973 F.3d 1254
11th Cir.2020Background
- Cynthia Santiago alleged childhood exposure to thorium from contaminated soil moved from a Pratt & Whitney testing site into the Acreage, Palm Beach County, Florida; she was diagnosed with ependymoma in 2009 at age 13 and later found to have elevated thorium-230 levels.
- Cynthia filed suit on November 7, 2014 shortly after turning 18; she later died in 2016 and her parents amended to pursue wrongful-death claims (negligence and trespass under Florida law) and a Price‑Anderson Act (PAA) public‑liability claim under federal law.
- Florida law provides a four‑year statute of limitations for negligence and trespass actions, which the district court determined began to run at Cynthia’s 2009 diagnosis; the district court granted summary judgment for Pratt & Whitney as time‑barred.
- The Santiagos argued on appeal that CERCLA §9658’s discovery‑tolling for state‑law personal‑injury claims delayed accrual until Cynthia discovered the cause of her cancer (or reached majority), making the suit timely.
- The Eleventh Circuit held the PAA creates an exclusive federal cause of action for public‑liability claims arising from nuclear incidents, so such suits are not "actions brought under State law" for purposes of CERCLA §9658; therefore CERCLA tolling does not apply and Florida’s four‑year limitation controls.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CERCLA §9658 discovery‑tolling applies to a PAA public‑liability action | Santiagos: CERCLA tolling applies because claim arises from hazardous‑substance exposure and was filed after discovery/majority | Pratt & Whitney: PAA public‑liability claims are federal — not "brought under State law" — so CERCLA tolling does not apply | Held: PAA public‑liability actions are exclusively federal; CERCLA §9658 does not apply |
| Whether state statute of limitations governs PAA public‑liability claims | Santiagos: PAA borrows substantive state law, so state tolling rules should apply | Pratt & Whitney: PAA borrows state substantive rules (including SOL) but does not make the action a state‑law action; state SOL applies without CERCLA tolling | Held: PAA borrows state substantive law (Florida’s four‑year SOL applies); claims are time‑barred |
Key Cases Cited
- Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 2003) (principles of plain‑meaning statutory interpretation)
- Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (federal‑question cases typically arise when federal law creates the cause of action)
- Roberts v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 146 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 1998) (Amendments Act created an exclusive federal cause of action for radiation injury)
- El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999) (PAA transforms public‑liability claims into federal actions)
- Halbrook v. Mallinckrodt, LLC, 888 F.3d 971 (8th Cir. 2018) (CERCLA tolling inapplicable to PAA public‑liability wrongful‑death claims)
- Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (interpretive canon: differing language in adjacent statutory provisions is significant)