Jose Ruiz-Vidal v. Loretta E. Lynch
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17668
| 9th Cir. | 2015Background
- Jose Reyes Alberto Ruiz-Vidal, a Mexican national and lawful permanent resident since 1976, was charged in California with sale of a controlled substance (count identified as methamphetamine) and possession for sale of 57+ grams of methamphetamine.
- Ruiz-Vidal pleaded no contest to the lesser included offense of simple possession under Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11377(a); remainder of the complaint was dismissed; he admitted a factual basis and received time served plus probation.
- DHS served a Notice to Appear; an IJ and the BIA concluded he was removable as having been convicted of an offense relating to a controlled substance (methamphetamine) under the CSA, triggering 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
- The Ninth Circuit applied the modified categorical approach (because § 11377(a) is divisible) and reviewed permissible documents (Information, plea colloquy, minute order) to determine whether the conviction involved methamphetamine.
- The majority held the charging document’s express reference to methamphetamine plus the plea’s reference to the lesser included offense of Count 1 (and the minute order stipulating a factual basis) established by clear and convincing evidence that Ruiz-Vidal was convicted of possessing methamphetamine and is removable.
- Judge Reinhardt dissented, arguing the court improperly extended United States v. Vidal by treating the Information’s allegations as proof of the drug when the plea was to a different statute and the plea colloquy did not expressly identify methamphetamine; he warned this undermines defendants’ reliance on circuit precedent and creates uncertainty.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether, under the modified categorical approach, the limited record shows Ruiz‑Vidal was convicted of possessing methamphetamine | Government: the Information names methamphetamine; plea references lesser included of Count 1; minute order and plea colloquy supply a factual nexus — clear and convincing proof of methamphetamine possession | Ruiz‑Vidal: plea was to a different statute (possession) and did not expressly identify methamphetamine; Vidal and related precedent bar using the Information when plea is to a different offense | Majority: Yes — permissible documents (Information, plea colloquy, minute order) make clear he pleaded to the lesser included of Count 1, which necessarily means possession of methamphetamine; removable |
| Whether the court may consult the plea colloquy and minute order to connect a plea to allegations in the charging document | Government: plea colloquy referencing a specific count and minute order stipulating factual basis are within Descamps/Descamps-derived limits for the modified categorical approach | Ruiz‑Vidal: plea colloquy did not memorialize acceptance of methamphetamine allegation; relying on silence or non‑objection is insufficient and runs afoul of Vidal | Majority: Yes — those documents memorialize that the plea was to Count 1 and thus permit considering the Information’s drug allegation |
| Whether this application departs from United States v. Vidal and creates an improper new exception | Ruiz‑Vidal: N/A (appellee) | Ruiz‑Vidal: majority’s approach creates a new exception to Vidal and undermines reliance interests; court should require explicit ‘as charged’ or plea to a specific count | Dissent: Yes — would adhere to Vidal and decline to create further exceptions; would find record ambiguous and not meet clear and convincing standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (compares state statute elements to federal generic definition)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (modified categorical approach and limits on documents courts may consult)
- Cabantac v. Holder, 736 F.3d 787 (9th Cir.) (application of modified categorical approach and reliance on charging count when plea ties to a count)
- United States v. Leal‑Vega, 680 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.) (plea to a numbered count permits consideration of the count’s drug allegation)
- United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. en banc) (rule that when record comprises only indictment and judgment, judgment must say ‘as charged in the Information’ to infer conviction of charged allegations)
- Cisneros‑Perez v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 386 (9th Cir.) (refusal to infer that a plea to a different offense incorporated the original complaint’s allegations when the record lacks a connection)
- Carachuri‑Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (look to the conviction itself as starting point for immigration consequences)
- Medina‑Lara v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir.) (distinguishes actual possession evidence from whether record establishes conviction for a particular federally defined substance)