Jose Ramirez v. Jefferson Sessions III
887 F.3d 693
| 4th Cir. | 2018Background
- Jose Ramirez, Salvadoran national, entered the U.S. in 1996 and later conceded unlawful presence; placed in removal proceedings and applied for NACARA special rule cancellation under § 203.
- Ramirez has convictions from 2012: one petit larceny (conceded as a CIMT but qualifying under the petty-offense exception) and two counts of obstruction of justice under Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-460(A).
- DHS argued the obstruction convictions were crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs), which would restart Ramirez’s NACARA continuous-presence clock and require a ten-year showing he lacked.
- The IJ and a single-member BIA decision concluded Virginia obstruction § 18.2-460(A) is a CIMT; Ramirez was removed; he petitioned for review to the Fourth Circuit.
- The Fourth Circuit addressed (1) whether Ramirez exhausted administrative remedies (jurisdiction), (2) whether the non-precedential BIA decision merited deference, (3) whether § 18.2-460(A) categorically is a CIMT, and (4) whether the government must facilitate Ramirez’s return for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Ramirez's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction/exhaustion: Did Ramirez exhaust administrative remedies so court can decide whether § 18.2-460(A) is a CIMT? | He raised below that Virginia obstruction is not a CIMT; that suffices to preserve the legal question on appeal. | He failed to exhaust administrative remedies because appellate counsel advanced new, more specific arguments and authorities on appeal. | Court held Ramirez satisfied exhaustion by arguing below that obstruction is not a CIMT; federal court has jurisdiction to decide the legal question. |
| Deference: Is the BIA’s one-member, non-precedential decision entitled to Chevron or Skidmore deference? | The BIA’s short, non-precedential opinion is not controlling and is unpersuasive. | BIA’s legal conclusion should be given weight. | Court held the single-member opinion is not entitled to Chevron and is unpersuasive under Skidmore; only precedential BIA decisions get Chevron. |
| Substance: Does Va. Code § 18.2-460(A) categorically constitute a crime involving moral turpitude? | § 18.2-460(A) requires intent to obstruct, but it does not require deceit, fraud, threats, or violence—so it can criminalize non-turpitudinous conduct (e.g., passive refusal). | Any intentional obstruction of lawful government operations is morally turpitudinous; BIA’s view supports CIMT classification. | Court held § 18.2-460(A) is not categorically a CIMT because it can encompass passive or non-deceptive acts that do not involve the fraud/deceit or morally reprehensible conduct required for moral turpitude. |
| Return facilitation: Should the Government be ordered to facilitate Ramirez’s return so he can complete NACARA proceedings? | Yes—ICE policy directs facilitation where an appellate judgment requires the alien’s presence for continued adjudication; presence is necessary to effectuate review. | Government argued return facilitation unnecessary. | Court directed the Government (pursuant to ICE Directive 11061.1) to facilitate Ramirez’s return for the limited purpose of further removal/NACARA proceedings; no substantive immigration benefits guaranteed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (agency interpretation review framework)
- United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (limits on Chevron; when agency action has force of law)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (categorical approach and divisible-statute framework)
- Mohamed v. Holder, 769 F.3d 885 (Fourth Circuit discussion of BIA definition of moral turpitude)
- Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902 (non-precedential BIA decisions do not receive Chevron deference)
- Sotnikau v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 731 (mens rea and actus reus requirements for CIMT)