‑force | Terre: he was qualified and was singled out; Quinn (younger) effectively filled his duties. | SCS: reduction in force for budgetary reasons; duties could be absorbed—no age motive. | Terre made a prima facie showing but failed to prove pretext; ADEA claim affirmed. |
| ADEA — pretext | Terre: younger hires filled vacancies and school’s conduct departed from excessing protocol — suggests age motive. | SCS: no age‑related statements; legitimate RIF explanation. | Court: no direct/circumstantial evidence that age was but‑for cause; summary judgment proper. |
| ADA — failure to accommodate (pre‑June 30) | Terre: he was granted leave as an accommodation and was excessed while on that leave, nullifying the accommodation. | SCS: claim was not pled/ exhausted as an accommodation claim distinct from termination. | Court: EEOC charge reasonably encompassed excessing while on leave; exhaustion satisfied; remanded for merits. |
| ADA — disparate treatment / pretext | Terre: Kyle made disability‑related comments about Terre’s health; Terre was qualified and had stronger credentials than Quinn. | SCS: legitimate RIF; position could be absorbed; no unlawful motive. | Court: disputed comments about Terre’s health plus staffing rules raise genuine issue of pretext; ADA disparate‑treatment claim remanded. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hirsch v. CSX Transp., Inc., 656 F.3d 359 (6th Cir. 2011) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 2003) (McDonnell Douglas burden‑shifting framework)
- Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (U.S. 2009) (but‑for causation standard for ADEA)
- Barnes v. GenCorp Inc., 896 F.2d 1457 (6th Cir. 1990) (proof required in RIF cases to show employer singled out plaintiff)
- Jones v. Sumser Ret. Vill., 209 F.3d 851 (6th Cir. 2000) (EEOC charge need not use precise legal labels for exhaustion)
- Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 1998) (approved medical leave can be a reasonable accommodation)
- Whitfield v. Tennessee, 639 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2011) (ADA McDonnell Douglas analysis)
- Geiger v. Tower Auto., 579 F.3d 614 (6th Cir. 2009) (ADEA prima facie elements)