Jordan v. State
166 So. 3d 1
| Miss. | 2012Background
- En banc Mississippi Supreme Court dismisses four writs of certiorari challenging a criminal conviction.
- Defendants Timothy Jordan, Glenn Grose, and Johnny Grose were convicted of multiple counts related to sexual abuse of Tim’s daughter A.B.
- Evidence at trial included a videotaped forensic interview of A.B. conducted under an investigative framework and a plea-related testimony from Krystal Jordan.
- Trial included testimony from Krystal Jordan (plea participant) and other lay/witness testimony; Krystal testified under a plea agreement.
- The court granted certiorari to review whether testimonial evidence and related Confrontation Clause issues violated defendants’ rights and affected the conviction.
- Separate concurring statement argues for a new trial due to the admission of a videotaped forensic interview and certain testimony.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether A.B.’s videotaped forensic interview violated the Confrontation Clause | A.B.’s statements were non-testimonial and admissible under hearsay rules | The forensic interview was testimonial and its admission violated the Sixth Amendment | Writs dismissed; overall ruling rejects reversal on this issue |
| Whether Krystal Jordan's statements via her attorney were admissible as prior consistent statements | Fondren’s testimony rebutted allegations of fabrication under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) | Admissions occurred after motive to fabricate arose; not admissible to rehabilitate credibility | Writs dismissed; issue not decisive in the order |
| Effect of Confrontation-Clause error on the verdict | Error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given remaining evidence | Confrontation-Clause violation was not harmless | Writs dismissed; no remand for new trial in the main order |
| Impact of testimonial evidence on overall weight of the conviction | Evidence other than the testimonial interview supported guilt | Key testimonial evidence was improperly admitted | Writs dismissed; no reversal on this theory in the main order |
Key Cases Cited
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004) (confrontation right and testimonial hearsay framework)
- Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (U.S. 2006) (limits on testimonial vs. non-testimonial statements in emergencies)
- Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (U.S. 2009) (business-record-like affidavits and testimonial concerns)
- Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (U.S. 2011) (requirements for testimonial evidence and confrontation rights)
- Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (U.S. 2008) (rule for confrontation in accomplice/household settings)
- Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (U.S. 2011) (primary purpose test for determining testimonial nature of statements)
- Hobgood v. State of Mississippi, 926 So.2d 847 (Miss. 2006) (testimony admissibility in child abuse cases via tender-years exception)
- Bishop v. State, 982 So.2d 371 (Miss. 2008) (statements to mother/therapist may be nontestimonial)
- Tome v. U.S., 513 U.S. 150 (U.S. 1995) (prior consistent statements must predate motive to fabricate)
- Owens v. State, 666 So.2d 814 (Miss. 1995) (limits on prior consistent statements to rebut fabrication)
- Davis v. Bryant, see Michigan v. Bryant (U.S. 2011) (included for context on primary purpose analysis)
