Jose Loza v. Betty Mitchell, 766 F.3d 466

Background

In 1991 Jose Trinidad Loza shot and killed four members of his girlfriend Dorothy Jackson’s family; he was convicted by an Ohio jury of four counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to death.
Police discovered a letter in a dumpster linking Loza to a drive-by shooting and used that and other trash items to locate and detain him and Jackson; Jackson later implicated Loza.
Loza was stopped by an unmarked officer, handcuffed, placed in the officer’s car, later Mirandized at the detention center, and after about an hour of interrogation he confessed on videotape.
Loza raised multiple federal claims in state and federal proceedings (Miranda/custody, voluntariness, exclusion of expert testimony under Crane, ineffective assistance re: cultural/mitigation investigation, jury coercion via supplemental charge, selective prosecution, and Vienna Convention consular-notice).
State courts denied relief; Loza petitioned for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied relief and this court affirmed, applying AEDPA deferential review where appropriate.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was Loza "in custody" during initial questioning such that Miranda warnings were required?	Loza: Enable’s armed approach, handcuffing, and placement in patrol car made the stop custodial; Miranda required.	State: Encounter was a Terry investigatory stop supported by reasonable suspicion; questions were routine identity/investigatory and not custodial.	Court: Ohio Supreme Court reasonably applied Terry/Berkemer; no AEDPA error — no Miranda suppression.
Was Loza’s confession involuntary (Due Process)?	Loza: detectives threatened or coerced him (references to harm to Jackson/unborn child, inducements, false statements), so confession involuntary.	State: Loza waived Miranda, was adult and competent, interrogation not unusually long or abusive; statements characterized as warnings of consequences or strategic deception.	Court: Totality of circumstances supports voluntariness; state court factual findings not unreasonable; confession admissible.
Did exclusion of Dr. Fisher’s psychological testimony at guilt phase violate Crane/right to present a defense?	Loza: Fisher would explain confession credibility (psychological susceptibility); exclusion was a Crane-type blanket ban on evidence relevant to credibility.	State: Fisher’s proffer related to defendant’s psychological makeup (internal), not the interrogation’s circumstances; jury could view videotape; exclusion was permissible and not arbitrary.	Court: Although some reasoning was imperfect, Ohio court’s outcome was not an unreasonable application of Crane under AEDPA; no habeas relief.
Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to investigate/present cultural and additional mitigation evidence (Strickland)?	Loza: counsel failed to obtain cultural expert and additional family witnesses; evidence would have materially strengthened mitigation and explanation for confession.	State: Counsel did investigate; Fisher and family members testified at mitigation; additional evidence largely cumulative; no deficient performance or prejudice.	Court: State-court application of Strickland was reasonable; no prejudice shown; claim denied.
Did the trial court’s supplemental jury instruction (Howard charge) coerce verdicts?	Loza: Charge was inappropriate and coercive given jury note; it may have pressured unanimity on death specifications.	State: The court properly responded to an ambiguous note and gave a Howard charge approved by Ohio courts; charge was not coercive when viewed in context.	Court: Ohio Supreme Court reasonably concluded instruction appropriate in context; no coercion established.
Was Loza selectively prosecuted for capital offenses on racial grounds?	Loza: Prosecutors targeted him (a Hispanic) while Jackson (white juvenile) was not prosecuted; statistical and investigator conduct evidence shows disparate treatment.	State: Prosecutorial decisions presumptively regular; Jackson was a juvenile and materially not similarly situated; ample race-neutral evidence (confession, other statements) supported prosecution.	Court: Under Armstrong and McCleskey, Loza failed to show discriminatory effect and purpose; state-court rejection reasonable.
Did failure to inform Loza of right to consular notification under the Vienna Convention warrant habeas relief?	Loza/Govt of Mexico: Authorities did not notify consulate or inform Loza of right to request consular assistance; treaty violation.	State: Vienna Convention does not clearly create privately enforceable, judicially remediable federal rights; state post-conviction relief limited to constitutional violations.	Court: Vienna Convention claims do not entitle Loza to habeas relief; no enforceable domestic remedy under the treaty in this context.

Key Cases Cited

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda warnings required before custodial interrogation)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (police may perform brief investigatory stops on reasonable suspicion)
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (routine investigatory stops are generally noncustodial for Miranda)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (AEDPA standards for "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" of federal law)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance standard: deficient performance + prejudice)
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (invalidates blanket exclusion of evidence about circumstances of a confession bearing on credibility)
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (Allen charge and coercion analysis)
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (contextual review of supplemental jury charges for coercion)
Armstrong v. United States, 517 U.S. 456 (standard for selective-prosecution discovery and proof)
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (ICJ decision and executive memoranda do not create directly enforceable domestic federal law)