753 S.E.2d 11
W. Va.2013Background
- In June 2009, during a declared State of Emergency after severe storms, DOH employee Joseph E. Jackson (driving a dump truck) backed into Joseph Wayne Belcher’s car; Belcher claimed neck/back injuries and sued for negligence and vicarious liability.
- Jackson and the West Virginia Division of Highways (DOH) moved for summary judgment asserting immunity under W. Va. Code § 15-5-11(a) for emergency service workers.
- The circuit court denied summary judgment, reasoning that the statute’s saving clause (“any other law”) could permit recovery under prior judicial decisions.
- The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed, holding that (1) judicial decisions are "law" within § 15-5-11(a)’s saving clause, and (2) Pittsburgh Elevator permits suits seeking recovery limited to the State’s liability insurance where the defendant is a State employee and recovery is confined to insurance limits.
- Two justices dissented, arguing the majority improperly eviscerated the statutory immunity and misapplied Pittsburgh Elevator and related immunity doctrines.
Issues
| Issue | Belcher's Argument | Jackson/DOH's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 15-5-11(a) immunity bars suit against a State employee performing emergency services | "Any other law" includes judicial decisions; Pittsburgh Elevator allows recovery from State insurance, so suit may proceed up to insurance limits | § 15-5-11(a) preserves statutory/benefit claims but does not incorporate court decisions as "any other law" to abrogate immunity | Held for Belcher: judicial decisions are "any other law" under § 15-5-11(a), so Pittsburgh Elevator applies where defendant is a State employee and recovery is confined to State liability insurance |
| Whether judicial decisions are encompassed by the phrase "any other law" in § 15-5-11(a) | Yes — judicial opinions are state law and thus preserved by the statute | No — the phrase should be read to preserve statutory or benefit entitlements, not judicially created exceptions to immunity | Held: Judicial decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeals are "law" and fall within "any other law." |
| Whether recovery may be had up to State insurance limits despite statutory immunity | Pittsburgh Elevator creates an exception to constitutional/sovereign immunity when recovery is sought only from State liability insurance; same logic applies to § 15-5-11(a) | Pittsburgh Elevator addresses sovereign immunity only and does not nullify statutory/functional immunities like § 15-5-11(a); insurance does not automatically waive those immunities | Held: Applying Pittsburgh Elevator, § 15-5-11(a) does not bar a suit against a State employee when the action is by a private plaintiff against the employee/State and recovery is limited to State liability insurance |
Key Cases Cited
- Pittsburgh Elevator Co. v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 172 W. Va. 743, 310 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 1983) (holds suits seeking recovery only from State liability insurance fall outside constitutional bar to suits against the State)
- Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (U.S. 1938) (state law may be declared by statute or by the highest court; judicial decisions constitute state law)
- Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (U.S. 1949) (judicial decisions are laws of the states)
- Clark v. Dunn, 195 W. Va. 272, 465 S.E.2d 374 (W. Va. 1995) (distinguishes sovereign immunity from narrower immunities and recognizes that insurance does not automatically eliminate qualified immunities)
- Parkulo v. W. Va. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 199 W. Va. 161, 483 S.E.2d 507 (W. Va. 1996) (unless insurance policy expressly waives immunity, common-law immunities persist despite § 29-12-5 insurance procurement)