92 F. Supp. 3d 405
D. Md.2015Background
- Named Plaintiffs sue HMS, Margaret Hoffberger, and Michael Hoffberger under the FLSA (collective action) and MWPCA/MWHL (individual for Named Plaintiffs).
- Plaintiffs claim unpaid time for warehouse waiting, pre- and post-travel, and travel to/from job sites, plus failure to compensate for prep and related work.
- Defendants permit a van service to transport employees to job sites; employees sometimes perform warehouse work without time sheets.
- Court addresses whether such time is compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act ( §254(a) and §254(b) ) and potential contractual/custom defenses.
- The matter includes Defendants’ MSJ and Plaintiffs’ Cross-MSJ, plus a motion to strike affidavits; court issues partial grant/partial denial and requests further briefing on state-law interplay and personal liability.
- Court preliminarily finds no duty to compensate pure wait/travel time at warehouse, except where pre-travel warehouse work or post-work warehouse work occurs; waits at jobsites may be compensable in some circumstances.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is warehouse wait time compensable under §254(a)? | Wait time is integral to loading/unloading work and thus compensable. | Wait time is a preliminary/postliminary activity not integral to principal work. | Warehouse wait time not compensable as a matter of law, with exceptions for warehouse work performed or time sheets disputed. |
| Is travel time from the warehouse to jobsites compensable under §254(a)? | Travel time is compensable because it is part of the workday for loading/unloading. | Travel time is exempt commuting or post/preliminary activity; no integral/indispensable status. | Generally not compensable; exception for pre-travel warehouse work may permit recovery. |
| Is wait time at the jobsite compensable when vans arrive before trucks? | Waiting at the jobsite is integral and indispensable to performing the work. | Wait time at jobsite is not integral to principal activities unless tied to actual work. | Waiting at jobsite can be compensable if it is the principal activity necessary to perform the work; issues of material fact remain for trial. |
| Can compensation for travel time be sustained under §254(b) due to a contract or custom? | Discretionary policy or custom may require travel time payment. | No written/nonwritten contract or established custom to compensate travel time. | No §254(b) liability; no contract/custom evidence supports compensation. |
| Are Margaret Hoffberger's claims viable under the FLSA/MWPCA/MWHL given control factors? | Operational control by Hoffberger makes her an employer liable for wages. | No personal liability established; control factors insufficient. | Material fact issue on Hoffberger's operational control; summary judgment denied to allow trial. |
Key Cases Cited
- Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513 (2014) (redefines integral and indispensable to principal activities under the Portal-to-Portal Act)
- IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005) (limits compensation for activities not integral to principal duties)
- Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247 (1956) (integral and indispensable test originated here)
- Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 650 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2011) (defines integral and indispensable in Fourth Circuit context)
- Ralph v. Tidewater Construction Corp., 361 F.2d 806 (4th Cir. 1966) (travel time as exempt commuting under Portal-to-Portal Act)
- Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (recognizes compensable engagement when worker is engaged to wait)
- Bailey v. County of Georgetown, 94 F.3d 152 (4th Cir. 1996) (overtime work requires employer knowledge of overtime)
- Baker v. Barnard Const. Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 1998) (mixed questions of law and fact in §254(a) analysis)