Roberts v. StateRoberts v. State
Keith Jerome Roberts apрeals the denial of his motion for new trial, as amended, and his convictions for malice murder, kidnapping, and false imprisonment in connection with the death of Carlnell Walker caused by hyperthermia from entrapment inside the trunk of an automobile. Roberts challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and the effectiveness of his trial counsel. Finding the challenges to be without merit, we affirm.1
Walker, Roberts, and Allen had attended the same college, and Roberts and Allen had been roommates in college. The three men knew each other and socialized together. Walker was involved in a car wreck in 2006, and shortly before his murder, he was advised that he might recover $50,000 in damages as a result of the wreck. He told his landlord, who also had ties to the same college, that he was expecting a settlement check. Walker was viewed as an “entrepreneur,” and was seen on his created website holding up “a wad of money.” Roberts, Allen, and others referred to Walker by the nickname “C-Money.”
When the police arrived at Walker‘s residence, they found the back door open, and no signs of forced entry. However, the house showed signs of a struggle with debris on the floor and blood throughout. Items, including a pair of scissors and remnants of Walker‘s hair, were on the living room floor, and they were placed in a pile in a manner indicating that someone intended to burn them. The globe from a hurricаne oil lamp was on the floor near the debris and close to dried smeared blood, which blood was determined to be Walker‘s and part of a pattern of someone actively bleeding. An empty bottle which had contained lamp oil was found near the debris. Roberts‘s fingerprints were recovered from the lamp globe; no other fingerprints, including Walker‘s, were on it. The base of the lamp was found undisturbed on top of a television approximately eight feet away from the globe, and there were no usable fingerprints found on the base.
When Allen was taken for palm and fingerprinting on July 20, 2006, police observed that he had a healing three-inch-long cut on his right hand which appeared to have been made by a knife. During the warranted search of Roberts‘s apartment, police found a sock stained with Allen‘s blood on the master bedroom floor.
1. Roberts contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on any count because the State did not meet its burden to prove that his fingerprints were impressed on the lamp globe at the time the crimes were committed, and that such fingerprints were the sole evidence that he participated in the crimes. Hе further urges insufficiency because of what he offers as a reasonable explanation of why his fingerprints were on the globe, that is, that he was frequently in Walker‘s home and that power to the home was often off necessitating use of the oil lamp.
As Roberts maintains, when fingerprint evidence is the only evidence linking a defendant to the crimes on trial, the State must prove to the exclusion of other reasonable hypotheses that the fingerprints could have been impressed only at the time of the commission of the crimes. Rivers v. State, 271 Ga. 115, 116 (1) (516 SE2d 525) (1999); Leonard v. State, 269 Ga. 867, 868 (1) (506 SE2d 853) (1998). It is equally true that under former
First, Roberts‘s fingerprints were not the only evidence linking Roberts to the crimes. The evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom showed that Roberts and Allen were close friends and were part of Walker‘s social inner circle; that Walker was perceived by some to have money, аnd indeed, cash on hand, and that Walker had not kept silent about the fact that he was to receive a substantial money settlement; the crime scene evidence suggested Walker knew his attackers, and that they were searching for something of value, tortured Walker to find out where it was, and when they were unsuccessful in doing so placed Walker in the hot car trunk; that the physical evidence of Allen‘s hand injury was consistent with having been sustained in the attack upon Walker; and that Allen‘s blood-stained item from an obvious injury was found in Roberts‘s bedroom.
