Jose Zurita v. Richard Hyde, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 25558

Waukegan amended its Towing Ordinance in 2002 to seize/impound vehicles and impose fines for driving without license or insurance, with protests alleging minority impact.
In 2004, the city adopted an Assembly Ordinance requiring permits/deposits/fees for outdoor events, involving police investigations and reporting to the city clerk.
Surita was barred from speaking at a city council audience time after allegedly insulting a city employee two days earlier, raising First Amendment claims against Mayor Hyde.
Carrasco, an anti-Towing Ordinance protester, faced a $1,500 permit fee based on Biang’s assessment of needed police, despite a lack of preapproved deposit, and had seats reserved for her group at a meeting.
Blanks engaged in multiple anti-Towing protests; he was warned by a letter that he would be violating the Assembly Ordinance for a September 4 protest, though Park District property complicates applicability.
The district court denied summary judgment on qualified immunity for Surita, Carrasco, and Blanks; the Seventh Circuit reviewed the denial for interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine and analyzed two theories for Surita and multiple claims for Carrasco and Blanks.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Surita’s audience-time restriction was a First Amendment violation in a designated public forum	Surita argues the speech ban was content-based and not narrowly tailored	Hyde contends ban was a permissible time/place/manner restriction	Yes; restriction violated First Amendment and was not narrowly tailored
Whether Carrasco’s Assembly Ordinance application was content-based and retaliatory/chilling	Carrasco asserts content-based fee and retaliatory/chilling effects	Biang argues neutral, non-retaliatory enforcement	Yes; content-based application and retaliation/chilling claims survive summary judgment, with Biang’s immunity unresolved for trial (specifics depend on record)
Whether Blanks’s claims against Biang were cognizable for qualified immunity	Blanks asserts Biang causally involved in enforcement and thus liable	Biang did not participate personally; Neddenriep applied the ordinance	Summary judgment warranted for Biang on Blanks’s claims; qualified immunity affirmed

Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (designated/public forum and time/place/manner rules; content neutrality; ample channels)
Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (designated/public forum framework; content neutrality requirements)
Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F.2d 736 (2d Cir.1988) (speech at public meetings entitled to First Amendment protections)
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (content-based permit fees unconstitutional; standards to guide fee decisions)
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (parade/open-air meeting license fees; local government flexibility balanced with First Amendment protections)
Vukadinovich v. Bd. of Sch. Trs. of North Newton Sch. Corp., 278 F.3d 693 (2002) (retaliation/causation standard in First Amendment contexts)
Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518 (7th Cir.2009) (but-for vs motivating-factor causation standard; First Amendment chilling/retaliation)
Greene v. Doruff, 660 F.3d 975 (7th Cir.2011) (clarified causation framework in First Amendment claims between motivating-factor and but-for)
Abrahams v. Walker, 307 F.3d 650 (7th Cir.2002) (summary-judgment posture and causation in First Amendment claims)
Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty., 235 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir.2000) (liability via directing or setting in motion events causing deprivation)