Jose A. Perez v. Texas Medical Board and Mari Robinson, JD, in Her Official Capacity, 03-14-00644-CV

Background

Perez’s Texas physician assistant license was revoked by the PAB on March 7, 2014 following a default SOAH proceeding after Perez refused to participate.
Perez sued the Texas Medical Board (TMB) in district court seeking judicial review of the PAB Order, but did not name the PAB as the agency with statewide jurisdiction.
The district court granted TMB’s plea to the jurisdiction, dismissing Perez’s claims with prejudice.
Perez asserted constitutional, inverse condemnation, FCRA, and ultra vires/UDJA-type claims against TMB and its Executive Director Mari Robinson.
The court held that the PAB has exclusive jurisdiction over physician assistants and that seeking review required naming the PAB; failure to sue the correct agency deprived the court of jurisdiction.
The appellate brief notes Perez’s prior federal and state litigation against the agency, which were dismissed and affirmed on appeal.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did Perez satisfy the statutory prerequisites for judicial review?	Perez argued the district court could review the PAB order despite naming TMB.	TMB contends Perez failed to sue the agency with nationwide jurisdiction (the PAB) as required.	No; jurisdiction lacked because Perez did not sue the correct agency.
Did Perez's constitutional claims fall within the court’s jurisdiction?	Perez asserted constitutional protections in his review petition.	Constitutional claims are still subject to statutory prerequisites for judicial review.	No; constitutional claims were barred for lack of jurisdiction under the prerequisites.
Did Perez have subject-matter jurisdiction for an inverse-condemnation claim?	Perez alleged a taking through license revocation.	Professional licenses are not real property and revocation is not a physical taking.	No; inverse-condemnation claim lacks jurisdictional basis.
Did Perez’s claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act have jurisdiction?	Perez asserted a FCRA violation arising from reporting related to the license.	FCRA does not apply to NPDB reporting by TMB/PAB; sovereign immunity bars monetary relief.	No; FCRA claim lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
Did Perez’s claims against Mari Robinson in her capacity as Executive Director have jurisdiction?	UDJA/ultra vires theory against Robinson.	UDJA does not waive immunity and actions by PAB officials are discretionary, not ministerial.	No; no valid ultra vires or UDJA claim against Robinson.

Key Cases Cited

Berry v. Tex. Democratic Party, 449 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014) (sovereign immunity and jurisdictional prerequisites govern suit against state entities)
Prairie View A&M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500 (Tex. 2012) (statutory prerequisites govern judicial review)
Westgate, Ltd. v. State, 843 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. 1992) (inverse-condemnation scope and property requirement)
Gilmer Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Dorfman, 156 S.W.3d 586 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003) (failure to join indispensable party defeats jurisdiction)
Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. Kelsoe, 286 S.W.3d 91 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009) (constitutional claims must comply with statutory prerequisites for review)
City of Dallas v. Stewart, 361 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. 2012) (constitutional claims require adherence to statutory prerequisites)
City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2009) (narrowly framed administrative-review jurisdictional rules)
Sierra Club v. Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n, 26 S.W.3d 684 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000) (proper party and procedural requirements define scope of review)
Heart Hosp. IV., L.P. v. King, 116 S.W.3d 831 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003) (judicial-review standards and agency-discretion considerations)
Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. 2006) (exclusive jurisdiction analysis under statutory schemes)
Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2002) (administrative deference and ultra vires considerations)