Moreover, the circumstances surrounding the fingerprints lead to the only reasonable explanation that they were impressed during commission of the crimes. See Crawford v. State, 292 Ga. App. 463 (1) (664 SE2d 820) (2008). Although Roberts cites testimony from his younger brother to the alleged effect that Roberts visited Walker‘s home on multiple occasions, and that Walker possessed the hurricane lamp because his power frequently went out, and therefore, that Roberts had an innocent reason to tоuch the hurricane lamp, such evidence does not aid Roberts‘s hypothesis of innocence. Indeed, it belies it. Roberts‘s brother‘s exact testimony was that Walker had resided not only in the ransacked home in Clayton County where the crimes occurred but in a different home as well, and that Roberts had been inside one of these unspеcified homes only on “several different occasions.” There was no testimony from the brother that Roberts was ever at Walker‘s residence when the power was out. In fact, the testimony was that when Roberts and his brother visited Walker, they would, inter alia, watch television, an activity which plainly required electric power. Further, the lack of Walker‘s or another‘s discernible fingerprints on the lamp or its base belie his or other‘s frequent recent use of the lamp, or indeed its use for the intended purpose at all. The empty bottle of lamp oil found near the globe and the pile of debris support the inference that the globe was removed from the lamр base in order to obtain the oil to incinerate evidence of the crimes and/or to torture Walker. Moreover, there was no testimony from the brother or other evidence that Roberts actually touched the lamp or its globe at any time other than that of the attack
“[C]ircumstantial evidence must exclude only reasonable inferences and hypotheses and it is not necessary that such guilt be devoid of every inference or hypothesis except that of the defendant‘s guilt.” Reeves v. State, 294 Ga. 673 (755 SE2d 695) (2014) (Emphasis supplied.) And, the circumstantial evidence in this case does not equally support a theory consistent with Roberts‘s innocence. O‘Neill v. State, supra.
The evidence, though circumstantial, was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonаble doubt that Roberts was guilty of the malice murder of Walker and the related crimes. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. Roberts further contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and call as a witness at trial, his friend and college freshman roommate, Hall, who he claims would have provided an innocent explanation for his fingerprints on the lаmp globe. He maintains that Hall would have testified that he and Roberts helped Walker move into his Clayton County home, thereby touching Walker‘s furniture and other belongings, that Roberts helped Walker unpack, and that Roberts visited Walker‘s home multiple times. He further urges that this testimony is not cumulative of that of Roberts‘s brother because although thе brother‘s testimony puts Roberts in Walker‘s home on multiple occasions, Hall‘s testimony puts Roberts‘s hands on Walker‘s furniture, and thus, Roberts was prejudiced by the jury not hearing this testimony.
In order for Roberts to prevail on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective, he has to demonstrate under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), that his trial counsel‘s performance was deficient, and that but for counsel‘s deficiency, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been more favorable. Allen v. State, 293 Ga. 626, 627 (2) (748 SE2d 881) (2013). In order to show a deficiency, Roberts must overcome the strong presumption that his trial coun
At the hearing on Roberts‘s motion for new trial, as amended, trial counsel, who was an experienced criminal defense attorney, testified he thoroughly prepared for Roberts‘s case with the assistance of two other attorneys; he was aware of the importance of the issue of when Roberts‘s fingerprints were made on the lamp globe; the defense needed to rebut the inference that Roberts‘s fingerprints were impressed on the globe at the time of the crimes and that he called Roberts‘s brother to testify to rebut such inference, to humanize Roberts, and to tell the jury about the relationship between Walker and the others; counsel did not recall either interviewing Hall, or Hall‘s name being provided to him; if the potential witness‘s name had been given to him, counsel would probably have written it down, had the person interviewed, and given the State notice of the witness; and counsel‘s practice was not to call more than one witness on thе same point because of the likelihood they would contradict one another.
First, in reviewing a trial court‘s decision on the alleged ineffectiveness of counsel, this Court is to accept the trial court‘s factual findings and credibility determinations unless they are clearly erroneous, but to independently apply the legal principles to the facts. Scandrett v. State, 293 Ga. 602, 605 (4) (748 SE2d 861) (2013). In this case, the trial court found that trial counsel‘s performance was not deficient in the manner claimed because there was no evidence that trial counsel was ever informed that Hall was a witness to Roberts helping Walker move into his house, and based upon the evidence at the hеaring in the matter, this Court cannot conclude that such finding is clearly erroneous. Id. What is more,
[t]he decision of whether to call a witness to testify at trial is a matter of trial strategy and tactics, and such a strategic and tactical decision cannot be deemed deficient performance unless the decision is so unreasonable thаt no competent attorney would have made it under similar circumstances.
Hites v. State, supra, citing Miller v. State, 296 Ga. 9, 12 (4) (a) (764 SE2d 823) (2014). And, it cannot be said that trial counsel‘s strategy
Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.