Jose Ruiz-Vidal v. Loretta E. Lynch
789 F.3d 1065
9th Cir.2015Background
- Ruiz-Vidal, a lawful permanent resident since 1976, was charged in California with sale and possession for sale of a controlled substance (count identified as methamphetamine) under Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11379(a).
- He pleaded no contest to the lesser included offense of simple possession under Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11377(a); sentenced to time served and five years’ probation.
- DHS served a Notice to Appear; an IJ and the BIA found Ruiz-Vidal removable as having been convicted of a controlled-substance aggravated felony (methamphetamine) under federal law.
- The Ninth Circuit panel applied the modified categorical approach because § 11377(a) is divisible and reviewed permitted documents (plea colloquy, charging information, minute order).
- The majority concluded the plea referenced Count 1 (which specified methamphetamine) and that a possession conviction necessarily included possession of methamphetamine given the charge; thus clear and convincing evidence supported removability.
- Judge Reinhardt dissented, arguing the record does not clearly show Ruiz-Vidal was convicted of possessing methamphetamine and that the majority creates an unwarranted exception to precedent protecting plea certainty (United States v. Vidal).
Issues
| Issue | Ruiz-Vidal's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a no-contest plea to a lesser included offense under a divisible California statute can be tied to a specific drug named in the charging count for removal purposes | Plea to §11377(a) did not identify the drug; thus record doesn’t show conviction was for methamphetamine | Plea referenced the lesser included to Count 1 (which specified methamphetamine); minute order and colloquy connect plea to that count | Held: Yes — documents show plea was to Count 1 (which alleged methamphetamine), so conviction is for methamphetamine and is a removable aggravated felony |
| Whether courts may consult plea colloquy and minute order under the modified categorical approach to identify the specific controlled substance | Records lack explicit drug admission in colloquy; such documents cannot substitute for an explicit conviction-as-charged statement | Permitted records under Descamps/Leal-Vega include plea colloquy and minute order; these link the plea to the methamphetamine count | Held: Yes — plea colloquy and minute order are in the limited class of documents and provide clear and convincing evidence |
| Whether a conviction for a lesser included offense need be explicitly labeled "as charged in the Information" to rely on the Information’s allegations | Vidal requires explicit ‘‘as charged in the Information’’ or clear plea to a specific count; otherwise the Information cannot be used | Where plea expressly references a specific count (even as a lesser included), the charging document’s specified drug can be considered | Held: Majority rejects Vidal limitation in this circumstance — the record here goes beyond indictment+judgment and supports reliance on the Information; dissent disagrees |
| Whether adopting this rule undermines defendants’ ability to rely on circuit precedent about immigration consequences of pleas | Argues reliance on Vidal and earlier Ruiz-Vidal decision meant plea avoided removal; changing rule is retroactive consequence-altering | Government emphasizes evidentiary sufficiency and established modified categorical authorities allow this inquiry | Held: Majority applies evidentiary rule despite dissent’s concern about altering settled expectations; dissent would deny removal and preserve Vidal’s rule |
Key Cases Cited
- Ayala-Villanueva v. Holder, 572 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2009) (aggravated felony removability standard for controlled-substance convictions)
- Cabantac v. Holder, 736 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 2013) (standard of review and use of limited documents under modified categorical approach)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (U.S. 2013) (limits documents courts may consult when a statute is divisible; modified categorical approach)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical approach—compare state elements to federal definition)
- Coronado v. Holder, 747 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2014) (Cal. § 11377(a) is divisible and some alternatives are not federal offenses)
- Ruiz-Vidal v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2007) (prior Ninth Circuit decision involving the same petitioner and similar issues)
- United States v. Leal-Vega, 680 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2012) (minute order and specific-count plea can connect conviction to charging document’s facts)
- United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2007) (requirement that judgment state conviction "as charged in the Information" when record lacks other memorialization)
- Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010) (focus on the conviction itself when determining immigration consequences)
