Jordan Jacobs v. State of Indiana
62 N.E.3d 1253
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- On Sept. 2, 2015, police surveilling Blackburn Terrace Apartments observed a group of persons, many appearing to be school-age juveniles and some wearing a known gang color (red). Jacobs (18) was among them and at times had a red T‑shirt over his shoulder.
- Officers watched the group during school hours; several individuals left when a park ranger or marked police units approached and returned after they left. Jacobs twice walked away quickly as officers came near and increased his pace; he failed to stop on an officer’s initial command.
- Officers detained Jacobs, ordered him to the ground, handcuffed him (told he was not under arrest), and escorted him back toward the group. Officer Casavan saw the outline of a handgun in Jacobs’s front right pocket, asked about weapons, received a denial, then retrieved the gun from Jacobs’s pocket and arrested him.
- The State charged Jacobs with Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license; at bench trial the court admitted the handgun over Jacobs’s Fourth Amendment and Indiana Constitution (Art. I, § 11) objections, found him guilty, and sentenced him.
- The Court of Appeals majority affirmed, holding officers had reasonable suspicion (including possible juvenile truancy, flight, gang‑related context, and visible outline of a weapon) to detain and to search for weapons; the handgun was admissible. Judge Crone dissented, arguing the stop and force (handcuffing) were unreasonable under both federal and state constitutional standards and the gun should have been excluded as fruit of an unlawful seizure.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Jacobs' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the warrantless search/seizure violated the Fourth Amendment | Officers had reasonable suspicion to detain based on juveniles in park during school hours, gang context, evasive flight, and visible outline of a gun | Stop/seizure lacked reasonable suspicion (truancy is a status offense), and officers used excessive intrusion (handcuffing) absent individualized suspicion | Majority: No Fourth Amendment violation; detention and search reasonable under totality (flight, context, visible outline). Dissent: seizure/unreasonable and fruit should be excluded |
| Whether search/seizure violated Indiana Constitution Art. I, § 11 | Under Litchfield factors, degree of suspicion and law‑enforcement needs justified intrusion despite high degree of intrusion | Litchfield balance favors defendant: low suspicion, high intrusion, minimal law‑enforcement need; exclusion required | Majority: Two of three Litchfield factors support State; detention/search reasonable under Art. I, § 11. Dissent: disagrees, would reverse |
| Admissibility of the handgun at trial | Gun was lawfully seized incident to a lawful investigatory stop/search for weapons | Gun is fruit of an unconstitutional seizure and should be suppressed | Majority: Handgun admissible; trial court did not abuse discretion. Dissent: would exclude gun and reverse conviction |
| Reliance on prior cases (Stalling/Bridgewater) to challenge reasonable suspicion | State: facts here differ—longer surveillance, juvenile appearance, gang context, repeated flight—providing reasonable suspicion | Jacobs: Stalling and Bridgewater show similar facts where stops lacked reasonable suspicion; presence in high‑crime area and walking away insufficient | Majority: Distinguishes Stalling/Bridgewater; factual differences support reasonable suspicion. Dissent: Treats those precedents as supporting suppression |
Key Cases Cited
- Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (reasonableness is the Fourth Amendment touchstone)
- Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable; exceptions narrowly delineated)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (officer may conduct limited stop and weapons search given reasonable suspicion of danger)
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (flight in high‑crime area is a relevant factor for reasonable suspicion)
- Stalling v. State, 713 N.E.2d 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (investigatory stop lacked reasonable suspicion where facts were insufficient)
- Bridgewater v. State, 793 N.E.2d 1097 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (presence in high‑crime area and flight alone did not supply reasonable suspicion)
- Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005) (three‑factor test under Art. I, § 11: degree of suspicion, degree of intrusion, law‑enforcement needs)
- Gaddie v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1249 (Ind. 2014) (persons may walk away from police unless officer has reasonable suspicion to detain)