Jose Socorro Ortiz v. Loretta E. Lynch
796 F.3d 932
| 8th Cir. | 2015Background
- Ortiz, a Mexican national and lawful permanent resident since 2002, pled guilty in 2006 (age 18) to Minnesota Obstructing Legal Process, Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 2(2), and received a one-year workhouse sentence (mostly stayed) and a fine.
- DHS later charged Ortiz with removability as an alien convicted of an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and separately as having committed a crime involving “moral turpitude” under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
- The IJ found Ortiz removable because his conviction was an aggravated felony as a “crime of violence”; the BIA affirmed that the statute is categorically a crime of violence.
- Ortiz petitioned for review; the Eighth Circuit retained jurisdiction to review the legal question whether the conviction is an aggravated felony.
- The court applied the categorical approach (and considered the modified-categorical approach) and analyzed whether Minnesota’s phrase “force or violence” matches the federal definition of “physical force” (as interpreted in Johnson) required for a categorical “crime of violence.”
- The court concluded Minnesota caselaw shows convictions under § 609.50, subd. 2(2) can rest on conduct involving de minimis or non-injurious force (e.g., curling into a fetal position to resist handcuffing), so the statute is not categorically a “crime of violence”; record documents for Ortiz’s plea do not establish that his plea necessarily involved ‘‘violence’’ rather than mere ‘‘force.’’
Issues
| Issue | Ortiz's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 2(2) is categorically a “crime of violence”/aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) and § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) | Statute permits convictions based on non-violent, minimal force; thus it does not meet the federal ‘‘physical force’’/violent-force requirement | The statute’s ‘‘force or violence’’ language covers violent physical force sufficient to qualify as a categorical crime of violence | The statute is not categorically a crime of violence; conviction here is not an aggravated felony on that ground |
| If statute is divisible, whether the modified-categorical approach shows Ortiz’s conviction necessarily involved ‘‘violence’’ (not merely ‘‘force’’) | Ortiz: plea records do not show the conviction necessarily involved ‘‘violence’’ | Government: remand to BIA to apply the modified-categorical approach | No remand necessary on this issue; existing record (plea form, register, sentence) does not establish the conviction necessarily involved ‘‘violence,’’ so modified-categorical approach cannot render it a crime of violence |
| Whether the court should remand for the BIA to address moral turpitude charge under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) | Ortiz: removal based on aggravated felony fails, so BIA must decide moral turpitude anew | Government: (implicitly) BIA should resolve remaining grounds | The court vacated removal as to aggravated-felony ground and remanded to the BIA to address the moral-turpitude charge |
| Standard of review and applicable federal definition of ‘‘crime of violence’’ | N/A (procedural) | N/A | Court reviews legal questions de novo, applies categorical approach using federal definition in 18 U.S.C. § 16 and Johnson’s ‘‘violent force’’ interpretation |
Key Cases Cited
- Roberts v. Holder, 745 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2014) (jurisdictional and aggravated-felony review principles)
- Olmsted v. Holder, 588 F.3d 556 (8th Cir. 2009) (courts retain jurisdiction over legal questions whether a crime is an aggravated felony)
- Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2010) (deference to BIA on immigration statutes; review standard)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013) (categorical approach to prior offenses in immigration context)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (‘‘physical force’’ means ‘‘violent force’’ capable of causing physical pain or injury)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. (2013) (modified-categorical approach and divisibility framework)
- United States v. Martinez, 756 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 2014) (clarifying scope of the modified-categorical inquiry)
- Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (use of statutory text and judicial interpretation to compare state statute with generic federal definition)