Jose Luis Gonzalez v. U.S. Attorney General, 710 F. App'x 442

Background

Gonzalez, a lawful permanent resident from Colombia, was convicted in May 1998 of resisting an officer with violence under Fla. Stat. § 843.01 (along with related battery offenses).
He was granted adjustment of status in July 1998; DHS alleges he did not disclose his § 843.01 conviction on that application.
In 2013 DHS placed Gonzalez in removal proceedings, asserting he was inadmissible at the time of adjustment because his 1998 conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude.
The Immigration Judge found § 843.01 requires intentional violence against an officer and thus is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude; the BIA affirmed.
Gonzalez sought termination arguing DHS failed to prove that, "at the time of adjustment" in 1998, his conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude under then-existing law.
The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition, holding the record conviction constituted clear evidence and that existing precedent (notably Matter of Danesh principles and later Cano) supports categorizing § 843.01 offenses as involving moral turpitude in 1998.

Issues

Issue	Gonzalez's Argument	DHS / Respondent's Argument	Held
Whether DHS met its burden to prove Gonzalez was inadmissible "at the time of adjustment" because his 1998 § 843.01 conviction was a CIMT	DHS must show that, under the law as it existed in 1998, Gonzalez's conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude; no binding authority in 1998 established that § 843.01 was a CIMT	Burden is on DHS to prove facts (conviction) by clear, convincing evidence; legal characterization can rely on existing BIA precedent and ordinary principles (violence against an officer is morally turpitudinous)	Held for DHS: conviction proved by official record and, under existing legal principles, § 843.01 crimes were CIMTs in 1998
Whether absence of published precedent in 1998 showing § 843.01 was a CIMT defeats removability	Lack of published authority means uncertainty and DHS cannot retroactively rely on Cano (2013)	Absence of contrary precedent does not help Gonzalez; BIA decisions and long-standing principles already treated violent interference with officers as morally turpitudinous	Held for DHS: absence of contrary binding precedent in 1998 supports removability; Cano merely confirmed the correct legal view
Whether unpublished administrative rulings (e.g., AAO) showing contrary view prevent removal	AAO decision showing § 843.01 not a CIMT proves unsettled law and negates DHS's claim	Unpublished AAO decisions have no precedential value and cannot defeat DHS proof	Held for DHS: unpublished administrative decisions are not binding and do not overcome the record evidence
Whether Gonzalez's failure (or alleged failure) to disclose the conviction on his adjustment application affects removability	Non-disclosure (or that agency approved despite conviction) means adjustment approval stands, so not removable	Approval was erroneous if applicant was inadmissible at time; removability depends on status at adjustment, not on agency error	Held: Approval error does not bar removal; removability depends on whether conviction rendered him inadmissible when adjusted

Key Cases Cited

Cano v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 709 F.3d 1052 (11th Cir. 2013) (held Fla. Stat. § 843.01 categorically a crime involving moral turpitude)
Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (government must prove deportability by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence)
United States v. Gloria, 494 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1974) (definitional formulation of "moral turpitude")
Gelin v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 837 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (recognizes moral turpitude is a nebulous concept that can evolve)
De la Rosa v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 579 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2009) (BIA accords no precedential value to its unreported decisions)