Jordan v. State, 305 Ga. 12

On May 6, 2011, Johnny Luckey (an elderly man) was shot twice and killed during a robbery; Jordan and three accomplices were implicated.
Two accomplices (Lindsey and Van) testified that Jordan carried a gun and shot Luckey; Jordan gave a post-Miranda statement admitting participation in the robbery but denying he was the shooter.
Jordan was tried alone in November 2012, convicted of malice murder, armed robbery, and firearm possession; sentenced to consecutive life terms and 5 years; he sought a new trial and appealed.
At trial the prosecutor, during a heated bench-jury exchange, told defense counsel she was "deceiving" the jury; Jordan moved for a mistrial which the court denied and gave curative instructions.
Co-defendant Feazell refused to take the oath and invoke the Fifth Amendment after the jury was excused; a brief recess occurred while defense counsel stepped out; defense counsel later questioned Feazell outside the jury’s presence but Feazell continued to refuse to testify.
The trial court denied the new-trial motion; the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, addressing (1) whether the prosecutor’s remark required a mistrial and (2) whether counsel’s brief absence deprived Jordan of the right to effective assistance.

Issue	Jordan's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether prosecutor’s on-the-record remark that defense counsel was "deceiving" the jury required a mistrial	The remark impugned counsel’s integrity and prejudiced Jordan, so mistrial required	Remark was isolated, not egregious; trial court’s curative instructions cured any prejudice; evidence was strong	No mistrial; curative instructions and context (jury reaction, strong evidence) meant no abuse of discretion in denial
Whether defense counsel’s brief absence during Feazell’s refusal to testify denied effective assistance (Cronic)	Absence during a critical stage constitutes constructive denial of counsel, entitling Jordan to new trial without showing prejudice	Counsel was present for critical parts; any absence was brief and not outcome-determinative; trial court’s factual finding entitled to deference	No Cronic relief; trial court’s finding that counsel was present not clearly erroneous; no automatic reversal

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency of the evidence)
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (circumstances where denial of counsel is so prejudicial that prejudice need not be shown)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (ineffective-assistance two-prong test requiring deficient performance and prejudice)
Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707 (2013) (criticizing arguments that impugn opposing counsel; context matters)
Childs v. State, 287 Ga. 488 (2010) (trial court’s discretion to grant mistrial reviewed for abuse)
Coleman v. State, 301 Ga. 720 (2017) (presumption that juries follow curative instructions)
Arrington v. State, 286 Ga. 335 (2009) (no abuse in refusing mistrial for prosecutorial remarks)
Green v. State, 302 Ga. 816 (2018) (trial-court factual findings on ineffective-assistance claims reviewed for clear error)
Yarbrough v. State, 303 Ga. 594 (2018) (same; clear-error standard even when findings rest on circumstantial evidence)
Lynch, 286 Ga. 98 (2009) (trial-court findings supported by some evidence are not clearly erroneous)
Johnson v. State, 276 Ga. 368 (2003) (party-to-a-crime liability for firearm possession)
Roberts v. State, 296 Ga. 719 (2015) (Strickland prejudice requires reasonable probability the result would differ absent counsel error)
Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369 (1993) (merger/vacatur principles for felony murder counts)