Jose Estrada-Rodriguez v. Loretta Lynch
825 F.3d 397
| 8th Cir. | 2016Background
- Jose Estrada-Rodriguez, a Mexican national who entered the U.S. unlawfully in 2000, was convicted in Arkansas in 2004 of first-degree assault under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-205 (recklessly creating substantial risk of death or serious physical injury).
- DHS initiated removal proceedings after a later arrest; Estrada conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal based on hardship to his U.S. citizen children (8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)).
- The IJ initially found the Arkansas assault statute could be applied to non-turpitudinous conduct (so not categorically a CIMT) but denied relief on other grounds (continuous presence and insufficient hardship). The BIA affirmed; Estrada did not seek review.
- Estrada successfully moved to reopen the BIA proceeding based on new hardship evidence; the BIA remanded "for further consideration of the hardship factors . . . and for other action as deemed appropriate."
- On remand the IJ reversed its earlier view, finding the 2004 Arkansas statute categorically a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT); the single-member BIA dismissed Estrada's appeal. Estrada petitioned for review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether IJ was precluded from reconsidering CIMT after remand | Estrada: collateral estoppel / law of the case barred reconsideration | DHS: remand allowed reconsideration; IJ may revisit issues on remand | IJ not collaterally estopped; law of the case discretion permits reconsideration on remand |
| Whether conviction under Ark. § 5-13-205 (2004) is a CIMT | Estrada: statute covers simple assault; no vicious motive or aggravating factor; therefore not a CIMT | DHS: statute criminalizes reckless conduct creating substantial risk of death/serious injury and is like other recklessness statutes the BIA deemed CIMTs | Court: conviction categorically is a CIMT (reckless creation of serious risk is morally turpitudinous) |
| Whether the agency violated due process by "changing the law" | Estrada: BIA change deprived him of due process | DHS: decisions reflect interpretation, not impermissible retroactive change | Court: no change in law; due process challenge unnecessary and rejected |
Key Cases Cited
- Etenyi v. Lynch, 799 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2015) (review of BIA decision and when IJ reasoning is reviewed)
- B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 569 F.3d 383 (8th Cir. 2009) (factors relevant to reconsideration principles)
- Anderson v. Genuine Parts Co., 128 F.3d 1267 (8th Cir. 1997) (elements for collateral estoppel)
- United States v. Brekke, 97 F.3d 1043 (8th Cir. 1996) (issue preclusion standards)
- Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (agency statutory interpretation/deference framework)
- United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (limits of Chevron deference; Skidmore persuasiveness)
- Leal v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding BIA view that reckless endangerment-type statutes can categorically be CIMTs)
- Partyka v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 417 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2005) (recklessness may support finding of moral turpitude)
- Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84 (3d Cir. 2004) (recklessness, depravity, and grave risk support CIMT finding)
- Marciano v. INS, 450 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1971) (definition of CIMT as contrary to accepted rules of right and duty)
- Godinez-Arroyo v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 848 (8th Cir. 2008) (treatment of deference to unpublished single-member BIA decisions)