Jones v. State, 290 Ga. 670

Jones was convicted after a jury trial of aggravated assault of Ms. Hurst and kidnapping of Ms. Hurst and her two children.
The trial court sentenced Jones to concurrent terms: 10 years for aggravated assault, 5 years for kidnapping of Ms. Hurst, and 25 years for each of the other two kidnapping counts.
The trial court denied a new-trial motion as to the aggravated assault; the kidnapping convictions were addressed in a later post-trial proceeding.
This Court affirmed the aggravated assault conviction on direct appeal; the kidnapping rulings were reconsidered after an interlocutory appeal remanding for further proceedings.
On remand the trial court denied the motion for new trial in its entirety and Jones pursued an out-of-time appeal.
Jones contends (1) insufficient evidence on kidnapping asportation, (2) improper merger of convictions, and (3) ineffective assistance based on sentencing challenges.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was there sufficient asportation proof for kidnapping?	Jones argues insufficient asportation under Garza.	State contends all four Garza factors satisfied or not required to prove asportation.	Asportation proven; sufficient evidence for kidnapping.
Should kidnapping counts merge with aggravated assault or with each other?	Jones asserts merger of kidnapping counts with aggravated assault or among themselves.	State argues different victims and separate elements prevent merger.	No merger; convictions upheld; each count involves different victims or distinct elements.
Were penalties and the related constitutional challenges to sentencing properly preserved and reviewed?	Jones challenges the 25-year mandatory minimum for child kidnapping as applied to him.	State argues timely challenges were not raised, but issues could be addressed on remand and were properly analyzed for ineffectiveness.	Constitutional challenges deemed untimely; ineffective-assistance claim analyzed and rejected.
Did trial counsel’s performance prejudice the outcome on sentencing challenges?	Jones asserts ineffective assistance for failing to raise sentencing challenges timely.	State maintains no prejudice; challenges would not change the outcome.	No deficient performance or prejudice; claims fail.

Garza v. State, 284 Ga. 696 (2008) (four-factor test for asportation in kidnapping cases pre-Garza date)
Hammond v. State, 289 Ga. 142 (2011) (describes Garza framework applicability and factor guidance)
Brown v. State, 288 Ga. 902 (2011) (Garza factors; movement duration not brief)
Henderson v. State, 285 Ga. 240 (2009) (movement after offense may still support asportation)
Horne v. State, 298 Ga. App. 601 (2009) (factors and circumstances supporting asportation)
Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211 (2006) (required-evidence test for merger; same conduct rule)
Williams v. State, 307 Ga. App. 675 (2011) (aggravated assault and kidnapping do not merge when elements differ)
Adams v. State, 288 Ga. 695 (2011) (kidnapping for victims under 14; proportionality discussion)
Woods v. State, 279 Ga. 28 (2005) (timing of constitutional challenges and review standards)
Souder v. State, 301 Ga. App. 348 (2009) (untimely challenges to sentencing on motion for new trial)
Nuckles v. State, 207 Ga. App. 63 (1993) (timeliness and review of sentencing challenges)
Parker v. State, 220 Ga. App. 303 (1996) (procedural posture for sentencing challenges)
Gioia v. State, 307 Ga. App. 319 (2010) (merger analysis where same conduct involved but distinct elements)
Gaither v. State, 312 Ga. App. 53 (2011) (same-conduct requirement for merger analysis)
Mayberry v. State, 301 Ga. App. 503 (2009) (merger and separate elements discussion)
Gandy v. State, 290 Ga. 166 (2011) (ineffective-assistance standard under Strickland)