Joseph Clark v. Ray Miller
641 F. App'x 418
5th Cir.2016Background
- Joseph Bradley Clark, a Mississippi prisoner, sued Harrison County officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging excessive force during his arrest: canine bites and being tased after submitting.
- District court granted summary judgment for defendants on qualified immunity grounds, dismissed some defendants for lack of personal involvement, and found no evidence a taser was deployed.
- Clark appealed pro se; the bulk of his appeal contested the district court’s rejection of his claim that he was tased and that force was excessive.
- The Fifth Circuit reviews summary judgment de novo and must view evidence and reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s (Clark’s) favor at this stage.
- The majority found Clark submitted affidavit/deposition evidence (hearing three pops, abdominal knots/bruising, hospital note of bruising) that could support a finding of taser use and injury, creating a genuine dispute of material fact as to tasing and the reasonableness of force.
- The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded Clark’s excessive-force claim against Officer Branning (qualified immunity reversed as to that claim) and affirmed the remainder of the district court’s judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether summary judgment on qualified immunity was proper as to Branning’s alleged use of a taser | Clark: evidence (heard three pops, had abdominal knots/bruises, hospital note) creates a genuine dispute that he was tased after submitting | Branning: no taser was deployed; district court reasonably credited officers and found no evidence of tasing | Reversed as to Branning: genuine dispute exists; remanded for excessive-force claim (qualified immunity denied at summary stage) |
| Whether repeated taser application after a suspect is subdued is objectively unreasonable / clearly established law | Clark: tasing a subdued, unarmed, disabled man is excessive | Defendants: force was reasonable given circumstances; no taser evidence | Held: law clearly establishes that force on a subdued, compliant suspect can be excessive; factual dispute could show constitutionally excessive force |
| Whether other defendants (Massengill, Branning re: dog bites, Moran, Brisolara) were properly dismissed for lack of personal involvement or supervisory liability | Clark did not press these issues on appeal | Defendants: no personal involvement or supervisory liability proven | Affirmed: claims abandoned by Clark on appeal; district court dismissal affirmed |
| Whether Clark waived challenge to qualified immunity by failing to brief it adequately | Clark: argued genuine factual dispute about tasing; challenged district court’s basis for summary judgment in reply | Branning/Dissent: Clark raised qualified-immunity argument only in reply; waived and burden on plaintiff; insufficient evidence beyond self-serving statements | Majority: did not find waiver dispositive; Dissent: would find waiver and affirm district court |
Key Cases Cited
- Nickell v. Beau View of Biloxi, L.L.C., 636 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 2011) (summary-judgment standard reviewed de novo)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (definition of genuine dispute of material fact at summary judgment)
- Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 2005) (courts must not discount plaintiff’s version at summary judgment)
- Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861 (U.S. 2014) (qualified immunity: view evidence in light most favorable to nonmovant at summary judgment)
- Rockwell v. Brown, 664 F.3d 985 (5th Cir. 2011) (excessive force standard: ‘‘clearly excessive to the need’’ / ‘‘objectively unreasonable’’)
- Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 2009) (excessive-force claims are fact-intensive under Graham)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1989) (Fourth Amendment reasonableness framework for use-of-force claims)
- Carroll v. Ellington, 800 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 2015) (repeated Taser applications on subdued suspect may be excessive)
- Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2008) (amount of force depends on crime severity, threat posed, and resistance)
