Jones v. Treubig
963 F.3d 214
2d Cir.2020Background
- April 7, 2015: NYPD arrested Matthew Jones in his building stairwell; officers used an asp (baton) and pepper spray; Jones’s right wrist was handcuffed but his left arm remained under his body.
- Lt. Christopher Treubig arrived and warned he would use his taser; he deployed the taser in cartridge mode once (5-second cycle) and then re‑cycled it a second time before Jones was handcuffed.
- At trial the jury found Treubig liable for excessive force (awarded nominal and punitive damages) and answered special interrogatories that Jones was resisting at the first tasing but was not resisting at the second, though Treubig believed he was.
- District court granted Treubig’s post‑verdict Rule 50(b) motion, holding Treubig entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established that a rapid second taser cycle under these circumstances was unconstitutional.
- Second Circuit reversed: it held that (1) controlling precedent made clear that significant force against an arrestee who is no longer resisting and poses no safety threat is unconstitutional, and (2) the record (construed in plaintiff’s favor) and jury interrogatory supported the conclusion Jones was not resisting at the second tasing, so Treubig is not entitled to qualified immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether it was clearly established in April 2015 that officers may not use significant force (e.g., a taser) on an arrestee who is no longer resisting and poses no threat | Tracy and related precedents clearly established the rule that gratuitous significant force against non‑resisting arrestees is unconstitutional; this extends to tasers | No controlling precedent put an officer on fair notice that a second, rapid taser cycle would be unconstitutional in these circumstances | Held: Yes — Tracy and later Second Circuit taser cases made the right clearly established that significant force against a non‑resisting, non‑threatening arrestee is unconstitutional |
| Whether Treubig is entitled to qualified immunity given the jury’s finding that Jones was not resisting at the second tasing | Treubig’s mistaken belief that Jones was resisting cannot confer immunity if that belief was unreasonable; the jury could find the belief unreasonable given evidence Jones was face‑down with arms spread | Treubig reasonably (though mistakenly) believed Jones continued resisting; an officer’s reasonable mistake of fact invokes qualified immunity | Held: Not entitled — the jury found Jones not resisting and the record, viewed in plaintiff’s favor, would permit a finding that Treubig’s belief was unreasonable, so qualified immunity fails |
| Whether the jury’s punitive‑damages verdict or general verdict required the court to refrain from asking special interrogatories or to assume the jury found Treubig’s mistake reasonable | The general verdict and punitive damages confirmed a finding of unconstitutional conduct and reckless disregard, so any ambiguity resolved for plaintiff | Defense sought focused interrogatories on Treubig’s belief and its reasonableness to support qualified immunity | Held: Court properly used interrogatories, but the interrogatory omitted the critical word "reasonable;" absence of a jury finding that Treubig’s mistake was reasonable prevents qualified immunity |
| Whether rapid succession of two taser cycles or the fact Jones was uncuffed justified the second taser cycle | Rapid, tense conditions and uncuffed status made re‑cycling reasonable; Treubig had to effect the arrest and could act in the moment | Two closely timed cycles do not excuse additional force when the officer had time to reassess and the suspect was subdued; uncuffed status alone does not authorize unlimited force | Held: Rapid succession and uncuffed status do not justify immunity where officer had time to reassess and suspect was no longer resisting |
Key Cases Cited
- Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2010) (Fourth Amendment violated when significant force used against an arrestee who was no longer resisting or posing a threat)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (two‑step qualified immunity framework: constitutional violation and clearly established law)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualifed immunity framework; courts may exercise discretion in order of Saucier steps)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (use‑of‑force reasonableness judged from perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene)
- Muschette ex rel. A.M. v. Gionfriddo, 910 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2018) (officers may not tase a compliant or non‑threatening suspect)
- Soto v. Gaudett, 862 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2017) (officers who tased a suspect after he had been stopped and was not a threat were not entitled to qualified immunity on disputed facts)
- Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (clearly established prong must be defined with specificity; later cases generally not used to establish the right retroactively)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (courts should assess clearly established law in the specific context)
- Abbott v. Sangamon County, 705 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2013) (multiple tasings may be excessive even in rapid encounters)