Joseph Hendrix v. Carmen Palmer, 893 F.3d 906

On Sept. 5–8, 2006, Hendrix was arrested in a stolen minivan; victim Evangeline Doen later died from blunt‑force head trauma after being pushed from the van.
Hendrix initially waived Miranda after arrest, then invoked his right to counsel on Sept. 6; detectives reapproached him on Sept. 8 and obtained additional statements after a new rights form Hendrix refused to sign.
Police testimony at trial emphasized Hendrix’s Sept. 8 statements and his post‑Miranda silence as inculpatory; prosecutor argued lack of an alibi and urged the jury to infer guilt from his silence.
Trial counsel did not move to suppress the Sept. 8 statements or otherwise challenge their admissibility; the trial court admitted them and also allowed the jury to consider in‑custody silence.
Michigan courts affirmed the conviction on direct appeal; Hendrix filed federal habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The State later conceded the Sept. 8 statements were admitted in error but argued harmlessness.
The district court granted conditional habeas relief on Fifth and Sixth Amendment grounds; this panel affirmed those holdings, reversed denial on a Doyle (due‑process) claim, and held the evidence was nevertheless sufficient to permit retrial.

Issue	Hendrix's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Admissibility of Sept. 8 statements (Miranda/Edwards)	Statements obtained after Hendrix invoked counsel on Sept. 6 were inadmissible under Edwards/Miranda	Initially defended admission; later conceded error but argued harmlessness	Admission violated Fifth Amendment (Edwards); error not harmless — substantial and injurious effect
Ineffective assistance for failing to move to suppress	Trial counsel rendered deficient performance by not filing a plainly meritorious suppression motion	Trial counsel’s inaction was reasonable/strategic	Counsel’s failure was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial under Strickland; ineffective assistance established
Prosecutor’s use of post‑Miranda silence (Doyle)	Prosecutor improperly invited jury to infer guilt from post‑Miranda silence	Argued Hendrix spoke post‑Miranda so Doyle did not apply; comments addressed inconsistencies, not silence	Prosecutor’s questions and argument drew impermissible meaning from silence — Doyle violation; reversible error
Sufficiency of the evidence to support conviction	Hendrix contended identification evidence was insufficient	State argued modus operandi, fingerprints, proximity of other thefts, and statements sufficed	Evidence was sufficient for conviction; retrial permitted (Double Jeopardy not barred)

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (police must give warnings and cease interrogation upon invocation of right to counsel)
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (prohibits reinterrogation after invocation of counsel absent counsel present)
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991) (Edwards rule is not offense‑specific)
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (use of post‑Miranda silence for impeachment violates due process)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (state‑court merits adjudication presumed when claim presented; AEDPA deference explained)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency of evidence review)
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (double jeopardy bars retrial if evidence insufficient)
O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995) ("substantial and injurious effect" harmless‑error standard; "grave doubt" rule)
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (2009) ("doubly deferential" Strickland review under AEDPA)